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Introduction
Natural science tells us that the world is fundamentally physical - everything is 
ultimately constituted by physical properties and governed by physical laws. How 
do we square this picture of the world with the apparent fact that there are genuine 
causal relations at levels that aren’t described by physics? The problem of mental 
causation is at the heart of this issue.  There are probably two reasons for this. 
Firstly, if there are any non-physical properties at all, surely mental properties are 
among them. And secondly, the reality of mental causation is arguably more 
important to us than the reality of any other kind of causation. Without it, it would 
be hard for us to make sense of ourselves as agents with free will and moral 
responsibility. The main purpose of this thesis is to defend a view that accepts a 
scientific worldview and still allows for mental properties to exist, be non-physical, 
and be genuine causes of actions and behaviour. Some philosophers are pessimistic 
that all these goals can be achieved. They think that the only way for mental 
properties to fit into the causal structure of the world is if these mental properties 
are really physical properties. I do not find the argument for this view compelling. 
As I will show, it relies on an implausibly strong constraint on causes that must be 
amended. Once amended, a new position emerges, the so-called Subset view, which 
is actually motivated by the very premises that initially pushed us towards a 
reductive view of mental properties. Below is a brief summary of the main points of 
the thesis.
In chapter 1 I discuss how best to understand the doctrine of physicalism – roughly 
the view that physics provides the fundamental inventory list of the universe. There 
are two central issues associated with fleshing out this metaphor. First, we need a 
non-trivial account of what the view amounts to. And second, we need an account 
that allows for the existence of non-physical properties without giving up the claim 
that the physical has priority in some sense. As for the former, I argue that 
physicalism makes a substantial and non-trivial claim in at least two ways – one, it 
denies the existence of fundamental properties that are such that they are incapable 
of being incorporated into natural scientific theory, and two, it denies the existence 
of fundamental mental properties. As for the latter, I argue that the relationship 
between the physical and the non-physical is one of metaphysical grounding. This 
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account is in contrast to accounts that attempt to specify the relationship in modal 
terms using the notion of supervenience. This is not to deny the importance of 
supervenience when defining physicalism. While the truth of any such 
supervenience-based account is insufficient for the truth of physicalism, it is
necessary. The reason for this is that grounding has modal consequences – it entails 
supervenience. Which kind of supervenience is determined by what goes in the 
grounding-base for a given set of entities. If laws of nature are included, then the 
supervenience entailed is nomic supervenience. I discuss which kind of 
supervenience is entailed in the case of the non-physical being grounded in the 
physical and argue that, contrary to what is often expressed in the literature, the 
right answer is that it should be no stronger than a form of nomic supervenience. 
In chapter 2 I discuss a potential problem that arises from this conclusion. 
Emergentism is the view that, while the world is fundamentally physical, there are 
some non-physical properties, so-called emergent properties, which are causally 
independent, in a strong sense, from physical properties. Historically, emergentism 
has been considered an anti-physicalist position. However, it is not obvious why we 
should think that is the case given the account of physicalism I endorse in chapter 1,
since the emergentist can accept that everything non-physical is grounded in 
physical properties and the laws of nature. The solution is to further restrict what 
goes in the grounding-base for the physical. The physicalist should not allow all
laws of nature in that grounding base, only physical laws. This raises the problem of 
distinguishing physical laws from non-physical laws. In the literature, the main 
focus tends to be on the non-causal laws that connect physical properties to 
emergent properties (what the emergentists called trans-ordinal laws). However, I 
argue that it is no straightforward matter to give a criterion for physical laws that 
exclude trans-ordinal laws from being physical. Instead, the problematic laws from 
a physicalist perspective are rather the causal laws in virtue of which emergent 
properties gain their causal independence from physical properties. These laws 
should not be considered physical and so, should be excluded from the physicalist 
grounding-base for non-physical properties. When this is done, physicalists and 
emergentists can be seen to disagree on what the world is like. Emergentists claim 
that there causal powers at the level of emergent properties which are not grounded
in the physical. Physicalists, on the other hand, deny this. 
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I end chapter 2 by considering how to draw the distinction between reductive and 
non-reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalists claim the non-physical 
properties, in particular mental properties, are identical to physical properties. The 
non-reductive physicalist denies this. However, given that I stipulate physics to be 
the science of fundamental properties, it seems that reductive physicalism becomes 
the paradoxical view that physicalism is true and that mental properties are 
reducible to fundamental properties. But this cannot be right since the existence of 
fundamental mental properties would make physicalism false. I argue that what is 
needed is some less restrictive notion of physical properties. These properties can 
function as a reduction-base for mental and other non-physical properties on a 
reductive physicalist account. Such physical properties need not be fundamental but 
are nevertheless broadly physical in the sense that they can be generated directly 
from fundamental physical properties. The relations suitable to generate them are 
conjunction and disjunction, and in particular, mereological fusion. It is the latter 
that allows the reductive physicalist to locate mental properties at mereologically 
complex levels, in particular at the level of neural states. The physical properties of 
such states are composite properties, ultimately decomposable into fundamental 
physical properties. The reductive physicalist’s claim is thus that every non-
physical property is identical to a conjunction, disjunction, or mereological fusion 
of fundamental physical properties. Correspondingly, the non-reductive physicalist 
denies this. 
In chapter 3 I begin settling some terminological issues and sketching the 
metaphysical framework assumed by the thesis. Roughly, the role of properties is to 
bestow causal powers on the particulars that instantiate them. When these powers 
manifest, the property that bestows them is causally efficacious, or simply a cause. 
This leads to a presentation of the Exclusion problem for mental properties. The 
Exclusion problem is a paradox consisting of four individually motivated, yet 
jointly incompatible statements. First, the claim that there is mental causation. Few 
facts seem as obvious as this one. Surely, what we do is frequently a causal result of 
what we want, believe, hope, fear, etc. Second, the claim the world is causally 
closed at the physical level. What this means is that every physical effect has a 
sufficient physical cause. This is backed up by the success of science, which 
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indicates that there are complete physical causal explanations of all physical effects. 
Third, the claim that, as a rule, no effect has more than a single sufficient cause. In 
other words, if a property is a sufficient cause of an effect, then all other properties 
are excluded from being causes of this effect. This is known as the Exclusion 
principle. The Exclusion principle is typically motivated by principles of 
ontological simplicity. And lastly, the claim that mental and physical properties are 
distinct, which is established by the argument from multiple realization. Any three 
of these claims can be used to establish the denial of the fourth. In particular, if we 
accept that there is mental causation, that every physical effect has a sufficient 
physical cause, and that these effects have no other causes, then it follows that 
mental and physical properties cannot be distinct. This is known as the Exclusion 
argument for reductive physicalism. 
The remainder of chapter 3 is largely devoted to a discussion of the so-called 
Drainage problem. If the Exclusion argument is sound, it seems that causal powers 
drain from higher to lower levels of mereological complexity – for instance, the 
effects caused by some higher-level broadly physical composite properties are also 
caused by the sum of the lower-level fundamental physical properties of which they 
are composed. This line of thought has devastating consequences if we accept that it 
is a contingent matter whether there are any fundamental properties at all. Perhaps 
the world decomposes endlessly with each level being more fundamental relative to 
the level above it. If so, causal powers would drain away into a bottomless hole and 
there would be no causation anywhere. I discuss various ways in which the 
proponent of the Exclusion argument can respond to this problem and ultimately 
argue that the only solution is to allow that higher-level composite properties have 
the very same causal powers as the sum of lower-level properties that compose 
them. This leads to an amendment of the claim that, as a rule, effects do not have 
more than a single sufficient cause. In many cases they do and what is common to 
these cases is that the various sufficient causes of a certain effect are causes in 
virtue of manifesting the very same causal power. I call this weak 
overdetermination.
In chapter 4 I consider how this conclusion can be applied to mental properties. If 
the causal powers of any mental property are also powers had by some physical 
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property, then they could both be allowed as sufficient causes of physical 
behaviour, even if these properties are distinct. This potential solution to the 
Exclusion problem is endorsed by the so-called Subset view for mental properties –
the view that the causal powers of any mental property forms a proper non-empty 
subset of the powers of some physical property. I present Sydney Shoemaker’s 
version of the Subset view, consider to what extent it is a physicalist view, and 
argue that it solves the Exclusion problem (though not exactly in the way 
Shoemaker himself suggests). While Shoemaker endorses certain controversial 
claims regarding the nature of causation and mental properties, I argue that these 
are not necessary commitments of the proponent of the Subset view. Rather, once 
the Exclusion principle is amended to allow for weak overdetermination, the Subset 
view is motivated by the very statements that supported reductionism about mental 
properties. At the same time, this removes the main motivation for popular 
reductive views. I end the chapter by considering some potential limits of the 
Subset view.
In chapter 5 I defend the Subset view against an objection according to which the 
Subset view solves the original Exclusion problem only on pain of creating another. 
The objection is the following: Even if we allow that effects can be overdetermined 
in the way suggested by the Subset view, we should not allow that the causal 
powers of objects are overdetermined by distinct properties as this would be 
ontologically unparsimonious. Since it is a central claim of the Subset view that the 
mental powers of an individual are determined by both mental and physical 
properties, the Subset view should be rejected as a consequence. I argue that this 
objection is based on new version of the Exclusion principle which we have little 
reason to accept. The reason is that some causal powers cannot help but be 
overdetermined by distinct properties. Hence, it cannot be a problem that the Subset 
view incorporates such overdetermination of powers. I end by expressing some 
general worries about the value of arguments from ontological parsimony.
In chapter 6 I argue that two current alternative non-reductive solutions to the 
Exclusion are either inferior to the Subset view or unlikely to work at all. The first 
is a solution according to which we should give up the claim that every physical 
effect has sufficient physical cause. Some effects are exclusively caused by mental 
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properties, though for any such effect there is a physical property which is causally 
sufficient for it. I discuss how the empirical evidence is arguably insufficient to rule 
out this possibility, though I ultimately reject it on the grounds that it, unlike the 
Subset view, leaves psychophysical supervenience a mystery. The second proposed 
solution is based on a trope theory of properties and claims that while reductionism 
is true for mental tropes, it is false for mental types. This makes it unmysterious 
how mental tropes can be causes in a world that is causally closed at the physical 
level, while still maintaining that mental and physical types are distinct. I discuss 
whether a trope can be of several distinct types and answer that it can only be so to 
the extent that the types in questions are individuated along the same dimensions 
(the so-called determination dimensions for properties). Unfortunately, we have 
good reasons for thinking that mental and physical types are individuated along 
different dimensions. This means that a trope cannot be of both a mental and a 
physical type, and this blocks the kind of psychophysical trope-reduction endorsed 
by the trope solution. Hence, the Exclusion problem is left unsolved.
In the end, I conclude that the Subset view presents an attractive theory of the 
relationship between mental and physical properties and an attractive solution to the 
problem of mental causation. 
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Chapter 1
Defining Physicalism
Abstract: In this chapter I discuss how best to define physicalism. I 
argue that a definition in terms of grounding is superior to a 
definition in terms of supervenience, but that some form of 
supervenience is entailed by the grounding relation. In the end, I 
argue that, for purposes of defining physicalism, the supervenience 
entailed is a form of nomic supervenience. 
1.1 Introduction
Physicalism is often said to be view that there is nothing over and above the 
physical with one of the debates over physicalism being over how to flesh out this 
slogan.1 Typically, this is framed in terms of properties. Hence, the physicalist 
slogan: 
(Slogan): There are no properties over and above physical properties.
Considering the physicalist slogan, two questions are particularly salient. First, what 
is it for a property to be physical? And second, what is it for a property to be 
nothing over and above physical properties? Starting with the former question, a 
plausible answer is that physics, the natural science, tells us which properties are 
physical.  
(Physical): A property is physical iff it is a property posited by physics.2
Coupled with the physicalist slogan this gives us a starting point for a definition of 
physicalism:
(Physicalism1): There are no properties over and above the properties posited by 
physics.
                                               
1 See for instance Dowell [2006], p. 26, Chalmers [1996], p. 41, Howell [2009], p. 83, Jackson 
[1998], p. 9, Wilson [2005], p. 426.
2 Roughly, a property is a posit of physics if the predicate that refers to it is a part of physical theory.
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Physicalism about other entities such as objects or events I take to be derivative of 
this definition. For instance, physicalism about objects is the view that every object 
in the actual world has only physical properties or properties that are nothing over 
and above physical properties, and physicalism about events is the view that every 
event in the actual world has only physical properties or properties that are nothing 
over and above physical properties.
1.2 Physics
Roughly, and without getting too bogged down in issues from the philosophy of 
science, physics we may take to be defined by its methodology (which includes 
empirical experiments, inductive reasoning, reproducibility, and so on) and its 
subject matter, which are the fundamental entities in the world. The former it shares 
with other natural sciences, the latter is unique to physics. Thus, physics here is to 
be understood as fundamental physics. Correspondingly, the properties posited by 
physics might be called fundamental physical properties. For now, however, I will 
simply refer to them as physical properties. Later on it will be necessary to make 
more fine-grained distinctions. Focusing on properties, physics is thus the science 
that is in the business of uncovering the fundamental properties in the world and 
their interactions, using a certain method distinctive of natural science. Thus, other 
special scientific disciplines use the same method, but treat only non-fundamental 
properties. Properties that are incorporable into scientific theories I will call 
scientific properties. Properties that are not I will call unscientific properties. As for 
fundamentality, we may take that to mean something along the lines of: not 
dependent for its existence on any other property (or properties), where the relevant 
form of dependence is metaphysical rather than causal. I will say more about this 
later.
One thing to note is that on this understanding of physics, many scientific 
disciplines typically thought of as being part of physics, will count as special 
scientific. For instance, assuming that atoms and their properties are non-
fundamental, atomic physics will count as a special science. This, however, poses 
no problem for my account. For the purpose of defining physicalism, the important 
point is that we have a distinction between science that treats fundamental 
properties and those that do not. Whether one prefers to cash that out in terms of 
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physics versus other natural sciences, or in terms of fundamental physics versus 
other natural sciences, some of which will be disciplines of non-fundamental 
physics, is a terminological dispute. I prefer the former since it avoids the question 
of what delineates non-fundamental physics from other special sciences (on my 
account there simply is no such thing as non-fundamental physics), but my account 
can easily be translated into an account that opts for the latter. Simply replace talk 
of physics and its posits, with talk of fundamental physics and its posits. 
1.3 Being Physical and Hempel’s Dilemma
The definition of physical properties above gives rise to Hempel’s Dilemma. The 
first horn of the dilemma is this: If physicalists base their physicalism on the 
properties postulated by current physics, physicalism is almost certainly false, as 
current physics and the list of properties it posits is bound to be revised in the light 
of new scientific discoveries. To most, this is taken as a decisive blow against 
basing physicalism on the posits of current physics.3 The obvious alternative is to 
look ahead and base physicalism on the properties postulated by future completed 
physics. Such a list would not be open to revision (given that the physics providing 
it is complete). Hence, we might define physical properties as those being posited 
by completed physics:
(Physical2): A property is physical iff it is a property posited by completed 
physics.
This definition, however, runs afoul of the second horn of the dilemma. As Alyssa 
Ney puts it, if physicalism is based on the properties postulated by completed 
physics, “the view is trivial since, in order to become complete, physics will of 
course expand as much as it has to in order to cover all phenomena, even if this 
means in the end positing irreducible mental entities”.4 This, however, cannot be 
quite right. If the subject matter of physics is the domain of fundamental properties, 
and physics goes about discovering these properties using a certain scientific 
method, there are two kinds of properties left out of the story told by completed 
                                               
3 Andrew Melnyk is one of the few that has defended such a strategy. See Melnyk [1997] and 
Wilson [2006] for some problems with this defense.
4 Ney [2008], p. 2.
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physics. First, completed physics will not expand beyond the domain of 
fundamental properties, and second, completed physics will be silent about 
fundamental properties that are undetectable using the methods of science or 
detectable but incapable of being incorporated into scientific theory.5 Hence, it is 
wrong to suggest, as Ney does, that complete physics must cover all phenomena. 
This response, however, does not yet effectively deal with the second horn of 
Hempel’s Dilemma. As Ney also points out, completed physics may end up 
positing mental properties, not because it must do so to cover all phenomena, but 
because mental properties may turn out to be fundamental. Now, if physicalism is 
unconditionally based on the properties postulated by completed physics this means 
that physicalism is compatible with mentality being fundamental. This suggests a 
different way in which physicalism based on completed physics is threatened by 
triviality - physicalism would be trivialized in the sense that it fails to contrast with 
paradigm examples of anti-physicalist positions. For instance, take Cartesian or 
strong property dualism to be the view that the domain of fundamental properties is 
bifurcated between mental and non-mental properties that causally interact.6 It 
certainly seems possible (though at present unlikely) that completed physics will 
end up vindicating such a view. And if so, physicalism as defined above and based 
on the properties postulated by completed physics would be compatible with 
Cartesian dualism. Of course, accepting this does not make physicalism wholly 
trivial. Physicalism still contrasts with positions that involve fundamental properties 
which, for some reason, cannot be incorporated into physical theory as such 
properties naturally wouldn’t be part of the posits of completed physics. It just fails 
to contrast with all the positions we thought it did. 
Some philosophers have accepted that, in principle at least, physicalism is 
compatible with such strong forms of dualism. J. L. Dowell, for instance, bases her 
physicalism on the posits of future completed physics and requires only that the 
fundamental properties that this physics posit must be capable of being incorporated 
into theories in a way which respects, as she calls it, “the hallmarks of scientific 
                                               
5 Detectability can here be both direct and indirect. The most obvious example of an undetectable 
property would a property with no causal powers.
6 Put aside the fact that Descartes himself was a substance dualist, not a property dualist.
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theories”.7 In other words, a fundamental property, mental or otherwise, which fails 
to be incorporable into scientific theories, will not count as physical on Dowell’s 
account. Her example of such a property is one which bestows miraculous powers, 
for instance the property being an angel. No further constraints are needed on what 
is to count as physical, according to Dowell. In particular, “if no actual mental 
property is among the basic physical ones, as it seems overwhelmingly likely, that’s 
a matter to be settled a posteriori”.8
Others disagree. Jessica Wilson, for instance, makes the point that:
Given that physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine, then while […] the
physics-based boundaries of the physical may stretch, they cannot stretch 
so far as to encompass fundamental mentality. Hence physicalists (and 
their rivals) have good reason to impose the NFM (no fundamental 
mentality) constraint on their operative account of the physical.9
Wilson has two reasons for imposing this additional constraint. First, a version of 
physicalism imposing a no fundamental mentality constraint (henceforth a NFM 
constraint) on the physical guarantees, contra a form of physicalism based on 
Dowell’s account of the physical, that physicalism will be distinct from its 
traditional rivals, in particular certain forms of dualism or idealism. This is 
important in so far as, historically, physicalism, and its ancestor materialism, have 
been partly defined as being in opposition to dualism and idealism. Secondly, the 
philosophical interest in defining the physical is in large part driven by a desire to 
formulate and motivate the mind-body problem, understood as the problem of 
seeing how mentality can arise or have its place in a world that is fundamentally 
non-mental. But if mentality is, in principle, allowed in the domain of fundamental 
physical properties, then a formulation of the mind-body problem in terms of the 
physical versus the mental is no good and would dissolve the mind-body problem, 
rather than motivate it. Hence, an account of the physical which guarantees that the 
physical is non-mental is preferable. 
                                               
7 Dowell [2006], p. 26.
8 Dowell [2006], p. 28.
9 Wilson [2006], p. 70.
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Of these two reasons, the former seems to me to carry the greater weight. After all, 
it might just be that the mind-body problem should not be framed in terms of the 
physical versus the mental. Furthermore, should it turn out that there are 
fundamental mental properties, the mind-body problem as it has been traditionally 
understood would presumably be rejected as illegitimate seeing that, contrary to 
what is at present assumed, the mind does not arise from something fundamentally 
non-mental. In other words, assuming that an account of the physical must motivate 
the mind-body problem is begging the question against Dowell’s account. What 
seems unlikely however, is that physicalists in general would accept that their 
position is compatible with dualism, or would continue to label themselves as 
physicalists should dualism be vindicated by future physics.10 This suggests that 
Wilson is ultimately right in thinking that a NFM constraint is needed in some form 
or another. Now, this does not yet decisively settle the issue in favour of Wilson, as 
one can accept Dowell’s account of the physical and impose the NFM constraint on 
physicalism itself, rather than the definition of physical properties. In this case, 
physicalism would be the view that there are no properties over and above the 
properties posited by completed physics, and that no mental property is a physical 
property. And following Wilson’s reasons for having the NFM constraint in the first 
place, this seems to be the more natural option. After all, the claim is that it is a 
defining feature of physicalism and its history that it is opposed to fundamental 
mentality, not a defining feature of the posits of physics. This also avoids the 
peculiar result that physics could end up positing properties that are not physical. I 
therefore endorse an account of physicalism which, following Wilson, imposes a 
NFM constrain, however, I suggest that it is best imposed on the definition of 
physicalism itself rather than the definition of the physical. Our starting point for a 
definition of physicalism therefore needs to be slightly amended:
(Physicalism2): 
There are no properties over and above the properties posited by completed 
physics, and no mental property is a physical property.11  
                                               
10 Wilson mentions some of these in Wilson [2006], p. 70. See also Joseph Levine [2001], p. 70 and 
David Papineau [2001], p. 12. 
11 A less discussed version of Hempel’s Dilemma would be one that targets the methodology of 
physics. The first horn of the dilemma is this: The methodology of current science may turn out to be 
ineffective or insufficient, and will eventually be replaced by different methods that allow us to gain 
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1.4 Do Fundamental Chemical or Biological Properties Falsify 
Physicalism?
One might worry that other posits of completed physics would falsify physicalism 
in the same way the discovery of fundamental mental properties would. For 
instance, would it not be equally problematic for physicalism if completed physics 
posits fundamental chemical or biological properties? And so, should we not then 
amend the definition of physicalism to exclude fundamental chemical or biological 
properties as well? Wilson argues that since, in fact, chemical and biological 
properties are ontologically dependent on physical properties this question can be 
put aside.12 But this is too quick since a definition of physicalism should be 
independent of how the actual world is. Even if we assume that it is beyond dispute 
that chemical and biological properties are non-fundamental, there is still a question 
of whether or not this must necessarily be so for physicalism to be true. Wilson may 
think that what it would take for physicalism to be true is, among other things, for 
chemical and biological properties to be non-fundamental, but if so she should 
endorse a ‘no fundamental chemical or biological properties’ clause in addition to 
NFM. The worry is that this makes physicalism an unsystematic or ad hoc position. 
My own view is that there is no need to impose a clause that rules out fundamental 
chemical or biological properties. There are three reasons for this. Before giving 
them, however, it is useful to first introduce the so-called ‘levels view’ according to 
which reality can be stratified following the axioms of mereology. At the bottom we 
have the level of mereological atoms, what I will call micro-objects, i.e. the smallest 
objects in the world. As we move up through the levels, the compositional 
complexity increases. We find elementary particles, then atoms, then molecules, 
then cells, then tables and chairs, and so on. With this picture in mind we can 
                                                                                                                                  
complete and accurate knowledge of the world and its properties. Perhaps these methods of future 
science will even be radically different from the methods of current science. So if physicalism is 
committed to the claim that the fundamental properties of the world can be exhaustively described 
using the methods of current science, physicalism is almost certainly wrong. This, however, leads to 
the second horn. If the physicalist gives up the claim that the world is fundamentally such that it can 
be completely and accurately described using the methods of current science, all she is left with is 
the negative claim that there are no mental properties among the fundamental properties. While 
some philosophers embrace such a purely negative definition of physical properties, at least for some 
purposes (see for instance Spurrett & Papineau [1999]), I do not find out of the question to simply 
deny the first horn of the dilemma. After all, current scientific methodology has proven much more 
stable than current scientific theories. Science textbooks can become outdated in a few years, while 
most of the central features of current scientific methodology have been in place for centuries. 
12 Wilson [2006], p. 75.
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distinguish physicalism simpliciter from a specific form of physicalism, micro-
physicalism. Micro-physicalism is physicalism with the added claim that the 
fundamental properties posited by completed physics will all be properties of 
micro-objects. Micro-physicalism is a popular form of physicalism, so much so that 
it is sometimes taken for granted as being physicalism simpliciter. As an example, 
consider Michael Tye’s description of physicalism:
Physicalism, in its most general form, is the thesis that no nonphysical 
ingredients are needed to account for anything in the actual world: the 
physical ingredients alone suffice […].  Indeed, the microphysical
ingredients alone suffice.  Once the microphysical facts about the world 
are fixed, everything else in the world is automatically determined.13
But chemical and biological properties, whether fundamental or not, are not 
properties of the smallest objects in the world so should they turn out to be 
fundamental, micro-physicalism would be false, as the micro-physical alone would 
not suffice to account for everything in the world. The first reason why physicalism 
need not exclude fundamental chemical or biological properties then is this: If some 
indeed have the intuition that fundamental chemical or biological properties would 
falsify physicalism, this can be partly accommodated by the fact that such 
properties would falsify micro-physicalism. And this, I suggest, is enough to 
explain the intuition (if indeed it is an intuition) that physicalism would be falsified 
by the discovery of fundamental chemical or biological properties. Second reason: 
The historical considerations which tell against the compatibility of fundamental 
mentality and physicalism are not present to the same extent in the case of chemical 
and biological properties, as few have ever wanted to posit the existence of such 
fundamental properties.14 Hence, the historical development of physicalism has not 
been one in which physicalism has defined itself in contrast with such views, at 
least not to the extent that physicalism has defined itself in contrast to views that 
accept fundamental mentality. Third reason: it seems possible that the actual world 
is gunky, i.e. is such that any part of it has proper parts. Framing things in terms of 
levels, this is equivalent to there being no lowest or bottom level. But if any part of 
                                               
13 Tye [2009], p. 25
14 It could be argued that the British Emergentists posited fundamental chemical and biological 
properties, and that physicalism is historically as opposed to emergentism as it is to mind-body 
dualism. I think it is questionable whether the emergentists did in fact posit fundamental chemical 
and biological properties. I will return to this question in the next chapter. 
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the world itself has proper parts, then there are no micro-objects and hence no 
objects to have micro-properties. And this means micro-physicalism would be false 
in a gunky world.15 The truth of micro-physicalism then depends on the world being 
non-gunky. But does the truth of physicalism also depend on the world being non-
gunky? This seems like the kind of question physicalism should be neutral about. If 
there are fundamental properties at some levels, if these properties are scientific, 
and if none are them are mental, that should be good enough for physicalism.16 17
1.5 Physicalism and Being ‘Nothing over and Above’
So far, our definition of physicalism tells us that physicalism is true if and only if all 
properties are nothing over and above the properties posited by completed physics, 
and no mental property is a physical property. What is it for a property (or a set of 
properties) to be nothing over and above another property (or set of properties)? 
Our definition of physical properties restricts the possible answers to this question. 
In particular, it rules out the most obvious interpretation, namely that all properties 
might be nothing over and above physical properties in the sense that all properties 
are identical to physical properties. If this is our interpretation of the ‘nothing over 
and above’ locution, physicalism would be a radically eliminativist position, in so 
far as it is unlikely that most properties around us, such as being a table, being a 
person, being a mountain, and being a philosophy department, will ever turn out to 
be among the fundamental properties posited by physics. And while some 
physicalists, perhaps, would be happy to embrace the conclusion that such 
properties do not exist, it would obviously be wrong to expect all physicalists to do 
                                               
15 It might be objected that micro-physicalism need not be committed to the claim that fundamental 
properties are properties of micro-objects. Instead, micro-physicalism may only entail the weaker 
view that fundamental properties are properties of objects below a certain level of compositional 
complexity, for instance below the level of atoms. In this case, micro-physicalism can be true in a 
gunky world. This may be Wilson’s view since she endorses the claim that “the physical entities are 
those existing at relatively low orders of complexity” (Wilson [2006], fn. 1), though she may just 
take that as a contingent fact about physical entities. In any case, even if micro-physicalism is 
defined in this way, it gives us no compelling reason to think that micro-physicalism is identical to 
physicalism simpliciter. In fact, it seems ad hoc to take it as a conceptual truth about physics that it 
treats only properties below a, more or less arbitrary, level.
16 The related possibility of there being no fundamental properties, and not just no bottom level, is 
more troublesome. It is helpful, however, to postpone a treatment of this issue until after the notion 
of ‘nothing over and above’-ness has been fleshed out. 
17 For some further reasons why physicalism need not be micro-physicalism see Hüttemann [2004] 
and Papineau [2008].
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so.18 As an alternative to identity, physicalists have looked to supervenience as a 
notion that will allow them to cash out ‘nothing over and above’ in a non-
eliminativist way. Supervenient properties, the claim is, need not be identical to 
their subvenient base-properties, yet in some important sense, they are nothing over 
and above those. If so, we can flesh out the physicalist slogan in the following way:
(Physicalism3): 
Every property is either a property posited by completed physics or a 
property supervenient on physical properties, and no mental property is a 
physical property.
How is supervenience defined? The standard definition of supervenience goes like 
this: 
(Standard Supervenience):
A standardly supervenes on B if and only if, for any two objects x and y, if x
and y are indiscernible with respect to B, they are indiscernible with respect 
to A.19
A and B are usually taken to be sets of properties, though this is not an essential 
assumption. Supervenience is a relation that can hold between other kinds of 
entities as well. Which objects are quantified over? If the domain contains objects 
in all possible worlds, the definition gives us strong supervenience. And if the 
objects in the domain are entire possible worlds, the definition gives us global 
supervenience.20 There is an abundance of philosophical literature on how to define 
supervenience and on whether or not supervenience of the non-physical on the 
physical (henceforth NP-P supervenience) can adequately support a physicalist 
                                               
18 To my mind, the notion of being ‘nothing over and above’ comes with such strong reductionist 
connotations, which many physicalists would reject, that the phrase is not particularly well chosen to 
describe the relationship between the physical and the non-physical. This is mainly a linguistic 
squabble though, and well chosen or not, the notion seems fairly ingrained in the literature by now. 
19 Indiscernibility is here with respect to all the features of A and B. In particular, if A and B are 
properties, the indiscernibility should be with respect to both instantiations and powers. 
20 If the domain contains objects in the same world, the definition gives us weak supervenience. It is 
generally agreed, however, that weak supervenience is too weak to be of use for the physicalist. For 
instance, a dualist can agree that any two objects in our world with the same physical properties will 
have the same mental properties.
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metaphysics.21 First and foremost, there is a worry that NP-P supervenience is not 
sufficient for physicalism. This is due to positions that are typically thought of as 
anti-physicalist positions, but which could nevertheless endorse NP-P 
supervenience. For instance, Moorean non-naturalism arguably includes the claim 
that moral properties supervene on natural properties, and British Emergentism 
arguably includes the claim that mental and chemical properties supervene on 
physical properties.22 But Moorean non-naturalism and British Emergentism are 
typically seen as examples of positions that are in opposition to physicalism. The 
underlying general point here is to the effect that supervenience might just express 
necessary co-variation between properties, and not track the kind of substantial 
metaphysical dependence of the non-physical on the physical that the physicalist is 
looking to endorse. As Jaegwon Kim says: 
Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation. It is not a “deep” 
metaphysical relation; rather, it is a surface relation that reports a pattern 
of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting 
dependence relation which might explain it.23
Perhaps the supervenience relation can be modified in such a way that it, at least for 
most practical intents and purposes, will track metaphysical dependence. However, 
even if this is so, there is something backwards about approaching the issue in this 
manner. After all, supervenience is appropriate for formulating physicalism, only in 
so far as the relation is able to track an underlying metaphysical relation which 
ensures that the non-physical depends on the physical in the right way. As Kim 
says, supervenience is at best a symptom of a deeper metaphysical relation which 
explains why the supervenience holds. So as a starting point, it would be more 
natural to define physicalism directly in terms of such a metaphysical relation. 
1.6 From Supervenience Physicalism to Grounding Physicalism
Some philosophers have done just that. For instance, Melnyk advocates what he 
calls realization physicalism.24 His claim is that everything that exists is either 
                                               
21 See for instance Bailey [1998], Bennett [2004], Horgan [1993], Jack [1994], Moser & Trout 
[1995], and Wilson [2005].
22 For a defense of this, see Horgan [1993].
23 Kim [2003a], p. 167.
24 See Melnyk [2003].
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physical or realized by the physical and that the truth of this claim is at least 
sufficient for physicalism. Here the realization relation is supposed to be a relation 
of metaphysical dependence. Another example is Douglas Ehring’s part-whole 
physicalism. Here the view is that mental properties are exhaustively composed of 
physical properties.25 Ehring achieves this in a framework where property-instances 
are abstract particulars, or tropes, and property-types are sets or classes of tropes. 
According to Ehring, classes of tropes making out mental types will be exhaustively 
composed of (or have as subsets) sets of tropes making out physical types. In other 
words, mental properties are literally composed of physical properties and hence, 
the relation between physical and mental properties is a part-whole relation.26
But while we may agree that realization and composition are examples of the kind 
of metaphysical dependence relation the physicalist is after, when trying to express 
the relation between the physical and non-physical, it is problematic to define 
physicalism in terms of any of those specific relations. Where definitions in terms 
of supervenience have the problem that their truth is not sufficient for the truth of 
physicalism, definitions in terms of realization or composition have the problem 
that their truth is not necessary for the truth of physicalism. You can reject that the 
physical realize or compose the non-physical and still be a physicalist. Whereas a 
supervenience-based definition of physicalism has the problem that it is not specific 
enough and would allow positions that, intuitively, are non-physicalist to count as 
physicalist positions, introducing notions of realization or composition to describe 
the relationship between the physical and the non-physical makes the corresponding 
definition of physicalism too specific to be of use as a general definition of 
physicalism that all and only physicalists should accept. Is there a more general 
notion of dependence that can be of help to the physicalist? I think there is and it is 
the notion of grounding as it is used by Jonathan Schaffer. According to Schaffer, 
grounding is a primitive relation of metaphysical dependence, which can be used to 
define the notion of fundamentality and non-fundamentality:
(Fundamentality): A property is fundamental iff it is ungrounded.
                                               
25 See Ehring [2003]. Ehring focuses his discussion on mental properties though presumably his 
account can be extended to apply to other non-physical properties as well. 
26 I will discuss a version of this view in more detail in chap. 6.
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(Non-fundamentality): A property is non-fundamental iff it is grounded.27
Being primitive, the grounding relation itself cannot be analysed in terms of any 
deeper metaphysical relations. Nevertheless, according to Schaffer, there are “clear 
examples” of it. For instance, it is the relation that holds between: “(i) the entity and 
its singleton, (ii) the Swiss cheese and its holes, (iii) natural features and moral 
features, (iv) sparse properties and abundant properties, and (v) truthmakers and 
truths.”28 And intuitively, it is also the relation that holds between the physical and 
the non-physical if physicalism is true. An advantage of such a view is that it 
directly captures the spirit of physicalism that supervenience was introduced to 
indirectly capture, namely that the physical is fundamental and metaphysically 
primary, and that the non-physical is non-fundamental and metaphysically 
dependent on the physical. In other words, the grounding relation can replace the 
notion of being nothing over and above used in the definition of physicalism above, 
which gives us the following definition of what we can call grounding physicalism:
(Physicalism4): Every property is either a property posited by completed 
physics or a property grounded in those properties, and no 
fundamental property is a mental property.
Or, given the definition of grounding, alternatively (and simpler):
(Physicalism5): Completed physics provide a list of all fundamental 
properties and no fundamental property is a mental 
property.29
                                               
27 Schaffer [2009], p. 373. Note that the terminology differs slightly from Schaffer’s in that his 
definitions of fundamentality and non-fundamentality are not limited to properties but covers all 
entities. 
28 Schaffer [2009], p. 375.
29 What if physicalism, thus defined, is true and there are unscientific but non-fundamental
properties? Would this not contradict the spirit of physicalism, and does this not show the definition 
to be inadequate? Two responses: First, it might be argued that unscientific non-fundamental 
properties would not strictly speaking falsify physicalism, though they would falsify something like 
naturalism (which is plausibly the view that all properties are scientific). Second, and this is the 
response I am inclined to go for, we may assume that properties grounded in scientific properties are 
themselves necessarily scientific. Then the scenario described is impossible.
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Given that physics is the science of fundamental properties and fundamentality is 
defined in terms of grounding, (Physicalism5) is equivalent to (Physicalism4). From 
this, we can see that physicalism can fail for two reasons. First, physicalism fails if 
there are fundamental mental properties. And second, physicalism fails if there are 
fundamental properties not posited by completed physics (whether these are mental 
or not). This would be the case if there are fundamental unscientific properties, i.e. 
fundamental properties which are undetectable using scientific methodology, or 
detectable but otherwise not incorporable into scientific theory. For now, I will call 
such properties whose existence falsifies physicalism (fundamental mental 
properties and unscientific properties), anti-physicalist properties.30
While I believe a grounding definition of physicalism captures the physicalist’s 
commitments better than a supervenience-based definition, I also think it must be 
admitted that no definition will be completely univocal and rule out all grey areas. 
‘Physicalism’ is a term of art with vague boundaries, so for some possibilities, we 
should accept there is no universally agreed upon fact of the matter as to whether or 
not they are acceptable from a physicalist perspective. For instance, say that 
completed physics reveals that properties of elementary particles are indeed the 
fundamental properties of the world. Would physicalism then be falsified if some 
properties of atoms turned out to be mental? According to the definition of 
grounding physicalism above, it would not (assuming atomic properties are 
grounded in the properties of subatomic particles). And perhaps some physicalists 
would happily accept this if it could be shown how the elementary particles which 
compose atoms ground, say, intentionality. Then again, others might think that the 
idea of mentality at the atomic level is an unacceptably anti-physicalist idea. Note 
that while the concepts employed in our definition of physicalism may themselves 
be vague, this does not account for the disagreement over atomic mentality. For 
                                               
30 A distinction can be made between what we can call restricted and unrestricted physicalism. 
Unrestricted physicalism makes a claim about all properties, both physical and non-physical. It says 
that there are no mental properties among the physical properties and that all non-physical properties 
are scientific. This is the kind of physicalism I have been concerned with so far in this chapter. 
However, physicalism might hold for a restricted class of properties. For instance, one may be a 
physicalist about chemical properties, while still holding that unrestricted physicalism is false, 
perhaps because one believes there are fundamental mental properties. Restricted physicalism, I 
believe, is best interpreted as the view that the class of non-physical properties about which one is a 
physicalist, is ultimately grounded in nothing but physical non-mental properties. If so, restricted 
physicalism about class of non-physical properties C allows that there are anti-physicalist properties, 
it just denies that any of them are in the grounding base for the properties in C.
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instance, two philosophers can decide on a non-vague definition of ‘physics’ and 
‘fundamental’, and still disagree about whether or not atomic mentality is 
compatible with physicalism. Of course, if our grounding definition of physicalism 
is compatible with atomic mentality, anyone thinking atomic mentality is ruled out 
by physicalism will think this definition is not sufficient for physicalism. Perhaps 
such a philosopher would want to add on to the definition that mentality can only be 
a property of objects above a certain level of mereological complexity, and that 
atoms fail to reach this level.31 So be it. Adding on this further condition on 
physicalism won’t improve our definition, as it will merely lead to other 
philosophers rejecting it as too strong. We simply have to accept that for certain 
scenarios, different philosophers will have different opinions over whether these are 
compatible with physicalism. 
1.7 What if there are no Fundamental Properties?
Having settled the question of how best to understand the notion of a set of 
properties being nothing over and above another, as it is used in the definition of 
physicalism, we are in a better position to deal with the possibility of there being no 
fundamental properties. Say that a world is such that every level is dependent on a 
level immediately below it. It follows from this that there is no bottom level in such 
a world and that there is no level of fundamental properties. In such a world, there 
would not only be no completed physics (since every level is grounded in a 
relatively more fundamental level, the project of physics would be never-ending), 
physics would simply have no subject matter. (Physicalism4) would then be false (if 
there are no fundamental properties, non-fundamental properties are not grounded 
in them).32 Is this unacceptable? I think not. First, recall that the notion of physics 
utilised in the definition of physical properties and physicalism is that of 
fundamental physics. It’s a trivial point that there is no such thing as fundamental 
physics if there are no fundamental properties, so if the physical and physicalism is 
best defined in terms of fundamental physics, it should be a trivial point that there is 
                                               
31 I argued before that fundamental chemical and biological properties would not falsify physicalism. 
I stand by this argument though I won’t put up much of a fuss if someone were to insist that this 
issue belongs in the grey area between physicalism and non-physicalism.
32 Whether (Physicalism5) would be false depends on what one takes the truthvalue to be of 
sentences that involve reference-failure (completed physics have no reference in a world with no 
fundamental properties). For this reason, it is probably best to see (Physicalism5) as equivalent to 
(Physicalism4) only in worlds with fundamental properties. 
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nothing physical and that physicalism is false if there are no fundamental properties. 
Of course, this does not mean that dualism or idealism is true in such a world. Such 
views require fundamental mentality and if there are no fundamental properties 
there are no fundamental mental properties either. However, certain counterpart 
views of physicalism, dualism, idealism, and other positions that are defined in 
terms of fundamental properties, may hold true in a world with no fundamental 
properties. As a first stab at defining a counterpart version of physicalism, consider 
again a world with no bottom level and no fundamental properties. Assume that at a 
certain level, say the chemical level, all properties are non-mental and scientific, 
and that the same is the case for all properties at every level below it. In other 
words, when moving down levels we will eventually reach a point (in the case 
described, the chemical level) after which all properties are non-mental and 
scientific.33 While physicalism is false in such a world (on my account of 
physicalism), the scenario described is still revealing as it undoubtedly captures the 
scientistic spirit of physicalism. After all, in the world described, all of reality 
would bottom out in (an infinitely long line of) purely scientific, non-mental 
properties. ‘Naturalism’ would perhaps be the best term to describe what holds true 
in this world, since everything is grounded in some scientific, or natural, non-
mental properties, which themselves are grounded in relatively more fundamental 
scientific, non-mental properties, and so on, ad infinitum.
In a world with no fundamental properties, the counterpart to idealism, traditionally 
the view that reality is fundamentally mental, would plausibly be the contrary view 
– that when moving down levels, we will eventually reach a point after which all 
properties are mental. The counterpart to dualism, traditionally the view that the 
fundamental properties include both mental and physical properties, would 
plausible be the view that one part of reality bottoms out in mental properties and 
another part bottoms out in scientific non-mental properties. So rather than reality 
consisting in one hierarchy of levels, it would consist in two. In one hierarchy, 
when moving down levels, we will eventually reach a level after which all 
properties are mental. In the other, we will eventually reach a level after which all 
                                               
33 The example is due to Barbara Montero [2006]. On her account of physicalism, a world with 
nothing but scientific mental properties below a certain level is a world in which physicalism is true. 
While I disagree, the scenario she describes is still revealing.
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properties are scientific and non-mental. I am not sure which terms best describe 
such counterpart views to idealism and dualism.
1.8 Grounding and Supervenience
As mentioned earlier, a grounding-based formulation of physicalism has an 
advantage over a supervenience-based formulation, in that it directly explicates the 
physicalist’s commitments. Furthermore, putting aside the question of whether or 
not supervenience-based definitions of physicalism are compatible with anti-
physicalist positions, Schaffer gives two additional reasons why supervenience does 
not track grounding. First, supervenience is reflexive and can hold symmetrically, 
while grounding is irreflexive and always asymmetric. For instance, if A and B are 
identical, A supervenes on B (and vice versa) following the standard definition of 
supervenience, yet nothing grounds itself according to Schaffer, so B does not 
ground A (nor vice versa). Secondly, necessary entities, say numbers, trivially 
supervene on any and all entities, yet necessary entities need not be grounded in any 
nor all entities.34
Nevertheless, Schaffer himself is open to the possibility of the grounding relation 
entailing supervenience. As he says: 
There is an interesting question about the modal consequences of 
grounding. This opens up the possibility of using supervenience for 
something – the right sort of supervenience failure can show grounding 
failure.35
                                               
34 Schaffer [2009], p. 363. I am not entirely convinced that this once and for all closes the door on 
attempts to define physicalism in terms of supervenience, in a way that brings it into line with a 
grounding definition. First, it might be that the definition of physicalism in terms of supervenience 
can be modified in a way that anticipates the differences between supervenience and grounding. For 
instance, considering that supervenience, unlikely grounding, is formally a non-asymmetric relation, 
the supervenience physicalist might simply add on to his definition that the non-physical 
asymmetrically supervenes on the physical. Second, the reasons why supervenience does not track 
grounding may simply be irrelevant as far as physicalism is concerned. For instance, it might be that 
numbers are necessary and trivially supervene on any and all things, yet they might also be entities 
about which physicalism is simply not concerned, perhaps because physicalism is taken as a claim 
about the empirical world and its properties. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, even if such moves 
are viable, if supervenience based definitions of physicalism are successful only in so far as they 
manage to track a grounding based definition, it is not obvious why we shouldn’t simply go for a 
grounding based definition in the first place.
35 Schaffer [2009], p. 364. Many famous arguments against various forms of physicalism, such as 
the zombie argument (Chalmers [1996], chap. 3) and the swampman argument (Davidson [1987]), 
exactly target the claim that the non-physical supervene on the physical (in the right way at least).
                                                    
24                                                                                                                             
If it can be shown that grounding entails supervenience this would be helpful in two 
ways. First, it will help to label some non-physicalist positions as being such, 
namely those that deny NP-P supervenience. Second, it helps to determine what 
goes in what we may call the complete fundamental grounding base for a given 
kind of entity E. The complete fundamental grounding base for E is the complete 
set of fundamental entities on which E ontologically depends. This is to be 
distinguished from grounding bases that contain non-fundamental entities and from 
grounding bases that are incomplete and does not contain all entities on which 
ontologically E depends. If grounding entails supervenience then, if a set of entities 
is not a supervenience base for E, then that set is either not a grounding base for E 
at all or an incomplete grounding base for E. 
But why should we think that grounding entails supervenience in the first place? I 
can think of three reasons. First, the grounding relation is an intimate metaphysical 
relation, perhaps the most intimate relation that can hold between distinct entities, 
and it seems right that such a relation should be modally strong and support 
supervenience. Second, when A supervenes on B, the grounding of A in B is a 
possible explanation of this (remember, supervenience is a symptom of some 
deeper metaphysical relation which explains it). And one obvious way grounding 
can explain why supervenience holds is by entailing that it does so. Third, the kinds 
of relations that are naturally seen as examples of grounding relations are typically 
thought to entail supervenience. For instance, composition and realization are 
plausibly instances of the grounding relation in that wholes/realized properties may 
be taken as grounded in their parts/realizers, and wholes/realized properties are 
typically thought to supervene on their parts/realizers. For these reasons it is
plausible to assume that the grounding of A in B (henceforth A-B grounding) 
entails that A supervenes on B. 
1.9 Grounding Physicalism and Standard Supervenience
Which kind of supervenience is entailed? To settle this question it will be helpful to 
turn to the debate on supervenience physicalism. Grounding physicalists and 
supervenience physicalists share the goal of trying to state the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for physicalism. Where they differ is in what they take to be 
sufficient for physicalism. Supervenience physicalists believe that some form of 
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NP-P supervenience will be sufficient for physicalism (putting aside the NFM 
constraint). Grounding physicalists, on the other hand, reject this, since they reject 
that supervenience in general is sufficient for grounding. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to think that grounding physicalists and supervenience physicalists should 
disagree on which kind of supervenience is necessary for physicalism. This is why, 
when trying to determine the modal consequences of grounding, it is helpful to turn 
to the debate over how best to formulate supervenience physicalism. 
Consider first a form of physicalism based on standard supervenience (following 
the definition of standard supervenience given earlier). 
(Standard Physicalism): All non-physical properties standardly supervene on 
physical properties, and no mental property is fundamental.
I take it that we have good reasons for thinking this formulation is too strong. The 
problem is that physicalism based on standard supervenience rules out that there are 
merely possible worlds that contain anti-physicalist properties, in particular, 
fundamental properties not capable of being incorporated into physics.36 Say that 
there is a fundamental unscientific property P in the actual world. A definition of 
physicalism based on standard supervenience would rightly judge physicalism to be 
false in our world (a possible world exactly like our world except that it does not 
contain P will be physically indiscernible from the actual world, but discernible 
with respect to non-physical properties). But what if there are no anti-physicalist 
properties in our world and the non-physical standardly supervene on the physical? 
Then physicalism is also false if there are possible worlds, physically indiscernible 
from our world, except for some extra fundamental unscientific property. This 
seems like the wrong result. Physicalism, after all, is a contingent thesis about the 
actual world – it does not aspire to rule out that physicalism is false in all other 
possible worlds. Turning to the grounding relation, the same point applies. The 
                                               
36 By merely possible, I mean possible and not actual. Note that merely possible fundamental mental 
properties, while anti-physicalist properties, pose no distinct problem for physicalism based on 
standard supervenience. If these fundamental mental properties are scientific, i.e. incorporable into 
completed physics, any world containing them will be discernible from the actual world with respect 
to physical properties, and so won’t be relevant from the perspective of evaluating the truth of 
physicalism in our world. If they are not scientific, then they falsify standard physicalism for the 
same reason non-mental unscientific properties falsify it.  
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mere possibility of a world where the physical does not ground the non-physical, 
due to there being fundamental unscientific properties in that world, should 
intuitively not rule out that the physical grounds the non-physical in the actual
world.  What this shows is that standard NP-P supervenience is too strong as a 
requirement for physicalism, either in its supervenience based or grounding based 
formulation.
1.10 Grounding Physicalism and Minimal Supervenience
In the light of this, Frank Jackson has suggested that physicalists are committed 
only to the claim that any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of the actual 
world with respect to the physical, rather than physically indiscernible simpliciter, 
is a world that is indiscernible with respect to everything else. As Jackson further 
explains:
[…] a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a world that (a) is 
exactly like our world in every physical respect [...], and (b) contains 
nothing else in the sense of nothing more by way of kinds or particulars 
than it must to satisfy (a). Clause (b) is a ‘no gratuitous additions’ or ‘stop’ 
clause.37
We can use this notion of a minimal physical duplicate to define what I’ll call 
minimal supervenience: 
(Minimal Supervenience): A minimally supervenes on B if and only if, for any two 
objects x and y, if y is minimal duplicate of x with respect 
to B, x and y are indiscernible with respect to A. 
While Jackson takes duplicates to be worlds, there is nothing preventing our 
definition of minimal supervenience from being applied to ordinary sized objects as 
well. For instance, the chemical properties of a body of water x, minimally 
supervenes on the micro-physical properties of the water if and only if, any object 
that is a minimal duplicate of x with respect to its micro-physical properties, is 
indiscernible from x with respect to chemical properties. According to Jackson, 
                                               
37 Jackson [1998], p. 13.
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physicalism is true if and only if the non-physical minimally supervenience on the 
physical, though as I argued earlier, an added NFM constraint is needed. So we get:
(Minimal Physicalism): All non-physical properties minimally supervene on 
physical properties, and no mental property is fundamental.
A physicalism based on minimal supervenience does better than one based on 
standard supervenience. First, minimal physicalism comes out false, as it should, if 
there are anti-physicalist properties in the actual world. If there are fundamental 
mental properties in our world, the NFM constraint is violated. And if there are 
fundamental unscientific properties in our world, the non-physical properties would 
fail to minimally supervene on physical properties. Second, physicalism can be true 
in the actual world, despite there being possible worlds with such anti-physicalist 
properties. Physicalism, on the minimal physicalist account, only requires that all 
minimal physical duplicates of the actual world are indiscernible with respect to 
non-physical properties, and worlds with extra fundamental unscientific properties 
are not minimal physical duplicates. These possible worlds are therefore irrelevant 
as far as the truth of physicalism in the actual world is concerned. 
The grounding physicalist should accept that NP-P grounding entails minimal NP-P 
supervenience, rather than standard NP-P supervenience, for the same reason a 
supervenience physicalist should base her physicalism on minimal, rather than 
standard, supervenience. Intuitively, NP-P grounding in the actual world is 
unaffected by there being duplicates of the actual world with extra anti-physicalist 
properties. And this intuition is not threatened by NP-P grounding entailing minimal 
NP-P supervenience. At the same time, if the actual world contains anti-physicalist 
properties, grounding physicalism would fail, and this is revealed by a failure either 
to satisfy the NFM constraint (if the anti-physicalist properties are fundamental 
mental properties) or a failure of minimal supervenience on the physical (if the anti-
physicalist properties are fundamental unscientific properties). 
No doubt there is more to be said about the relationship between grounding and 
supervenience. For one thing, there are reasons to think that minimal NP-P 
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supervenience (along with the NFM constraint) is insufficient for physicalism.38 If 
so, this would indicate that NP-P grounding entails a form of supervenience 
stronger than minimal supervenience. Of course, this does not change the fact that 
failure of minimal NP-P supervenience is sufficient for failure of physicalism and 
NP-P grounding, and for purposes to come, using failure of minimal NP-P 
supervenience to indicate failure of grounding is good enough.  
1.11 Strong and Global Supervenience
There is a further question of whether the supervenience entailed is strong or global 
supervenience. The relation between the two has been the subject of a fairly 
complex debate in the literature on supervenience. Rather than rehash that I will 
proceed with the assumption that grounding entails global supervenience and leave 
it an open question whether it also entails strong supervenience. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, supervenience definitions of physicalism are typically 
formulated in terms of global supervenience and a formulation of physicalism is 
what is at issue. And secondly, strong NP-P supervenience raises some issues about 
semantic externalism and the wide content of mental states that are best avoided 
here. 
1.12 The Modal Strength of the Relevant Supervenience 
What is the modal strength of the supervenience entailed by grounding? Is it 
metaphysical or merely nomic? Before answering this question, an ambiguity needs 
to be cleared up. What we might call the textbook distinction between metaphysical 
and nomic necessity I take to be roughly this: Something is metaphysically 
necessary at a world w if and only if it is the case in every possible world, 
regardless of what laws of nature hold in those worlds. Something is nomically 
necessary at a world w if and only it is the case in every possible world with the 
same laws as w.39 So for instance, it might be nomically necessary that, in the actual 
                                               
38 This is due to the possibility of what John Hawthorne calls ‘blockers’ (Hawthorne [2002]). 
Blockers are properties that block the instantiation of supervenient non-physical property, even when 
the relevant supervenience base is present. According to Hawthorne, physicalists should reject the 
possibility of blockers, since they do not believe that the tie between physical and non-physical can 
be so easily disrupted. But minimal physicalism is compatible with the existence of possible worlds 
that are (i) physical duplicates of our world, and (ii) contains blockers that prevent the instantiation 
of certain non-physical properties contained in our world. 
39 There are further distinctions that can be made within nomic necessity, corresponding to which 
laws are held fixed. For instance, we might talk of biological necessity, where the fixed laws are 
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world, water boils at 100 degrees Celsius in 1 atmosphere pressure, since, in every 
possible world with the same laws as the actual world, water boils at 100 degrees 
Celsius in 1 atmosphere pressure. However, it is arguably not metaphysically 
necessary as there are possible worlds with different laws of nature, where water 
boils at a different temperature in 1 atmosphere pressure or boils at 100 degrees 
Celsius under different pressures. That water is H2O, however, is the case in every 
possible world (where water exists at least), regardless of the laws that hold in those 
worlds.40
We can use this textbook distinction between metaphysical and nomic necessity to 
define corresponding notions of minimal metaphysical and nomic supervenience:
(Minimal metaphysical supervenience):
A minimally supervenes on B with metaphysical necessity in world w iff for 
any world w*, regardless of the laws in w*, if w* is a minimal B-duplicate 
of w, w and w* are indiscernible with respect to their A-properties.
(Minimal Nomic supervenience):
A minimally supervenes on B with nomic necessity in world w iff for any 
world w*, with (all and only) the same laws as w, if w* is a minimal B-
duplicate of w, w and w* are indiscernible with respect to their A-properties.
The distinction between minimal metaphysical and nomic supervenience is 
important for the same reason it was important to determine whether the 
supervenience entailed by grounding is standard or minimal41 - if failure of NP-P 
supervenience is to be used as a test to indicate failure of NP-P grounding, and by 
implication failure of physicalism, we will need to know whether the supervenience 
entailed is metaphysical or merely nomic. For instance, if the grounding of the non-
physical in the physical entails only nomic supervenience of the non-physical on the 
                                                                                                                                  
biological laws, causal necessity, where the fixed laws are causal laws, non-causal necessity, where 
the fixed laws are non-causal laws, and so on. All these I take to be varieties of nomic necessity. 
More on that shortly.
40 These are just examples. Some would deny that water is H2O in every possible world or that there 
are worlds with different laws from the actual world where water boils at different degrees.
41 From now on, unless otherwise noted, supervenience is to be understood as minimal 
supervenience.
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physical, it will be no strike against physicalism if metaphysical supervenience of 
the non-physical on the physical fails to hold. Now, seeing that grounding is a 
metaphysical relation it would be natural to think that the kind of supervenience 
entailed by grounding is metaphysical supervenience. This conclusion also seems to 
be backed up by the literature on supervenience physicalism. For instance, David 
Chalmers says that physicalism (or in Chalmers’s terminology, materialism) is true, 
‘…if for any logically possible world W that is physically indiscernible from our 
world, all the positive facts of our world are true of W’ (my italics).42  And Frank 
Jackson’s minimal physicalism basically expresses the same idea when he says that 
physicalism is the claim that any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of the 
actual world, is a duplicate simpliciter.43 However, contrary to first appearance, it is 
not clear that these views are endorsing the textbook definition of metaphysical NP-
P supervenience, as a necessary condition for the truth of physicalism. The problem 
is that the supervenience base for the non-physical may itself contain the laws of the 
actual world. This, for instance, is explicit in Jackson’s formulation of physicalism, 
where a physical duplicate of our world is a world that is identical with respect to 
both physical properties and physical laws. In this case, the textbook definition of 
metaphysical supervenience simply collapses into a form of textbook nomic 
supervenience. If A supervenes on B with nomic necessity, it follows that any world 
with the same laws as the actual world that is indiscernible with respect to B will 
also be indiscernible with respect to A. But those are the very same worlds that are 
indiscernible with respect to B and all actual laws. In other words, if A 
metaphysically supervenes on B and all actual laws, this is equivalent to A 
nomically supervening on B. So there is an ambiguity in the notion of metaphysical 
supervenience. It can be metaphysical supervenience of A on B in the textbook 
sense, where the relevant possible worlds are all B-indiscernible worlds, regardless 
of the laws that hold in those worlds. Or it can be metaphysical supervenience of A 
                                               
42 Chalmers [1996], p. 42. A couple of notes: Chalmers formulates physicalism in terms of logical 
supervenience, though to him, metaphysical and logical supervenience comes to the same thing. 
Also, while Chalmers seems to say that metaphysical supervenience of everything on the physical is 
merely sufficient for physicalism, he clearly takes it to be a necessary condition as well, as his main 
argument against physicalism rests on supervenience failing to hold between the non-physical and 
the physical, which in turn, is supposed to show that physicalism is false. Obviously that would not 
follow if supervenience of the non-physical on the physical was merely sufficient for physicalism as 
physicalism might then be true for other reasons. 
43 Jackson [1998], p. 12.
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on B and all actual laws, which is equivalent to the textbook definition of nomic 
supervenience.  
With this ambiguity cleared up, we can return to the question of what the modal 
strength of the supervenience entailed by grounding is. The answer is that it 
depends on what goes in the grounding base for a given entity. For instance, a 
grounding base for determinable colours such as red, green, and blue, plausibly 
includes the set of determinate colours, such as scarlet, lime-green, and navy-blue -
it is in virtue of having a determinate colour that objects have determinable colours. 
Does this grounding base also include any laws? Probably not. That determinate 
colours ground determinable colours seems to be independent of whatever laws 
obtain. Rather, it follows from the very nature of these entities themselves. To give 
it a name, we can call the kind of grounding where the grounding base does not 
contain any laws metaphysical grounding. So the supervenience that is entailed by 
the grounding of determinable colours in determinate colours is proper textbook 
metaphysical supervenience – any possible world, regardless of the laws that hold 
in that world, that is indiscernible from the actual world with respect to determinate 
colours, will be indiscernible with respect to determinable colours. But now 
consider the further claim that colours are dispositions to reflect light at certain 
wave-lengths, and that the grounding base for dispositions includes the set of 
categorical properties. Again, we might consider whether this grounding base 
include laws in addition to categorical properties. And now the answer is arguably 
yes. For instance, if the laws of optics had been very different, the same categorical 
properties would have underlain entirely different dispositions to reflect light. So 
the grounding base for dispositions plausibly includes both categorical properties 
and the laws of nature.44 Hence, we can call the grounding involved here nomic 
grounding. If the grounding base for colour-properties includes the laws of our 
world, the supervenience entailed by this grounding is merely a form of textbook 
nomic supervenience – any possible world, with the same laws of nature as the 
actual world, that is indiscernible from the actual world with respect to categorical 
properties, will be indiscernible with respect to colours. 
                                               
44 Again, these are merely examples to illustrate a point. 
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To sum up then, what these examples show is that there is no univocal answer to the 
question of which kind of supervenience is entailed by grounding – it will depend 
on the kinds of entities in question. 
1.13 Grounding of the Non-Physical in the Physical: Which 
Supervenience is Entailed?
Of course, what we are interested in is not any old grounding base. Seeing that, 
according to physicalism, the set of physical properties coincides with the set of 
fundamental properties (and no mental property is among them) and grounds 
everything else, what we are interested in is the total fundamental grounding base 
for the non-physical. Are there any laws in this grounding base? On most 
physicalist accounts, the answer is yes. For one thing, the fundamental physical 
laws will go in the grounding base for the non-physical. This is particularly clear if 
we consider physicalists that are also functionalists. For instance, Jackson explicitly 
takes the supervenience base for the non-physical to be physical properties and laws 
and this supervenience-base plays the role that the grounding base for the non-
physical plays for a grounding physicalist.45 Another example is Jaegwon Kim who 
argues that mental properties are definable in terms of their causal relations to other 
properties and realized by physical properties. Talking about a mental property M, 
Kim says:
To functionalize M is to make M non-rigid, and this is easily seen: M is 
defined in terms of its causal/nomic relations to other properties, and since 
these relations are contingent – contingent on the laws that prevail in a 
given world – it is a contingent fact whether a given property satisfies the 
causal/nomic specification that is definitive of M.46
In other words, to fix the domain of mental properties, on Kim’s account, it is not 
enough to fix the domain of non-mental properties, you also have to ensure that the 
prevailing laws are held fixed. Otherwise the realizers of mental properties cannot 
be guaranteed to enter into the same causal relations they do in the actual world and 
hence, cannot be guaranteed to enter into the causal relations that are distinctive of 
                                               
45 Jackson [1998], p. 11.
46 Kim [1998], p. 99, my italics.
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the mental properties they realize in the actual world. The grounding base for 
mental properties on Kim’s account therefore includes laws.
Are there forms of physicalism that do not include laws in the grounding base for 
the non-physical? A technical variant would be a form of physicalism that allows 
only for physical properties and no non-physical properties. Such a physicalism 
would not include laws in the grounding base for the non-physical for the simple 
reason that there is nothing non-physical to ground and hence no grounding base for 
it. What of non-functionalist forms of physicalism? Though they may not include 
laws in the grounding base for the non-physical for all the same reasons that 
functionalists do, it is still natural to think that physicalists in general will take 
fundamental physical laws to be part of the grounding base for the non-physical. 
For instance, consider the view that physical micro-properties ground non-physical 
macro-properties, not because the micro-properties satisfy any causal role 
distinctive of the macro-properties, but because micro-parts (and their micro-
properties) compose macro-wholes (and their macro-properties). However, 
composition itself may depend on fundamental physical laws. For instance, the 
criterion for when some parts compose a whole may be that the parts ‘hang 
together’ in some suitable way. But whether some parts hang together will be 
dependent on the laws of nature. For instance, eliminate the strong nuclear force 
and subatomic particles would no longer combine into atoms. So on this account, it 
would not be enough to fix the physical properties of the actual world in order to fix 
the non-physical properties, you would also need to fix, at least some, laws of 
nature. And so, the grounding base for the non-physical according to this particular 
non-functionalist form of physicalism would include laws. And presumably 
something similar will be the case for most other forms of physicalism. The 
physical laws of our world make a difference to facts about non-physical properties 
and so, cannot be left out of the grounding base for the non-physical if this is to be 
able to support supervenience. And as a result, the supervenience entailed by 
grounding the non-physical in the physical can only be nomic supervenience, or at 
least some form of it, of the non-physical on the physical. 
An exception to this would be forms of physicalism that wishes to do without laws 
at all, at least in the traditional sense of laws. Alexander Bird, for instance, has 
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argued that properties have dispositional essences.47 What this means is that the 
causal profile of a property, which specifies the causal relations into which the 
property can enter, could not possibly have been different than it actually is. If the 
causal profile is different, it is a profile of a different property. This is known as 
dispositional essentialism (or simply, as I will sometimes refer to it, essentialism). 
Bird also believes that laws of nature can be generated directly from properties and 
their dispositional essences. In other words, laws of nature should not be thought of 
as entities in the world that govern the behaviour of properties, rather they flow 
directly from these properties. The upshot of such a view, when coupled with 
physicalism, is that the grounding base for the non-physical does not contain laws, 
at least not laws in the traditional sense if being some entities in the world in 
addition to properties. Still, to say that it follows from this that NP-P grounding 
entails metaphysical NP-P supervenience would be misleading. First of all, while a 
dispositional essentialist may not posit laws in the traditional sense, she will still 
have a revisionary notion of laws as being derived from the causal profiles of 
properties. For instance, if it is part of the causal profile of a property P that it has 
(or bestows) the power to cause effect E, then it will be a law that P causes E. On 
this account, to fix the properties of a world is ipso facto to fix the laws of that 
world, and vice versa. This means that the set of worlds that are indiscernible with 
respect to the properties of the actual world just is the set of worlds with the same 
laws as the actual world. And similarly, if physicalism is true, the set of worlds that 
are indiscernible from the actual world with respect to physical properties will be 
exactly the set of nomically indiscernible worlds. Metaphysical NP-P supervenience 
thus collapses into nomic NP-P supervenience on a dispositional essentialist 
account.48
In conclusion, there are no obvious candidates for forms of physicalism that 
endorses supervenience of the non-physical on the physical in the textbook sense of 
metaphysical supervenience, and even if there were forms of physicalism that entail 
                                               
47 In Bird [2007].
48 It is not compulsory for essentialists to be revisionists about laws of nature. One can maintain that 
properties have dispositional essences and hold that these essences are determined by the laws of 
nature. The result is much the same though, as the distinction between nomic and metaphysical 
supervenience collapses. 
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this, it should be clear by now that this is not a commitment of physicalists in 
general. 
1.14 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have argued that physicalism is best taken as the view that 
completed physics provides a complete list of all fundamental properties, none of 
which are mental. Since being non-fundamental is to be ultimately grounded in the 
fundamental, this means that all non-physical properties are grounded in the 
properties posited by completed physics. While this is a better definition of 
physicalism than one in terms of supervenience, there are nevertheless interesting 
modal consequences of physicalism. In particular, it entails that the non-physical 
minimally and nomically supervenes on the physical. 
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Chapter 2
Emergentism and Reductive vs. Non-Reductive Physicalism
Abstract: In this chapter I first discuss how to distinguish emergentism from 
physicalism. I argue that emergentists posit the existence of fundamental 
causal laws which should be considered non-physical, and which should 
therefore be excluded from a physicalist grounding base for non-physical 
properties. As a result, some non-physical properties have causal powers 
not grounded in the physicalist base in an emergentist world, and this is 
incompatible with physicalism. I then argue that emergentism is incoherent 
if dispositional essentialism is true. Second, I consider how to draw the 
distinction between reductive and non-reductive physicalism. I argue that 
we need a notion of what I call broadly physical properties, which can 
function as a reduction base for other non-physical properties. These 
broadly physical properties can be generated from fundamental physical 
properties via the relations of mereological fusion, conjunction, and 
disjunction.
2.1 Emergentism
One of the troublesome positions when it comes to giving a satisfactory formulation 
of physicalism is the position defended by the British Emergentists.49 The reason is 
that while the position of emergentism is typically thought of as being in opposition 
to physicalism, traditional formulations of physicalism, in particular supervenience 
based definitions, have had difficulties excluding emergentism from physicalism. In 
the following I will discuss how best to understand the doctrine of emergentism and 
to what extent the truth of a grounding-based definition of physicalism rules it out.
Roughly, emergentism is the view that while everything is ultimately composed of 
parts with purely physical properties, some wholes have emergent properties with 
genuinely novel causal powers. For instance, humans may have emergent mental 
properties, organisms may have emergent biological properties, molecules may 
have emergent chemical properties, and so on. What is required for emergence to 
occur is a certain degree of complexity at the physical level. Once such complexity 
is reached among the physical properties, new properties emerge. This emergence is 
                                               
49 Here I focus on C.D. Broad’s formulation of the view from Broad [1925]. For other proponents of 
emergentism, see Alexander [1920] and Morgan [1923]. Philosophers who have pointed out some of 
problems associated with distinguishing emergentism from physicalism include Crane [2007], Kim 
[1992b], and Wilson [2005].  
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governed by what C. D. Broad called trans-ordinal laws. These are non-causal laws 
that connect the physical properties in the emergence-base with the higher-level 
emergent properties. In addition, higher-level emergent properties have novel causal 
powers not found at any lower level – not only powers to cause other emergent 
properties, but also powers to cause physical properties at lower levels. In so far as 
the causal powers a property has are dependent on the prevailing causal laws, 
emergentists are therefore also committed to the existence of fundamental causal 
laws that govern the (causal) behaviour of emergent properties, in addition to their 
commitment to fundamental trans-ordinal laws. The fact that these causal laws are 
fundamental is what ensures the genuine novelty of emergent properties.  I will call 
such laws emergent causal laws. 50 51
It is arguably a part of the emergentist position that physical emergence-bases (i.e. 
the base from which emergent properties arise) are also supervenience-bases for 
emergent properties.52 That is, if emergentism is true in world w, then any world 
that is indiscernible with respect to physical properties and their relations will 
include all emergent properties of w. On a supervenience-based account of 
physicalism, according to which NP-P supervenience (that is, supervenience of the 
non-physical on the physicals) is sufficient for physicalism, this makes it difficult to 
see how emergentism is to be distinguished from physicalism. The same problem 
arises for grounding physicalists if emergent properties are grounded in the physical 
properties they emerge from. If they are, what is to separate emergentism from 
physicalism? Whether or not the British Emergentists took emergent properties to 
be fundamental or grounded in physical properties is a historical question. 
                                               
50 Broad does not use the term ‘emergent causal law’. Instead he contrasts trans-ordinal laws with 
what he calls intra-ordinal laws. These are causal laws that connect properties within a level. It is not 
obvious to me, however, that this distinction tracks the distinction between trans-ordinal laws and 
emergent causal laws as I understand them. For one thing, emergent causal laws not only (causally) 
connect properties at the same level, but also (causally) connect properties at the emergent level with 
properties at lower level. Nevertheless, even if emergent causal laws can be trans-ordinal in the 
sense that they connect properties at different level, they are not examples of what Broad has in mind 
when he talks of trans-ordinal laws since, to him, trans-ordinal laws do not causally connect physical 
properties with emergent properties. Rather, the connection is constitutive or metaphysical.
51 Sometimes emergentism is characterised in epistemic terms, as the view that facts about emergent 
properties cannot, even in principle, be deduced from complete facts about the physical. 
Correspondingly, physicalism is given an equally epistemic interpretation and involves the denial of 
this claim. Here, however, I focus on a metaphysical interpretation of emergentism, just as I took 
physicalism to be a metaphysical position in the previous chapter.
52 See the quote from Broad below. For a recent defence of this claim, see Horgan [1993].
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Personally, I believe there is some evidence for the latter. Consider, for instance, 
what Broad says about emergent chemical properties:
No doubt, the properties of silver-chloride are completely determined by 
those of silver and of chlorine; in the sense that whenever you have a whole 
composed of these two elements in certain proportions and relations you 
have something with the characteristic properties of silver-chloride, and that 
nothing has these properties except a whole composed in this way.53
Now contrast this view about emergent chemical properties with what Broad says 
about trans-ordinal laws immediately after:
But the law connecting the properties of silver-chloride with those of silver 
and of chlorine and with the structure of the compound is, so far as we 
know, an unique and ultimate law.54
It seems clear that Broad is pointing out what he takes to be an important difference
between, on the one hand, emergent chemical properties and, on the other, the 
trans-ordinal law that connects them with the underlying physical properties. The 
former are, as Broad puts it, completely determined by their constituent physical 
properties, the latter is unique and ultimate. I believe a plausible interpretation of 
this is that Broad is making the point that emergent properties are dependent upon 
or grounded in physical properties, whereas trans-ordinal laws are fundamental. But 
if NP-P grounding is sufficient for physicalism (along with the constraint that there 
be no fundamental mental properties), and emergent properties are among the non-
physical properties grounded in physical properties, then it seems that emergentism 
will count as a form of physicalism on a grounding physicalist account as well.55
                                               
53 Broad [1925], p. 64.
54 Broad [1925], pp. 64-65.
55 An interpretation of emergentism according to which emergent properties are fundamental, would 
be easily dealt with from the perspective of both supervenience and grounding physicalism. If the 
emergent properties are mental, emergentism would count as a non-physicalist view due to violating 
the NFM constraint. If the emergent properties are unscientific, there would be fundamental 
properties not treated by completed physics, and physicalism would also fail. If the emergent 
properties are non-mental and scientific, emergentism would simply be a form of macro-
physicalism. 
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2.2 Using the Nomic/Metaphysical Distinction to Sort Emergentism 
from Physicalism
One popular way to solve this problem has been by way of the distinction between 
metaphysical and nomic supervenience. For instance, Robert Howell, after having 
argued that physicalism requires metaphysical NP-P supervenience, goes on to say: 
“Since properties emerge only given the existence of emergence laws, […], they 
seem to emerge nomologically but not metaphysically.”56 This particular way of 
drawing the distinction between physicalism and emergentism has been criticised 
on the grounds that it relies on a non-essentialist view of properties.57 The objection 
is the following: On the dispositional essentialist account of properties, 
metaphysical NP-P supervenience collapses into nomic NP-P supervenience, since 
the set of worlds indiscernible from our world with respect to physical properties, 
just is the set of worlds indiscernible from our world with respect to physical 
properties and the laws of nature of our world. In this sense, emergentists are as 
committed to metaphysical NP-P supervenience as a physicalist is. But while this 
may be right, the discussion from the previous chapter clearly shows that there is a 
deeper problem, independent of the debate over essentialism, as physicalists 
themselves are committed only to a form of nomic NP-P supervenience. So contrary 
to Howell’s claim, metaphysical NP-P supervenience cannot be necessary for 
physicalism. If the difference between physicalism and emergentism is to be found 
in the modal strength of the NP-P supervenience these positions entail, the 
difference must be located within the realm of nomic possibility. For instance, it 
may be that the emergentist allows for certain failures of nomic NP-P 
supervenience which, in turn, would falsify physicalism. If so, this would also 
indicate that physicalists and emergentists differ on what they take to be the 
grounding base for non-physical properties. 
2.3 Physical and Nomic Supervenience
Consider again the interpretation of Broad’s claims, according to which emergent 
properties are grounded in physical properties. It is clear, however, that the physical 
properties cannot make out the complete grounding base for emergent properties. 
For one thing, emergent properties require for their instantiations that there are 
                                               
56 Howell [2009], p. 90. In the quote, ‘emergence laws’ is referring to trans-ordinal laws.
57 See Wilson [2005], pp. 436-437.
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trans-ordinal laws that connect them to physical properties. This failure of 
grounding is revealed by a failure of supervenience – a minimal duplicate of our 
world with respect to physical properties only will not contain any trans-ordinal 
laws, and so, will be a world in which emergent properties fail to instantiate. If 
emergent properties are to be grounded in physical properties, it must therefore be 
the case that trans-ordinal laws are included in the grounding base. The same point 
applies to the causal powers of emergent properties, the existence of which requires 
that there are emergent causal laws. So these powers cannot be grounded only in 
physical properties and trans-ordinal laws. Again, this failure of grounding is 
revealed by a failure of supervenience - a minimal duplicate of our world with 
respect to physical properties and trans-ordinal laws, but in which there are no 
emergent causal laws, will be a world where emergent properties instantiate but 
have no causal powers (or at least not all the powers they have in our world). These 
points suggest a solution to the problem of distinguishing emergentism from 
physicalism: If somehow the physicalist can exclude trans-ordinal and emergent 
causal laws from the relevant supervenience base for non-physical properties, then 
the truth of physicalism will entail that emergentism is false.
The most obvious way of drawing the physicalism-emergentism distinction in such
a fashion is by way of what I’ll call physical supervenience. Minimal physical 
supervenience is defined as follows:
(Minimal Physical Supervenience): 
A minimally supervenes on B with physical necessity in world w iff for any 
world w*, with (all and only) the same physical laws as w, if w* is a 
minimal B-duplicate of w, w and w* are indiscernible with respect to their 
A-properties.
Note how nomic and physical supervenience comes apart if there are fundamental 
non-physical laws in our world. Nomic supervenience makes a claim about worlds 
with (all and only) the same laws as w, whatever these laws might be. But if there 
are fundamental non-physical laws in w, these worlds will be different from worlds 
with (all and only) the same physical laws of w. This means that physicalism based 
on nomic supervenience has different truth conditions from physicalism based on 
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physical supervenience. If there are fundamental non-physical laws in our world, in 
virtue of which certain non-physical properties are instantiated and have certain 
causal powers, then physicalism based on nomic supervenience might be true 
(provided there are no fundamental unscientific or mental properties in our world). 
However, physicalism based on physical supervenience would be false (a minimal 
duplicate of all physical laws and physical properties in the actual world, would 
either fail to include the non-physical properties partly grounded in fundamental 
non-physical laws, or include them but fail to include their causal powers). 
2.4 Physical Supervenience and Emergentism
As far as using this distinction between physical and nomic supervenience to 
distinguish supervenience physicalism and emergentism, the idea is this: 
Emergentists are committed to the existence of fundamental non-physical laws. If 
such laws exist, physicalism based on physical supervenience fails, yet physicalism 
based on nomic supervenience simpliciter is true. Since emergentism is intuitively 
and historically incompatible with physicalism, a definition of the latter in terms of 
physical supervenience is superior to one in terms of nomic supervenience, and will 
allow us to distinguish supervenience physicalism from emergentism.
A similar move is available to the grounding physicalist. For the supervenience 
physicalist, the way to sort emergentism from physicalism is by restricting the 
supervenience base for non-physical properties to only physical properties and 
physical laws. Likewise, the grounding physicalist can restrict the grounding base 
for non-physical properties to physical properties and physical laws. Call the kind 
of grounding where the laws included in the grounding base are only physical laws 
for physical grounding. The argument would then go like this: Emergentists are 
committed to the existence of fundamental non-physical laws which partly ground 
some non-physical properties and their causal powers. If such laws exist, 
physicalism based on physical grounding fails, yet physicalism based on nomic 
grounding is true. Since emergentism is intuitively and historically incompatible 
with physicalism, a definition of the latter in terms of physical grounding is superior 
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to one in terms of nomic grounding, and will allow us to distinguish physicalism 
from emergentism.58
2.5 What is a Non-Physical Law?
Of course, the way of sorting emergentism from physicalism described above 
assumes that, indeed, the emergentist is committed to fundamental non-physical 
laws. In the literature, the focus tends to be on trans-ordinal laws, which are often 
assumed to be non-physical laws, without argument.59 It seems to me though, that if 
we actually try to establish some criteria for what makes a law a non-physical law, 
emergent causal laws are more problematic from a physicalist perspective. 
Assuming that we are not entitled to simply stipulate that the laws posited by 
emergentists are non-physical, this raises the question of what makes a law a 
physical law. The necessary and sufficient condition for a property being physical is 
that the property is a posit of completed physics. Correspondingly, a non-physical 
property is one that fails to be a posit of completed physics. We might try to use the 
same definitions for physical and non-physical laws. So a law is physical iff it is a 
posit (or part of) completed physics, and a law is non-physical if it is not. 
One reason a law could fail to be a posit of completed physics would be that it is a 
non-fundamental law. But this obviously does not apply to trans-ordinal and 
emergent causal laws, since both are fundamental laws on the emergentist account. 
A second reason might be that trans-ordinal or emergent laws are unscientific and 
simply incapable of being incorporated into scientific theory. Consider, for instance, 
a causal law according to which P’s cause Q’s. If this law manifests entirely 
arbitrarily and P only sometimes causes Q, even when background conditions are 
held fixed, then it would likely be such that it would not satisfy the criteria for a 
scientific posit, and so, would not be incorporable into scientific theory. But neither 
trans-ordinal laws nor causal emergent laws are like that on the emergentist 
                                               
58 A small caveat here: While the fundamentality of trans-ordinal and emergent causal laws prevent 
them from being grounded in physical properties and laws, it does not, strictly speaking, prevent 
them from supervening on physical properties and laws, since they may supervene for other reasons. 
For instance, if they are metaphysically necessary, they trivially supervene on anything. I take it, 
however, this is quite implausible, and in any case, it would only cause problems for a supervenience 
based definition of physicalism, not the grounding based definition I endorse.
59 As examples, see Yates [2009], p. 116, McLaughlin [2007], p. 161
                                                    
43                                                                                                                             
account. Consider first trans-ordinal laws. If certain physical conditions are present 
and property E emerges, then whenever those physical conditions are reproduced in 
our world, E will emerge. Trans-ordinal laws thus do not manifest arbitrarily. In 
fact, the methodology for discovering trans-ordinal laws seems to satisfy the 
hallmarks of scientific methodology. They are uncovered empirically and 
inductively, and their manifestations are reproducible. In this sense there is nothing 
unnatural about them. As Broad himself notes:
There is nothing, so far as I can see, mysterious or unscientific about a trans-
ordinal law […]. A trans-ordinal law is as good a law as any other; and, 
once it has been discovered, it can be used like any other to suggest 
experiments, to make predictions, and to give us practical control over 
external objects.60
Presumably the same applies to emergent causal laws. There is nothing in the 
emergentist account which suggests that such laws are any different from other 
causal laws of science. 
Thirdly, it might be argued that trans-ordinal and emergent causal laws lack the 
generality that genuine physical laws exhibit. For instance, a law such as Newton’s 
law of gravitation applies to every object in the universe (with mass at least). Trans-
ordinal and emergent causal laws, on the other hand, act only on certain very 
specific arrangement of physical matter (in the case of trans-ordinal laws) or 
specific emergent properties (in the case of emergent causal laws).61 So if physics 
posit only laws with a high degree of generality, trans-ordinal and emergent causal 
laws will not be posits of completed physics, despite being fundamental. It is one 
thing, however, to say that the fundamental laws of nature posited by current 
physics exhibit a high degree of generality, it is another to say that future physics 
could not possible posit laws that act only to very specific entities. The latter claim 
is what needs to be justified if the specificity of trans-ordinal and emergent causal 
laws is enough for them to count as non-physical. While generality is no doubt a 
                                               
60 Broad [1925], p. 79.
61 By a law ‘acting upon’ some properties I mean that these properties have powers to produce 
certain effects in virtue of this law obtaining. The production may be causal (as in the case of an 
emergent causal law) or non-causal (as in the case of a trans-ordinal law). 
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feature of current laws of physics, it is not ‘built in’ to physics from the get-go that 
this must be so. 
Finally, and this seems to me to be the more promising strategy, a law may fail to 
be a posit of completed physics because it does not act on physical properties. Since 
physics describes only fundamental properties and their interactions, such a law, 
even if fundamental, would simply be left out of completed physical theory. 
Emergent causal laws are like this. They act only on emergent non-fundamental and 
non-physical properties, ensuring that these properties have novel causal powers, 
not found at the level of the physical properties from which they emerge. Since they 
do not act on physical properties, such laws simply fall outside the scope of 
completed physics. If emergent causal laws count as non-physical in this way, they 
should be excluded from a physicalist grounding base for non-physical properties. 
This arguably makes physicalism false in an emergentist world, since that world 
would contain non-physical properties with causal powers not grounded in the 
physical properties and laws. This is also revealed by failure of supervenience – a 
world that is a minimal duplicate of all the physical properties and physical laws of 
an emergentist world would differ at the level of non-physical properties, since the 
non-physical properties instantiated in the duplicate world fail to have all the causal 
powers they have in our world. 
Note that this argument for the non-physicality of emergent causal laws does not 
obviously apply to trans-ordinal laws, since trans-ordinal laws do act on physical 
properties. Still, we might wonder if trans-ordinal laws are really the kind of laws 
that could be posited by completed physics. If completed physics posits only laws 
that govern how physical properties interact with other physical properties, then 
trans-ordinal laws would not be posited by completed physics, since trans-ordinal 
laws govern how physical properties interact with other non-physical properties (as 
noted, the interaction here is non-causal). Nevertheless, there are independent 
reasons for why the physicalist should be hesitant to exclude them from a 
physicalist grounding base on this basis. To see this, note that there might be 
fundamental non-physical laws that the physicalist would want in the grounding 
base for non-physical properties. For instance, say that composition is a law-
governed relation between parts and wholes and that the fundamental physical 
                                                    
45                                                                                                                             
objects are micro-objects. Say also that, in our world, the law of composition L 
obtains and acts on certain collection of micro-level parts, which consequently 
make out macro-level wholes. In some other worlds, there is no such law and no 
wholes exist. If we exclude L from physicalist grounding base for non-physical 
properties, the existence of composite wholes is enough to make physicalism false 
in our world. This, however, seems awfully rough. Surely someone can consistently 
claim that composition is law-governed and occurs in our world, and still be a 
physicalist. Physicalism, it seems, should therefore allow for laws like L in the 
grounding base for non-physical properties. But if L is allowed in the grounding 
base, despite the fact that it connects physical and non-physical properties or 
objects, then why shouldn’t trans-ordinal laws be allowed as well? Personally, I do 
not believe there is a problem here for the physicalist. Consider again Broad’s 
example with the properties of silver-chloride being completely determined by the 
properties of silver and chloride. If we take away the claim that silver-chloride has 
novel and fundamental causal powers, do we then have a view that should be 
considered anti-physicalist? I do not think so. Physicalists need not worry about the 
mere existence of silver-chloride, as long as the properties and powers of silver-
chloride are fully grounded in the underlying physical properties and powers. And 
as long as there are no emergent causal laws, this will be the case. Thus, trans-
ordinal laws alone do not pose a threat to physicalism and, should they exist, the 
physicalist can happily accept them in the grounding base for non-physical 
properties.
2.6 Emergentism and Dispositional Essentialism
In the debate over how to distinguish emergentism from physicalism, dispositional 
essentialism (or simply essentialism) requires special treatment. As I proposed 
above, emergentism is incompatible with physicalism due to the fact that 
emergentists are committed to the existence of fundamental emergent causal laws, 
in virtue of which emergent properties have novel and fundamental causal powers. 
The physicalist should exclude these laws from the grounding base for non-physical 
properties, on the basis that they are non-physical laws. This has as a consequence 
that physicalism is false in an emergentist world, since, in the latter, some non-
physical properties would have causal powers not grounded in the relevant base. 
However, if the relevant base allows for trans-ordinal laws, this move is unavailable 
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to the essentialist. According to emergentism, physical properties plus trans-ordinal 
laws necessarily suffice for the instantiations of some non-physical emergent 
properties. But if essentialism is correct and properties have their causal powers 
essentially, this means that physical properties plus trans-ordinal laws necessarily 
suffice for the causal powers that makes physicalism false according to the proposal 
suggested earlier. 
A response might be to insist that, contrary to my earlier claim, this shows that 
trans-ordinal laws must be excluded from the physicalist grounding base after all. 
But even if some criteria could be produced that would prohibit trans-ordinal laws 
from the physicalist grounding base, this does not effectively solve the problem. For 
what if the essentialist position is that properties have all their powers, both causal 
and non-causal, essentially? If so, trans-ordinal laws would reduce to essential 
dispositions or powers of physical properties. But then, to exclude trans-ordinal 
laws from the relevant grounding base would be to exclude physical properties 
themselves from the relevant grounding base. And this is surely not an option for 
the physicalist. 
2.7 Howell: Trans-Ordinal Laws Contaminate the Physicalist 
Grounding Base
A different approach to this problem is to argue, as Robert Howell does in a recent 
paper, that if some properties are essentially disposed to give rise to emergent 
properties, this in itself disqualifies them from being genuine physical properties. 
As Howell explains:
Let’s grant to the emergentist that there is a genuinely new emergent
property E which emerges necessarily from C. [Where C is some 
configuration of physical properties (author’s insert)] […] By hypothesis, 
E is a fundamental, mental property, which means that C is essentially 
characterized by the disposition to produce a fundamental mental property. 
[…] How could the dispositional property to give rise to a new, non-
physical property itself be physical? Even if one wanted, […], to call C 
itself physical, the property that is nothing but the disposition to give rise 
to something non-physical surely is not.62
                                               
62 Howell [2009], p. 93.
                                                    
47                                                                                                                             
In other words, combining emergentism and essentialism leads to a contamination 
of the physicalist grounding base. It either fails to contain any genuinely physical 
properties at all (because the properties in the base give rise to anti-physicalist 
properties such as fundamental mental properties), or it necessarily includes 
something non-physical (the property that is nothing but the disposition to give rise 
to anti-physicalist properties). In either case, if emergentism and essentialism is 
combined, a physicalist grounding base is unavailable to the physicalist.
I think Howell’s argument is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, from the 
perspective of the conclusions and terminology developed in the previous chapter, it 
is unnecessarily complicated. If emergentism is true and emergent property E is 
fundamental and mental, then physicalism will already be falsified on the grounds 
that emergentism violates the NFM constraint. Whether or not the properties from 
which E emerges are proper physical properties simply becomes an irrelevant issue. 
Second, the argument targets only emergentism about mental properties. Though 
Howell does make the point that, in general, a group of properties C being disposed 
to give rise to a non-physical property entails that C cannot be physical, he surely 
cannot be right about this. After all, it is entirely uncontroversial that physical 
properties give rise to all kinds of non-physical properties. For instance, put a bunch 
of fundamental entities with fundamental physical properties together in the right 
way and you can create tables, chairs, mountains, etc. But no one would argue that 
the particles composing a chair are not physical entities, just because the thing they 
compose isn’t strictly speaking a physical entity. Even if you add the essentialist 
assumption that certain particles are essentially disposed to give rise to, say, chairs 
(when put together in the right way), this still seems like a thing the physicalist need 
not worry about in the slightest. Therefore, what Howell means must be that 
physical properties cannot be essentially disposed to give rise to properties the 
existence of which would falsify physicalism. Obviously, properties such as being a 
table or being a mountain do not fall in that category. The question now is, will 
Howell’s reasons for thinking that emergentism about mental properties is 
incompatible with physicalism apply to emergentism about other kinds of 
properties, for instance, chemical properties? The answer is: Only if you think that 
the existence of fundamental chemical properties automatically falsifies 
physicalism. As I argued earlier, this is confusing physicalism with micro-
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physicalism, something we should be careful not to do. If Howell insists that 
fundamental chemical properties falsifies physicalism, then he should endorse a ‘no 
fundamental chemical properties’ constraint on physicalism (or the physical), in 
addition to a NFM constraint, and likewise for all the other kind of properties one 
could be an emergentist about. In any case, if one endorses such a plurality of 
constraints on what counts as physical or what physicalism can accept, the first 
problem with Howell’s argument reappears – if the existence of fundamental 
chemical properties falsify physicalism, and emergentists about chemical properties 
are committed to the existence of said properties (given essentialism), emergentism 
about chemical properties is automatically disqualified as a form of physicalism. 
There is no need to consider whether properties can have essential dispositions to 
give rise to chemical properties and still be considered physical. Thus, my initial 
response to Howell takes the form of a dilemma: If physical properties are 
essentially disposed to give rise to anti-physicalist properties, then the existence of 
these properties is enough to falsify physicalism. If physical properties are 
essentially disposed to give rise to non-physical, but not anti-physicalist properties, 
then I can see no reason for thinking that the grounding base for such properties is 
contaminated from a physicalist perspective, just like a physicalist grounding base 
is not contaminated by ‘giving rise to’ tables and chairs.
2.8 Emergentism is Incoherent if Dispositional Essentialism is True
Another problem is that Howell assumes that emergent properties are fundamental. 
This, however, is contrary to my interpretation of emergentism, according to which 
emergent properties are non-fundamental properties with fundamental causal 
powers. Nevertheless, Howell’s assumption is a natural one given essentialism. 
According to emergentism, emergent properties have fundamental causal powers 
due to the existence of fundamental causal laws. This is compatible with emergent 
properties being non-fundamental, only given the assumption that a property and 
the powers it has can come apart. But of course, on an essentialist account, this is 
impossible. According to essentialism, properties have their powers essentially and 
the emergent causal laws that, on the non-essentialist account, partly or wholly 
determine the causal powers of emergent properties, are reducible to these powers 
(or some of them). Properties thus come with their causal powers ‘built in’, on the 
essentialist account, and in so far as the causal powers of emergent properties are 
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fundamental, this makes emergent properties fundamental as well. This puts 
pressure on the very idea of emergentism. If essentialism is true and emergent 
properties are grounded in physical properties and trans-ordinal laws (where trans-
ordinal laws themselves may reduce to certain non-causal powers of physical 
properties), then their causal powers must be grounded in that base as well. There 
simply is no room for the idea that a base can ground the instantiations of certain 
properties without grounding their powers, if these properties have their powers 
essentially. This leaves the emergentist with a choice. On the one hand, she can give 
up the claim that emergent properties are grounded in physical properties and 
accept them as fundamental (which is what Howell assumes). If so, emergentism 
about mental properties would automatically falsify physicalism and emergentism 
about, for instance, chemical or biological properties would simply be forms of 
physicalism (though not forms of micro-physicalism). On the other hand, the 
emergentist can insist that emergent properties are non-fundamental properties 
grounded in physical properties (and trans-ordinal laws). But if so, it seems they 
cannot have fundamental causal powers since to ground a property, according to 
essentialism, is to ground its powers. This means that emergent properties fail to be 
novel in the sense claimed by the emergentist. To my mind, this makes 
emergentism a form of physicalism. The emergentist position would be that there 
are non-physical higher-level properties, yet these properties have no powers that 
are not grounded in powers bestowed by physical properties. And this is exactly 
what the physicalist claims as well. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks on Physicalism and Emergentism
In the end then, whether dispositional essentialism is true or not, physicalism is 
incompatible with emergentism. If essentialism is false and properties have their 
powers contingent on the laws of nature obtaining, then emergent properties have 
causal powers not grounded in physical properties and physical laws. This is 
incompatible with physicalism. On the other hand, if essentialism is true, the 
traditional idea of emergentism is incoherent. Either emergent properties are 
fundamental and have fundamental causal powers, in which case emergentism 
about mental properties violate the NFM-constraint and will count as a non-
physicalist position, and emergentism about chemical, biological, and other special 
scientific properties, will be forms of physicalism, though not forms of micro-
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physicalism. Or emergent properties are not fundamental and have no novel causal 
powers, in which case emergentism should count as a form of physicalism.
2.10 Reductive and Non-reductive Physicalism
The standard distinction between reductive and non-reductive physicalism found in 
the literature goes something like this: Reductive physicalists claim that all 
properties, in particular mental properties, are identical to physical properties. Non-
reductive physicalists, on the other hand, claim that some properties, in particular 
mental properties, are distinct from physical properties, though they are grounded in 
(or supervene upon, according to supervenience physicalists) physical properties. 
While common, this way of drawing the distinction between reductive and non-
reductive physicalism obviously won’t work given the terminology developed in 
the previous chapter. In fact, the phrase ‘reductive physicalism’ is a contradiction in 
terms if defined as the view that mental properties are physical. Physical properties 
are fundamental properties, so if mental properties are physical, then mental 
properties are fundamental – and this is incompatible with physicalism. Fortunately, 
turning to the literature on reductive physicalism, it becomes clear that self-
proclaimed reductive physicalists are not actually trying to identify mental 
properties with fundamental physical properties. Rather, mental properties are 
usually claimed to be identical to complex neural properties. But such properties are 
arguably not fundamental, and as such, not strictly speaking physical. Now, 
physicalists will of course insist that neural properties are grounded in fundamental 
physical properties. But this simply makes reductive physicalism a form of non-
reductive physicalism as it is defined above – on the reductive physicalist account, 
mental properties are non-physical properties that are grounded in physical 
properties. 
2.11 Non-Physical Properties and Broadly Physical Properties
Seeing that mental properties are non-physical on both the reductive and non-
reductive physicalist account, if there is a distinction to be drawn between the two 
positions, it must be found in the kind of non-physical properties they each take 
mental properties to be. In other words, we are looking to draw a distinction within 
the domain of non-physical properties. It should be a consequence of this distinction 
that paradigm examples of reductive and non-reductive physicalism differ on the 
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kind of properties they take mental properties to be. As a paradigm example of a 
reductive physicalist position we may take the identity theory, according to which 
mental properties are type-identical to neural properties of the brain. As a paradigm 
example of a non-reductive physicalist position we may take role functionalism, 
according to which mental properties are type-identical to functional properties, 
which in turn are realized by neural properties of the brain (in humans at least).
Some non-physical properties stand in a particular close relation to physical 
properties. These are the non-physical properties which can be ‘built out of’ 
physical properties. Such properties are what I’ll call broadly physical properties. 
They are physical in the same sense that an ordinary material object, say a table, is a 
physical object: it is ultimately and entirely composed out of (fundamental) physical 
entities. Broadly physical properties are the kind of properties which requires the 
instantiation of specific physical properties to instantiate. Contrast this with the kind 
of non-physical properties which do not require the instantiation of any particular 
physical properties, though which may still be ‘physicalistically acceptable’ if, in 
the actual world, they are grounded in the physical. 
Until now, I have used the notion of physical properties as a term for the 
fundamental properties posited by completed physics, and the notion of non-
physical properties as a blanket-term for all properties not physical. To stay in line 
with the terminology used in the literature, however, it is now better to dub the 
properties posited by physics fundamental physical properties. Physical properties,
in turn, I take to be properties that are either fundamental physical or broadly 
physical properties. Non-physical properties I take to be properties that are 
physicalistically acceptable, but neither fundamental physical nor broadly physical 
properties (obviously this excludes anti-physicalist properties from being non-
physical properties).
2.12 Generating Broadly Physical Properties from Fundamental 
Physical Properties
Which tools does the physicalist have in her toolbox with which she can build 
broadly physical properties? One place to start is with the standard Boolean 
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operations of conjunction and disjunction.63 In other words, broadly physical 
properties can be generated by conjoining and disjoining physical properties.64
Doing so, however, would never take us outside the level of fundamental physical 
properties. If P and Q are fundamental physical properties of fundamental physical 
objects, then the conjunctive property P and Q and the disjunctive property P or Q, 
will also be properties of physical objects. This makes these properties unsuited as 
reduction-bases for mental properties. Mental properties aren’t properties of 
fundamental objects on the reductive physicalist account, they are properties of 
complex biological organisms such as humans and other animals. The same point 
applies to other properties about which one might be a reductive physicalist. For 
instance, chemical properties cannot be generated by conjoining or disjoining 
fundamental physical properties, as chemical properties are (presumably) not 
properties of fundamental objects. So conjunction and disjunction cannot be the 
only tools at the physicalist’s disposal, if she is to build the broadly physical 
properties which can serve as reduction-bases for higher-level properties. 
What is needed is a relation that will allow the physicalist to move up levels (or 
down, if the fundamental properties are higher-level properties), in order to generate 
broadly physical properties. For material objects, moving up (or down) levels is a 
matter of composing (or decomposing) objects. For instance, we move from the 
subatomic to the atomic level by composing atoms out of subatomic particles. Such 
composition occurs when the parts are fused together mereologically. The relation 
of mereological fusion can be applied to properties as well, and we can talk of 
composite properties having other properties as proper parts. As an example, 
consider the structural property such as the property of being an H2O-molecule. 
This property is a higher-level property since it is a property of a non-fundamental 
compositionally complex object (a molecule). It has the properties being a 
hydrogen-atom and being an oxygen-atom as proper parts, in the sense that an 
                                               
63 I’m leaving out negation. Even if there are such properties as negative properties (which is 
controversial), it is unlikely that physical properties are closed under negation. For instance, an 
immaterial substance has the negative property of not being a boson, as well as countless other 
properties like it (not being an electron, not being a proton, etc), yet I take it we do not wish to say 
that an immaterial substance has countless physical properties. For the same reason, we should think 
that negations of fundamental physical properties need not generate broadly physical properties.
64 Of course, this is not to say that any conjunction or disjunction of fundamental properties is a 
genuine property. The claim is just that if a conjunction or disjunction of fundamental physical 
properties form a genuine property, then this property is a broadly physical property. 
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object instantiating the property will have proper parts, two of which instantiate the 
property being a hydrogen-atom, and one which instantiates the property being a 
hydrogen-atom.65  The suggestion is that, in addition to conjunction and disjunction, 
mereological fusion is a relation that generates broadly physical properties from 
fundamental physical properties. Of course, these relations do not exclude each 
other and can be applied together. For instance, a conjunction of disjunctions of 
physical properties will be broadly physical, a conjunction of structural properties 
with fundamental physical properties as parts will be broadly physical, a structural 
property with conjunctions of fundamental physical properties as parts will be 
broadly physical, and so on. On the other hand, non-physical properties are those 
properties that are grounded in fundamental physical properties, but which cannot 
be generated by applying the relations of conjunction, disjunction, and mereological 
fusion. 
2.13 Applying the Distinction between Non-Physical and Broadly 
Physical Properties
Does this distinction between non-physical and broadly physical properties give the 
right result when applied to the paradigm cases of reductive and non-reductive 
physicalism? I think it does. The neural properties with which the identity theorist 
wishes to identify mental properties are presumably quite complex and will be 
properties of, if not the entire brain, then a significant part of it. It will be something 
like the property of having certain parts (neurons) with certain properties (being a 
neuron, firing, etc.), standing in certain relations. Presumably the property of being 
a neuron is itself a structural property (the property of having molecules with 
certain properties as parts, with those parts standing in certain relations), the 
property of being a molecule is a structural property (the property of having atoms 
with certain properties as parts, with those parts standing in certain relations), and 
so on, until we get the fundamental physical properties. In this way, the neural 
properties which serve as a reduction-base for mental properties according to the 
                                               
65 Of course, these parts must also instantiate certain relational properties for the structural property 
to be instantiated. I take it that it is one of the defining characteristics of structural properties that 
they require certain relations to obtain between their non-relational parts. If so, there are plausibly 
examples of composite properties that are not structural. For instance, the mass of a composite object 
may be construed as the property of having certain parts with certain masses. In this case, however, 
it is not clear that the parts need to instantiate any particular relational properties. I will discuss this 
example in further detail in the following chapter.
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identity theorist can be entirely decomposed into fundamental physical properties. 
And in this sense, these neural properties require the instantiation of certain 
physical properties and relations - they are broadly physical properties. Contrast this 
with the claims made by the functionalist. According to the functionalist, structural 
neural properties realize mental properties, yet they are not identical to any one of 
them in particular. In fact, mental properties could be realized by anti-physicalist 
properties, for instance, fundamental mental properties. That is, the instantiation of 
the functional properties with which the functionalist wishes to identity mental 
properties, requires neither the instantiation of any particular physical properties, 
nor even the instantiation of any physical properties at all. Nevertheless, as it 
happens, the higher-level functional properties of our world are grounded in (and 
therefore supervene upon) the physical laws and properties of our world. They are 
non-physical properties.
This gives us our distinction between reductive and non-reductive physicalism. 
Reductive physicalism is the view that all non-physical properties, in particular 
mental properties, are identical with composite or structural properties that are 
ultimately and entirely composed of fundamental physical properties (and relations 
between them). Non-reductive physicalism, on the other hand, allows that some 
non-physical, in particular mental properties, are distinct from properties ultimately 
and entirely composed of fundamental physical properties, but nevertheless 
grounded in them.66
2.14 General Worries about Composite Properties
Admittedly, the discussion above skirts several issues about composite or structural 
properties. First, it might be that one thinks there are no structural properties 
because one thinks that the kind of composition involved in generating them is 
unintelligible, and that there is no other way of accounting for them (as David 
Lewis argues, at least if properties are universals67). Second, it might be that 
structural properties should be accounted for in a non-mereological fashion. For 
                                               
66 Of course, it is assumed here that physicalism is true. That is, neither broadly physical nor non-
physical properties are subject to emergent causal laws, and have only powers that are ultimately 
grounded in the powers of fundamental physical properties. Also, there can be no anti-physicalist 
properties.
67 Lewis [1986a]. For a reply see Armstrong [1986].
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instance, it might be that structural properties are themselves simple, and that the 
relation between a structural property S and the relevant properties instantiated by 
the parts of the object that instantiates S is one of ‘brute’ necessitation, not 
composition (what Lewis calls a “magical” conception of structural properties). If 
so, it would be false that structural properties are composite properties with physical 
properties as parts, and structural properties wouldn’t count as broadly physical, 
though of course, they may nevertheless count as non-physical if they are grounded 
in fundamental physical properties. In either case, the distinction between reductive 
and non-reductive physicalism that I am proposing won’t work. This leaves two 
options: Either there is no distinction to be drawn at all or the distinction can be 
drawn in a different manner. The former would be surprising given that the use of 
the reductive/non-reductive distinction is prevalent in the literature. Therefore, until 
the latter is worked out in detail, I prefer to put aside the worries about composite 
structural properties and use them to help draw the distinction between broadly 
physical and non-physical properties.
2.15 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have argued that if properties have their powers contingent on the 
laws of nature, emergentism can be distinguished from physicalism by way of the 
fundamental emergent causal laws that the former position is committed to. Such 
laws act only on non-physical properties and should be considered non-physical 
laws because of it, despite the fact that they are fundamental. They should therefore 
be excluded from the physicalist grounding base for non-physical properties. But if 
they are excluded, and emegentism is true, there would be causal powers at the non-
physical level which are not grounded in the physicalist grounding base. And this 
contradicts physicalism. In the case of dispositional essentialism being true, 
emergentism fails to be a coherent position. If properties have their causal powers 
essentially, a grounding base cannot ground a property without grounding its 
powers. But emergentism is exactly the view that emergent properties are, firstly, 
grounded in physical properties and trans-ordinal laws, and, secondly, have 
fundamental causal powers. So whether dispositional essentialism is true or not, 
there is no risk of emergentism being counted as a form of physicalism.
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Finally, I argued that the best way to understand the difference between reductive 
and non-reductive physicalism is via the notion of composite or structural
properties. Reductionism about a certain group of higher-level properties is the 
view that these properties are identical to composite or structural properties 
ultimately and entirely composed of physical properties and relations, or any 
disjunction or conjunction thereof. Non-reductionism denies the identity. While 
properties in the disputed group are grounded in physical properties, they are not 
identical to any mereological fusion, disjunction, or conjunction of these properties. 
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Chapter 3
The Causal Exclusion Argument and the Drainage Problem
Abstract: In this chapter I begin by clearing up some terminological issues 
concerning properties, causal powers, and causation. Then I go on to set up 
the Exclusion problem. I claim that it is best seen as a paradox involving 
four independently motivated, yet jointly incompatible claims – the claims 
that there is mental causation, that the physical domain is causally closed, 
that there is no systematic overdetermination, and that mental properties 
are distinct from physical properties. This leads to the Exclusion argument, 
which is the argument that uses the first three claims to establish the denial 
of the fourth. I discuss to what extent this argument generalizes to higher-
level properties and answer affirmatively, which leads to the problem of 
causal powers draining away if there is no fundamental bottom level (the so-
called drainage problem). I argue that reduction of properties across levels 
is of no help since it comes with similar problems. Finally, I argue that to 
solve the drainage problem, it must be the case that causal powers reduce 
across levels. This, in turn, allows for a rejection of the claim that there is 
no systematic overdetermination.
3.1 Causes
In the previous chapter I talked rather freely of properties and powers. Before 
proceeding, some brief clarifications are needed. 
The relata of causal relations I take to be particulars or tokens, rather than types. So 
for instance, we say such things as ‘the football caused the window to break’ (an 
object causing an event) or ‘the football hitting the window caused it to break’ (an 
event causing another event). Of course, objects and events can be types. For 
instance, football games all involve the same type of object (football) and window-
breakings are often preceded by the same type of event (window-hitting). Yet, when 
a football hits a window and breaks it, I take it that it would be unnatural to think 
that what is (literally) causing the window to break is the object-type football or the 
event-type window-hitting. Surely, it’s the particular football that happened to fly 
through the air and hit a window at a particular place and time that’s the cause. 
Sometimes we say things that might suggest otherwise, for instance, when we say 
‘war causes misery’ without having any particular war in mind. However, such a 
claim is plausibly interpreted as the claim that all particular wars cause misery. In 
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other words, by saying that war causes misery one is not necessarily committed to 
there being an event-type (war) that is literally causing misery. 
It is equally unnatural to think of properties as causes. Say that one is a nominalist 
about properties and thinks that properties are sets of concrete objects 
(Resemblance Nominalism) or tropes (Trope Nominalism). It would be quite 
strange to insist that what is doing the causing in a case of causation is a set of 
particulars. Members of a set might be causes but the sets themselves just do not 
seem like the kind of entities that are apt for being causes. Positing universals as 
properties rather than sets does not make properties any better suited as causes. The 
problem is that the universals instantiated by the football that crashes through the 
window have multiple locations. They are located wherever they are instantiated (at 
least on an Aristotelian account of universals). So if properties can be causes and 
properties are universals, it might be that the very properties instantiated by the 
book on my shelf is at this very moment causing a window to break in Sydney. But 
this is not how we typically think of causes. Causes have specific locations. 
Whatever it is that is the proximate cause of the window breaking, it is there, in the 
close vicinity of the window and nowhere else.
3.2 Causal Powers
To have a causal power is to be a potential cause. For instance, a rock has the power 
to cause windows to break because it can cause windows to break, assuming certain 
conditions obtain. So if types and properties cannot be causes, it follows that they 
are not the kind of entities that have causal powers. What have causal powers are 
the entities that can be causes, i.e. particular objects and events, not object-types, 
event-types, or properties (in the following, when I talk of objects and events, I take 
these to be particulars unless otherwise stated). But if a property does not itself have
causal powers, what exactly is the relationship between properties and causal 
powers? It seems obvious that there is a close relation in so far as we are inclined to 
think that what a thing can do depends on what it is. Following fairly standard 
terminology, the job of properties is to bestow or confer causal powers on objects 
and events (I will use the former term throughout). The bestowing relation that 
holds between a property and the powers of the particulars that instantiate it is 
arguably an example of the grounding relation, with properties grounding the 
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powers of particulars - particulars have their causal powers in virtue of the 
properties they instantiate.68 This way of describing things is useful since it allow us 
to pinpoint the aspects of causes that are causally relevant. A football may be the 
cause of a window-breaking but not everything about the football is causally 
relevant. The colour, for instance, seems to have no causal relevance, whereas the 
mass and velocity of the football does. The latter properties bestow the power to 
cause window-breakings on the football, the former does not.69
3.3 Causation
What of causation itself? Anyone familiar with this topic knows that there is little 
consensus in the literature on how to understand causation. Since having a power to 
cause an effect is to be a potential or possible cause of that effect, what we might 
say is that causation involves the manifestation of a causal power. This 
manifestation requires certain conditions to obtain, which are exactly those 
conditions that upgrade a thing from being a merely potential cause of an effect (i.e. 
having a power to cause the effect), to being an actual cause of that effect. A 
property is causally efficacious with respect to the effect if the power manifested is 
a power bestowed by the property. I take this be a stipulation or platitude about the 
connection between causal powers and causation, or as I will sometimes refer to it, 
causal efficacy. For this reason, I also take it to be neutral on the metaphysics of 
powers and causation. To have a power is to be a potential cause and to manifest a 
power is to be a cause, whatever causation amounts to. If, for instance, one is
attracted to a so-called production view of causation where causation involves 
(perhaps metaphorical) pushing and pulling, or ‘omph’, then one might also be 
attracted to a metaphysically robust understanding of powers and their 
manifestations. Objects and events have real powers, the manifestation of which 
                                               
68 I prefer to remain neutral on the metaphysics of property-instances, or property-tokens, though I 
do believe that much of the discussion to come will make no sense if instances of properties are 
concrete objects (as they would be on some nominalist account of properties). I will not argue for 
that here. Since properties require instantiation to bestow powers, some would prefer to say that 
powers are bestowed by property-instances. I have no objections to this way of talking.
69 Sometimes the term ‘property’ refers to what is known as abundant properties. As the name 
suggests, abundant properties are plentiful and unlike sparse properties, which are the properties that 
ground the causal powers of individuals (perhaps among other things), abundant properties carry no 
real ontological commitment. Unless otherwise noted, when I talk of properties, I have in mind 
sparse properties. For more on the distinction between sparse and abundant properties, see Lewis 
[1986], p. 59-60.
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involves this kind of pushing and pulling.70 On the other hand, if one is attracted to 
a counterfactual account of causation, according to which C causing E is simply a 
matter of E being counterfactually dependent on C, this is likely to spill over to 
one’s account of powers. On this account, C having a power to cause E might 
likewise reduce to the truth of certain counterfactuals, for instance the 
counterfactual ‘were C to occur, E would occur and be counterfactually dependent 
on C’. I expect similar stories can be given for other accounts of causation. 
Despite the reasons mentioned earlier for taking particulars to be causes and having 
causal powers, for reasons of simplicity, it will still be useful to talk as if properties 
(understood as types) are causes and have causal powers. In what follows, if I say 
that a property P has a power to cause effect E, this will be shorthand for saying 
that property P bestows a power to cause E on the objects and events that instantiate 
it. Likewise, if I say that a property P is a cause of effect E, this will be shorthand 
for saying that property P bestows a power to cause effect E on an object or event 
and that this power is manifested, or that the object or event is a cause of effect E in 
virtue of instantiating property P. 
3.4 The Causal Exclusion Problem
The Causal Exclusion problem (or simply, the Exclusion problem) is best seen as a 
paradox involving four distinct claims that are independently motivated and prima 
facie plausible, yet jointly incompatible.
3.5 Mental Causation
First claim: Mental properties are sometimes causes, both of physical properties and 
other mental properties. As an example of mental causation, say that Jones 
instantiates an intentional property P, for instance by having the belief that it is 
sunny outside, and that this intentional property bestows on Jones the power to 
cause him to reach for his sunglasses (a broadly physical behavioural effect, or 
effect with broadly physical properties) and the power to cause him to believe that 
his lawn will dry out (an intentional effect, or effect with an intentional property). If 
these powers manifest, the intentional property P is a cause of him reaching for his 
                                               
70 This is not to say everyone endorsing a production view of causation is necessarily committed to a 
realist view of powers and their manifestations.    
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sunglasses and believing that his lawn will dry out. The former is a case of mental-
to-physical causation, the latter a case of mental-to-mental causation. To deny that 
there is mental causation, and thereby deny that examples like the one just 
described ever occurs, is to embrace epiphenomenalism, the view that mental 
properties are never causally efficacious. This is a view that few contemporary 
philosophers share. As Kim says:  
[…] epiphenomenalism strikes most of us as obviously wrong, if not incoherent; 
the idea that our thoughts, wants, and intentions might lack causal efficacy of any 
kind is deeply troubling, going as it does against everything we believe about 
ourselves as agents and cognizers.71
Thus, the following principle is heavily supported by what most of us takes as facts 
about human agency:
(Mental Causation): Mental properties sometimes cause other mental properties 
and other physical properties.
3.6 The Causal Closure Principle
Second claim: The physical domain is causally closed. This is motivated by 
empirical arguments. To deny it would be to accept that sciences dealing with 
physical properties, either fundamental or broadly physical, cannot give a complete 
causal account of physical effects and the explanatory success of such sciences 
indicate otherwise.72 Sometimes this is known as the claim that physics is complete 
– physics would never have to move outside the physical domain to give causal 
explanations of physical effects. Often the causal closure of the physical is 
expressed as the following principle: Every physical effect has a sufficient physical 
cause. Note though that formulated in this simple fashion, the principle of causal 
closure is too weak to capture the idea behind it, as it does not rule out that a 
physical effect is the result of a chain which includes both non-physical, or even 
anti-physical properties, and physical properties. For instance, say that physical 
property P causes non-physical property N, which causes physical effect E, and that 
                                               
71 Kim [2005], p. 70.
72 For some examples of this evidence, see Papineau [2001].
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E has no other causes. This is clearly a counter-example to the claim that the 
physical domain is causally closed since E cannot be completely causally accounted 
for, without moving outside the domain of physical properties (to N). However, 
assuming that causation is transitive (a standard assumption in the philosophy of 
causation), it is not a counterexample to the principle of causal closure as it is 
expressed above, since E does has a sufficient physical cause.73 A solution is to 
require that for any time t and any physical effect E, if E has a cause at t, E has a 
sufficient physical cause at t.74 The example just given would be incompatible with 
the truth of this principle, since there is a time t (the time at which N occurs), where 
E has a cause but no sufficient physical cause. 
While an improvement over the initial simple formulation of Closure, I still think 
this amended version of the closure principle is too weak to fully capture what 
philosophers, in particular physicalists, have in mind, when they look to endorse the 
claim that the physical domain is causally closed. Consider the following example: 
Assume that the world is ripe with non-physical properties sufficiently causing 
physical properties. As a matter of extraordinary coincidence, for every one of these 
physical effects caused by a non-physical property, there is an independent physical 
property which happens to also sufficiently cause the effect. So we do not have a 
counterexample to the proposed formulation of the causal closure of the physical 
domain since every physical effect does have a sufficient physical cause. Yet, some 
might argue that if the physical domain is causally closed, it cannot be by pure 
accident. Or rather, what physicalists mean when they say that the physical domain 
is causally closed or that physics is causally complete is stronger than any principle 
expressing this, which is compatible with causal closure by pure accident. In any 
case, the empirical support for closure certainly seems to justify a stronger claim. 
Putting radical sceptical worries aside, the fact that, in the past, for any time t and 
any physical effect E, E had a sufficient physical cause at t (if it had a cause at t), 
justifies us in inferring that, in the future, for any time t and any physical effect E, E 
will have a sufficient physical cause t (if it has a cause at t). But this is just to say 
that the empirical support for closure justifies the claim that it is guaranteed that, 
                                               
73 See Lowe [2000] for more on this point.
74 This is how Kim formulates the closure principle in one of his recent writing on the Exclusion 
problem. See Kim [2005], chapter 2.
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for any time t and any physical effect E, if E has a cause at t, E has a sufficient 
physical cause at t. And in turn, this is to say that it is no accident that the closure 
principle holds true.  
The obvious way of incorporating into the closure principle that it is non-
accidentally true, is by giving it some modal strength. Given the causal laws of our 
world, it is necessary that, for any time t and any physical effect E, if E has a cause 
at t, E has a sufficient physical cause at t. In other words, the closure principle 
supervenes on the causal laws of our world. This rules out that a physical property 
P can be sufficiently and accidentally causing a physical effect, that would have 
been sufficiently caused by non-physical property N in any case, since we would 
not have to change any causal laws in order to make non-physical property N  the 
sole sufficient cause of E. It would be enough to simply remove physical property 
P.75 We might worry that this makes the formulation of closure too strong, since 
closure would then be incompatible with the existence of possible worlds with extra 
causal laws that overrule some of the laws of our world. For instance, say that it’s a 
law L of our world that P’s sufficiently causes E’s, where P and E are physical 
properties, and that nothing is interfering with this law in our world. But now 
imagine a possible world w that is a duplicate of our world with respect to causal 
laws but with an extra law L* that interferes with L. L* does this by ensuring that 
whenever P is instantiated, non-physical property N both causes E and prevents P
from causing E. Intuitively, physicalists should allow, or at least be neutral about, 
the possibility of such a world. But the closure principle, as stated, rules it out. Note 
how this problem is similar to the problem physicalists faced when defining 
physicalism in terms of standard supervenience. The problem was that physicalists 
were in danger of ruling out the possibility of worlds that are identical to the actual 
world with respect to physical properties and laws of nature, but which contain 
extra anti-physical properties. The solution was to commit physicalists only to 
minimal supervenience of the non-physical on the physical. This makes the 
possibility of worlds with extra anti-physical properties irrelevant from the 
perspective of physicalism. And the same move can be made here - the closure 
principle minimally supervenes on the causal laws of our world. This makes the 
                                               
75 Of course, this does not rule out that a physical and a non-physical property can each be sufficient 
causes of the same effect. 
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possibility of worlds with extra causal laws interfering with the laws of our world
irrelevant. The principle that best captures the idea of the causal closure of the 
physical is therefore the following:
(Closure): In any world that is a minimal duplicate of our world with respect to 
causal laws, for any time t, and any physical property E, if E has a 
cause at t, E has a sufficient physical cause at t. 
In the following, however, I will often abbreviate this to the simpler claim that 
physical effects always have sufficient physical causes
3.7 The Causal Exclusion Principle
Third claim: If an effect E has a sufficient cause C at time t, then all other properties 
distinct from C are excluded from being a cause of E at t. This is known as the 
exclusion principle. Before trying to motivate it, let us consider what is involved in 
denying it. 
To deny the exclusion principle would be to accept that the world contains causal 
overdetermination. Causal overdetermination occurs when an effect has two (or 
more) sufficient causes and where these sufficient causes are not themselves related 
as cause and effect. A standard example of this from the literature involves two 
snipers each firing a riffle at a person, call him Target. As it happens, the two 
bullets fired hits and kills Target at exactly the same time. Also, each bullet would 
alone have been sufficient for killing Target.  In this case, it seems that we have two 
distinct objects (or events), each a sufficient cause of Target’s death. Are such cases 
impossible? Perhaps not. And as a result, perhaps the Exclusion principle as stated 
is too strong. What is striking about the sniper case, however, is that it involves an 
extraordinary coincidence. Even with the added assumption that both snipers are 
highly skilled and specifically instructed to try to shoot at the same time, it would 
still require a substantial amount of luck on the snipers part, were their bullets to hit 
at exactly the same time. This suggests that the kind of overdetermination 
exemplified by the sniper-case, in so far as it occurs at all, occurs only on rare 
occasions. We can take this conclusion on board and appropriately amend the 
exclusion principle as originally stated: 
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(Exclusion): In general, if an effect E has a sufficient cause C at time t, then all 
other properties numerically distinct from C are excluded from being 
a cause of E at t.
This version of the exclusion principle allows for the possibility of sniper-cases. 
What the principle does prohibit is systematic overdetermination. If certain effects 
are overdetermined in a systematic manner, overdetermination would be frequent 
and commonplace (at least assuming that the effects in question are commonplace). 
And this is exactly what the exclusion principle rules out.
Why believe this principle? First, there are methodological considerations, such as 
arguments from simplicity or Ockham’s Razor. If an effect has a sufficient cause, it 
seems redundant to posit additional causes. And an ontology that allows for (or 
even worse, embraces) such additional causes seems both unparsimonious and ad 
hoc. This is also reflected in our practice concerning causes and effects. For 
instance, if the police find the culprit that caused the death of the victim, they 
typically close the investigation. They do not continue to look for additional causes 
of the victim’s death. Second, if overdetermination indeed requires extraordinary 
circumstances, then it seems incredible that some effects could be overdetermined 
as a rule, rather than an exception. Third, and this problem is rarely discussed in this 
context in the literature, it seems that only certain kinds of effects can be genuinely 
overdetermined at all. What is required is that the effect is of a kind that fails to 
accumulate. I will call such effects non-cumulative effects. What I mean by this is 
that, unlike cumulative effects, they do not come in quantities. An example will 
illustrate the difference I have in mind. Consider again Target that gets hit by two 
bullets simultaneously. The two bullets cause many effects of course, in addition to 
the death of Target, one of which is the exertion of a certain amount of force F on 
Target’s body. The exertion of force F, however, is not overdetermined, since 
neither bullet is a sufficient cause of it. If only one of the bullets had hit target, the 
total amount of force exerted on Target’s body would have been less than F. In fact, 
it seems that the total amount of force exerted could not possibly be 
overdetermined. An additional object exerting force on Target’s body would simply 
add to the total amount of force exerted, preventing this effect (the total amount of 
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force exerted) from being overdetermined. Exertion of force is the kind of effect 
that accumulates given additional causes. Contrast this with the effect of Target 
dying. An additional bullet fired at Target would not cause him to die an additional 
time - while you can die in a variety of ways, you cannot die more than once 
(barring resurrection). The effect thus fails to accumulate given additional causes 
and this is what allows for this effect (the dying) to have more than a single 
sufficient cause.76  If only non-cumulative effects can be overdetermined, this 
already puts a natural restriction on the occurrence of causal overdetermination. 
More importantly, anyone wishing to deny the exclusion principle in order to allow 
for the systematic overdetermination of cumulative effects needs to explain how 
such overdetermination is even possible. As far as solving the exclusion problem by 
rejecting the exclusion principle, this is relevant since at least some effects of 
mental properties are cumulative. I will say more about such strategies later.
3.8 Distinctness
Fourth and final claim: Mental properties are numerically distinct from physical 
properties. One powerful motivation for this claim comes in the form of the 
argument from multiple realization. In one of the early formulations of the 
argument, it is presented as a challenge to the reductive physicalist. As Hilary 
Putnam writes about the prospect of locating a broadly physical property which can 
serve as the reduction base for pain: 
                                               
76 A couple of points: First, there is a similar way of dealing with sniper cases, and other cases 
involving non-cumulative effects, according to which they are not cases of genuine 
overdetermination. For instance, the death caused by both bullets might be ever so slightly different 
from the death that would have been caused by one of the bullets on its own. In this case, the very 
specific death that occurred was not overdetermined by the two bullets, since neither of the bullets 
on its own was a sufficient cause of that death. Of course, if sound, this line of reasoning merely 
supports that the original stronger version of the exclusion principle is motivated as well. Second, it 
might be argued that cases of force being exerted, and other cases involving cumulative effects, do
involve some form of overdetermination. Consider again the two bullets that each exerts part of a 
force on Target’s body, the total amount of which is F. Now, it may be true that neither of the bullets 
on its own is a sufficient cause of exerting force F. However, each bullet does cause the effect of 
some indeterminate force being exerted. And this effect is also caused by both bullets in conjunction. 
So if we consider effects at a relatively determinable level, even cumulative effects, such as exertion 
of force, become overdetermined. Personally, I find it implausible to claim that the determinable 
event caused by both bullets in conjunction is identical, at the token-level, to the determinable event 
caused by each bullets individually (though they are all tokens of the same determinable event-type 
of exerting some indeterminate force). So I do not think that the two bullets overdetermine even their 
relatively determinable effects. However, whether the argument succeeds or not is irrelevant for 
present purposes. If it does succeed, the exclusion principle could simply be rewritten so as to be 
specifically about causes of relatively determinate effects. 
                                                    
67                                                                                                                             
He [the reductive physicalist] has to specify a physical-chemical state such 
that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it 
possesses a brain of a suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain 
is in that physical-chemical state. […] It is not altogether impossible that 
such a state will be found. […] But it is certainly an ambitious hypothesis.77
However, even if it should turn out that, as a matter of fact, all creatures do share a 
relevant broadly physical property P when instantiating mental property M, the 
argument can be strengthened to prevent the identification of P with M by invoking 
possible worlds with creatures instantiating M without P. If such worlds are 
possible, M cannot be identical to P. And, the argument goes, surely such worlds 
are possible. Hence, claiming that mental and physical properties are distinct is 
motivated. 
3.9 The Exclusion Argument
Despite each of the four statements being independently motivated, any three of 
them can be used to establish the denial of the fourth. This is particularly worrisome 
to non-reductive physicalists, since they tend to accept all four. Distinctness is 
obviously a constitutive claim of the position, and Closure is universally accepted 
by all physicalists. Mental Causation and Exclusion are plausible claims in general, 
independently of whether or not one is a physicalist. In the literature on mental 
causation, this has lead to the Exclusion Argument against non-reductive 
physicalism, which I take to be the argument that uses Mental Causation, Closure, 
and Exclusion to show that Distinctness is false. That is, Mental Causation, Closure, 
and Exclusion together establish that mental properties are identical to physical 
properties. This argument has been developed and defended in detail by Kim in 
various writings:78 From Closure we know that all physical effects, such as 
behavioural effects, each have a sufficient physical cause. The Exclusion principle 
tells us that, in general, if an effect E has a sufficient cause C, then no property 
distinct C from is also a cause of E. But Mental Causation tells us that mental 
properties are sometimes causes of physical properties. It therefore follows that 
mental properties must be identical to physical properties. So Distinctness, and by 
implication non-reductive physicalism, is false. 
                                               
77 Putnam [1967], p. 228.
78 See in particular Kim [1998] and Kim [2005]. See Papineau [2001] and [2002] for a similar 
version of the argument.
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3.10 Tidying up the Argument
There are a couple of obvious loop-holes in the way I have set up the Exclusion 
argument that should be closed straight away. First, the non-reductive physicalist 
cannot plausibly exploit the fact that the Exclusion principle allows for special or 
rare cases of overdetermination by claiming that cases of mental causation are such 
cases. Mental causation is a commonplace phenomenon and as such, does not 
exhibit the rarity of the cases that the Exclusion principle is meant to allow. Another 
problem is that mental and physical properties are not independent in the way the 
overdetermining causes in standard cases of causal overdetermination are. This is 
due to the fact that non-reductive physicalist is not likely to construe the co-
instantiation of a given mental property with the physical properties that are 
competing with it to cause the relevant physical effect as an extraordinary 
coincidence. Rather, the instantiation of the mental property is determined, in part at 
least, by those very physical properties. But then the resulting overdetermination of 
physical behavioural effects by physical and mental properties is systematic. And 
this is exactly what the exclusion principle prohibits. Some strategies for dealing 
with the exclusion problem attempt to turn the table on the exclusion principle by 
exploiting the very fact that mental causation involves systematic 
overdetermination. Roughly, the idea is that if overdetermination is problematic 
because it involves extraordinary coincidences, then psycho-physical 
overdetermination is unproblematic since it is no coincidence that the 
overdetermining causes are co-instantiated.79 While I am sympathetic to this 
response, it is important to note that this is insufficient to reject the exclusion 
principle given the motivations I presented for it. Non-coincidental 
overdetermination may explain why it is not so incredible after all that some effects 
are systematically overdetermined. However, it fails to explain why such 
overdetermination does not involve redundant causation or why accepting such 
redundant causation is not unparsimonious and ad hoc. If anything, insisting that 
the overdetermination is no coincidence makes such views seem even more 
unparsimonious and ad hoc. Worse, if some effects of mental causes are 
cumulative, then overdetermination of these effects, coincidental or not, seems to be 
impossible. And for at least some effects of mental causes, this is plausibly the case. 
                                               
79 See Bennett [2003] and Kallestrup [2006].
                                                    
69                                                                                                                             
For instance, say that Jones instantiates the property being in pain because he 
accidentally put his hand on a hot stove. This property has powers to cause certain 
types of effect when instantiated in individuals like Jones, including screaming. 
Now, if this property has a physical base P that, in the circumstances, is a sufficient 
cause of this type of effect, then we might wonder why the pain and its physical 
base do not each cause a distinct token of this effect and why these token-effects do 
not accumulate. If an instance of pain causes Jones to scream at a certain volume, 
why doesn’t the physical base for this mental property cause Jones to scream even 
louder? After all, the effects of pains typically accumulate in this fashion (putting 
your entire hand, rather than just a small part of it, on a hot stove will typically 
cause a greater scream). To accept that the effects do accumulate is not an option of 
course, since this is to accept that the total effect is not sufficiently caused by the 
physical property and this violates the closure principle. Merely saying that 
psychophysical overdetermination is non-coincidental does nothing to solve this 
puzzle.
Second, the non-reductive physicalist may object that the Exclusion argument does 
not show that all mental properties are identical to physical properties, just that the 
mental properties that cause physical effects are identical to physical properties. 
Hence, there might still be irreducible mental properties that cause only other 
irreducible mental properties (which themselves have only powers to cause other 
irreducible mental properties, and so on). Putting aside the fact that it is not clear
which mental properties would have such causal features, there are further reasons 
to think that such a move will not succeed. Kim has argued that, on a non-reductive 
physicalist account, cases of mental to mental causation will invariably involve 
mental to physical causation, since causing a mental property will invariably 
involve causing its physical grounding base.80 Kim, in effect, establishes this by 
way of an extended Exclusion principle which applies to causal and non-causal 
relations alike.81 The argument proceeds as follows: Say that mental property M
putatively causes mental property M*. If non-reductive physicalism is true, M* will 
have a physical grounding base P* which metaphysically determines M*. But now, 
                                               
80 Kim [2005], pp. 36-41. Kim talks of supervenience bases rather than grounding bases but it is 
clear that he takes the supervenience relation to express some form of metaphysical determination. 
81 Kim introduces this principle in his [2005], p. 17.
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Kim asks, if M* is grounded in P*, it seems redundant to claim that, in addition, M
is a cause of M*. After all, P* is there and is guaranteeing the instantiation of M*,
regardless of whether or not M is there. Thus, P* excludes M from being a cause of 
M*. The exception, Kim notes, is if M is itself a cause of physical grounding base 
P*. M would then be causing M* by causing the grounding base for M*. But since 
this grounding base is physical, this means that mental to mental causation involves 
mental to physical causation. And as the Exclusion argument shows, this is only 
possible if mental properties are identical to physical properties. So the non-
reductive physicalist cannot even settle for the moderate view that there are 
irreducible mental properties which cause only other irreducible mental properties. 
3.11 Solving the Exclusion Problem
Of course, an attempt to solve the Exclusion Problem by rejecting one of the four 
inconsistent claims should preferably be supplemented by further arguments, either 
to the effect that the motivation for the rejected claim can be discarded, or to the 
effect that they motivate a different claim than we thought they did. An example of 
this strategy can be found in Kim’s earlier writings on the Exclusion problem. Kim 
accepts that Putnam’s challenge of finding a single broadly physical property which 
all organisms in pain share cannot be met. But rather than inferring from this that 
pain is distinct from any broadly physical property, he argues that such generic 
mental properties should be eliminated and replaced with what he calls structure- or 
species-specific mental properties. In other words, there is no mental property pain
which can be shared by organisms with very different physiological set-ups. Instead 
there might be pain-in-humans, which can be shared by humans, provided that the 
neural base for pain in humans is sufficiently homogenous.82 Kim’s strategy is 
thereby partly eliminativist, partly reductionist. He is an eliminativist about mental 
properties whose reduction-base consists of heterogonous broadly physical 
properties. But he is a reductionist and realist about species-specific mental 
properties with a single neural physical realizer (or set of homogenous neural 
realizers). Such properties are reducible to their neural base. In addition, he allows 
                                               
82 David Lewis proposes a similar strategy in his [1980].
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that there are generic mental concepts such as the concept of pain simpliciter, 
though this concept fails to pick out a genuine property.83
Whether or not one accepts Kim’s proposed strategy for dealing with Distinctness 
and its motivation, it is in any case what I will call a dialectically satisfactory 
approach to the Exclusion Problem. By this I mean that Kim attempts to deal with 
the motivation for the claim he rejects. Putative cases of organisms with vastly 
different physiological set-ups sharing a mental property are really cases of 
organisms having different species-specific mental properties, which fall under the 
same generic mental concept. Hence, the proposed evidence for Distinctness fails to 
adequately support the statement. By contrast, an unsatisfactory approach to the 
problem would be one which settles on three of the claims to establish the denial of 
the fourth, while not addressing the motivations for the rejected premise. A paradox 
is not satisfactory dealt with by simply rejecting one of the inconsistent claims – we 
also want to know why it is that a claim which seemed plausible nevertheless turned 
out to be false or how the evidence for the rejected claim is actually evidence for a 
different claim which generates no paradox. I take it to be a constraint on any 
proposed solution to the Exclusion Problem which involves a rejection of one of the 
claims, that it is dialectically satisfactory in this way. 
3.12 The Generalization Problem 
Before moving on to a discussion of positions which attempt to solve the Exclusion 
Problem by rejecting one of the claims constituting a paradox, let me first discuss 
an attempt to approach the issue in a different manner. We might look at this as a 
sort of meta-objection to the Exclusion problem, since it can be seen as an attempt 
to reject the problem, without targeting any particular claim. First part of the 
objection is this: If the Exclusion argument is successful against non-physical 
properties such as mental properties, it can be applied to other higher level 
properties, such as chemical and biological properties. This is known as the 
Generalization problem since the problem of mental causation threatens to 
generalize to all higher level properties. It is sometimes taken to constitute a 
                                               
83 See Kim [1992a]. 
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reductio against the Exclusion argument and the Exclusion problem. We find this 
line of thought in several writings. For instance, Lynne Rudder Baker tells us that:
[…] not only has the problem of mental causation proved to be intractable 
but even worse, the same reasoning that leads to scepticism about mental 
causation also leads to scepticism about almost all supposed ‘upper-level’ 
causation, and hence to scepticism about explanations that mention 
‘upper-level’ properties, including explanations offered by the special 
sciences […].84
This is echoed by Ned Block who says in response to the Exclusion argument that: 
‘it is hard to believe that there is no mental causation, no physiological causation, 
no molecular causation, no atomic causation but only bottom level physical 
causation.’85 These, however, are peculiar worries, in so far as the Exclusion 
argument has as a premise that there is mental causation. Likewise, applying the 
Exclusion problem to higher level properties in general would presumably involve a 
premise to the effect that there is higher level causation. If the Exclusion argument 
shows anything about higher-level properties in general, it is that higher level 
properties are reducible to physical properties, since this is the conclusion of the 
argument with respect to mental properties. But for some higher level properties, 
this is uncontroversial. We have already seen how a property of chemistry such as 
being an H2O-molecule is broadly physical, since it is ultimately decomposable 
into fundamental physical properties. Of course, not all higher-level properties are 
like that. For instance, the property of being metallic is arguably a functional 
chemical property, defined by its causal role of conducting electricity, and with 
many distinct realizers (being gold, being iron, being copper, and so on). There’s a 
real issue over whether or not the higher level properties that are not obviously 
broadly physical must be reduced in order to secure their causal powers, just as 
there is an issue over whether or not mental properties must be reduced in order to 
secure their causal powers. What is not clear, however, is that this is enough to 
establish a reductio against the Exclusion argument. After all, reduction in the 
special sciences is a live option. 
                                               
84 Baker [1993], 94. 
85 Block [2003], p. 5. Other authors have argued the same point. See Bontly [2002] and Noordhof 
[1999].
                                                    
73                                                                                                                             
3.13 The Drainage Problem
Let us therefore put the initial formulation of the generalization problem aside and 
instead focus on Block’s claim that the Exclusion Argument has as a consequence 
that there is only causation at the ‘bottom level’. I take it that by ‘bottom level’, 
Block has in mind the fundamental physical level. The idea is this: For any property 
at a higher level, there will be a property at the level below which is causally 
excluding it. Repeat this step down through the levels and it will turn out that the 
only properties not causally excluded are the properties at the lowest level. But now 
imagine that there is no bottom level, which, as Block argues, is a real possibility. 
In other words, broadly physical objects and properties might decompose endlessly 
such that, for every level, there is a level below it. In this case, no properties would 
be causes since all properties are relatively higher level properties. This is known as 
the Drainage problem, since all causal powers threaten to drain away into a 
bottomless hole. But if it is an open question whether there is a bottom level, and 
the Exclusion argument shows that there is only causation at the bottom level, this 
means this Exclusion argument leaves it an open question whether there is any 
causation at all. And this is surely a reductio against the Exclusion argument. 
3.14 Kim on the Drainage Problem: Levels versus Orders
In earlier writings, Kim has responded to the Drainage problem by stressing a 
distinction between orders and levels. Recall, levels are individuated 
mereologically. Molecules are at a lower level than cells because molecules 
compose cells, cells are at a lower level than animals because cells compose 
animals, etc. A property P is a higher level property relative to property Q, when 
the object instantiating P is mereologically complex relative to the object 
instantiating Q. So for instance, being a molecule is a lower level property relative 
to being a cell and a higher level property relative to being an atom. In contrast to 
this, a higher order property is a second order property – it is the property of having 
some first order property. Sometimes dispositional properties are construed in this 
manner. For instance, if a set of different molecular structures are the structures that 
are causing objects to break when struck, then being fragile might be defined as the 
second order property of having one of these first order molecular structures. From 
this it follows that the relation between lower and higher order properties is an 
intra-level relation since a property P and the property of having P will always be 
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properties of the same object. The object that has one of the molecular structures in 
the relevant set, say a glass, will be the very same object that has the second order 
property being fragile. Why is this important? It is important because the Exclusion 
principle only kicks in when an effect has two (or more) sufficient causes. And as 
Kim goes on to argue, it is generally not the case that there are properties at 
different levels competing to cause the same effect. For instance, molecules cause 
effects that no individual atom cause, atoms cause effects that no sub-atomic 
particle causes, and so on.86 In the case of higher-order properties, on the other 
hand, a first and a second order property are in direct competition to cause the 
relevant effect. If a certain molecular structural property S realizes fragility in virtue 
of having the causal power to cause objects to break when struck, then it seems that 
being fragile is causally excluded from being a cause of that effect, unless being 
fragile reduces to S. According to Kim then, worries about causal exclusion will 
typically be worries about exclusion within a level, rather than across levels. 
Likewise, reduction as a cure for these worries will be intra-level reduction. For 
instance, the relevant reduction-base for a mental property will presumably be a 
complex neural property, both of which are properties of the same person or 
cognizer. By stressing this distinction between levels and orders, Kim has 
supposedly blocked the causal drainage from higher to lower levels, while leaving 
the force of the argument intact with respect to mental properties and other second 
order properties.
3.15 Composite Overdetermination
It is not clear, however, that this response by Kim effectively deals with the 
drainage problem. Granted, as Kim says, higher level objects often have causal 
powers in virtue of their properties that no lower level object has. For instance, a 
higher level object can have powers in virtue of its mass that none of its parts has. 
Hence, there is no singular property at the lower level that is threatening to causally 
exclude this higher level property and by implication, no immediate threat of causal 
drainage across levels. But why think that causal competition must be between two 
singular properties, one higher level and one lower level property? Perhaps a higher 
level property can be causally excluded by a plurality of lower level properties. For 
                                               
86 Kim [1997], p. 292.
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instance, say that an object has the power to exert downward force F on a surface in 
virtue of its mass, and that each of its two parts has the power to exert a downward 
force of half an F. While it is true that none of the properties of the individual parts 
are competing with the mass of the whole to exert F, it might be argued that the 
masses of the two parts taken collectively are competing with the mass of the whole 
to cause that effect. In other words, we are facing systematic composite 
overdetermination – overdetermination by a whole and the parts that compose it. 
And if the mass of each of the parts are collectively exerting force F on the surface, 
then it seems that it would be redundant to claim that the mass of the whole is also 
exerting F on the surface. In this case, it certainly looks as if the causal powers of 
the higher level property drain to a level below. 
For now, let’s grant the proponent of the original Exclusion argument that the 
argument successfully shows that all non-physical properties (with causal powers at 
least), such as mental properties, must reduce to physical properties. In other words, 
the Exclusion argument shows that the world contains nothing but physical 
properties, some of which are higher level composite properties with fundamental 
physical properties as parts. We can now formulate a new version of the Exclusion 
problem in terms of higher level composite properties, based on the following four 
claims which appear to be mutually inconsistent.
I: Higher level composite properties sometimes cause effects (call this claim 
Higher Level Causation, or HLC for short).
II: Those effects are also sufficiently caused by the sum of lower level 
properties that compose these higher level properties (call this claim Lower 
Level Causation, or LLC for short).
III: In general, if an effect E has a sufficient cause C at time t, then all other 
properties distinct from C are excluded from being a cause of E at t
(Exclusion).
IV: Higher level properties are distinct from the sum of lower level properties 
that compose them.
Note that, unlike the original Exclusion problem where epiphenomenalism about 
mental properties is an option, a rejection of HLC, the claim that higher level 
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properties sometimes cause effects, is blocked off by the drainage problem. The 
view that there is no bottom level is the view that all properties are composite since 
any property will be decomposable into further parts. So if composite properties are 
epiphenomenal, then there is no causation anywhere and this is not an option. 
Note also that the Closure principle in the original formulation of the Exclusion 
problem is replaced by LLC, the claim that a sum or plurality of lower level 
properties causes the effect also caused by the higher level property they compose. 
In effect, LLC plays the role that the Closure principle plays in the original 
formulation of the Exclusion problem. But while the Closure principle finds 
empirical support in the explanatory success of natural science, it is not clear that 
the same support extends to LLC. After all, the issue here is not causal competition 
between a physical and a non-physical property but between some lower level 
physical properties and another physical property at a higher level. Nevertheless, 
LLC can be empirically motivated in a different way. Consider mass and the law of 
gravitation. I take it that this law is empirically supported as a universal law. As 
such, the law of gravitation does not discriminate between objects that are parts of a 
whole and those that are not. Say that an object O has a mass of 1 and that the law 
of gravitation dictates that the object exerts a downward force F when placed on a 
surface. Now imagine a situation where O is a proper part of another object O*. If 
the mass of O* is to causally exclude the mass of O from exerting a downward 
force, this would mean that when O is a proper part of O* and placed on a surface, 
the law of gravitation applies only to the mass of O*, not to the mass of O. In other 
words, the relation that O enters into when it becomes part of O* somehow trumps 
the law of gravitation - before O becomes a proper part of O*, its mass is subject to 
the law of gravitation. And then when O becomes a proper part of O*, this law no 
longer applies to O. In this case, composition would violate one of the basic laws of 
nature. But this sounds incredible and it is doubtful that anyone would want to 
defend such a claim. Surely an object is subject to the law of gravitation, whether or 
not it is a proper part of another object. Further, the mass of every non-overlapping 
proper part of O* each exert a downward force according to this law, the total of 
which is exactly the amount of force exerted by the mass of the entire object. So the 
claim that the lower level masses are sufficiently causing the exertion of the 
downward force also caused by the higher level mass they compose is empirically 
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motivated, at least in this specific case. Of course, it does not follow from this one 
example that lower level properties always cause the effects also caused by the 
higher level properties they compose. I will return to this issue shortly and also 
argue that as far as the drainage problem is concerned it does not matter if LLC is 
true for all composite properties.
In any case, if one endorses a rejection of the claim that mental and physical 
properties are distinct, in order to solve the Exclusion problem for mental 
properties, it is natural to assume that a rejection of the analogous claim that 
composite properties are distinct from the sum of their parts would be the preferred 
solution to the Exclusion problem for higher level properties. In other words, the 
way to avoid the causal competition between composite properties and their parts is 
therefore to reduce composite properties to their parts – composition is identity.87 If 
higher level properties are identical to lower level properties, then there cannot be 
any causal competition between them. This view comes with problems of its own. 
For one thing, it requires that identity can hold one-many, a notion some 
philosophers object to, since it holds between a singular higher level property and a 
plurality of its parts.88 Another worry, which is more directly relevant for Kim, is 
that the levels view of reality is ruled out if composition is identity. If higher level 
properties just are lower level properties, then there is no genuine metaphysical 
division of reality into distinct mereological levels. Rather, all supposedly higher 
and lower levels would collapse into one level, which would encompass all of 
reality. However, recall that Kim’s initial defence of the Exclusion argument 
against the drainage problem was based on higher level objects having causal 
powers in virtue of their properties which no lower level object has. Endorsing that 
composition is identity in order to avoid causal competition between properties and 
the sum of their parts will therefore invalidate this defence. On the other hand, the 
higher level defence is problematic, as we have seen, since it illegitimately assumes 
that causal competition is always between two singular properties or objects, 
whereas, in fact, there seems to be nothing wrong with it being between, on the one 
                                               
87 A weaker view would be one according to which composition isn’t identity but merely analogous 
to it. This is Lewis’s view in his [1991]. It is not clear, however, that anything short of genuine 
identity between higher and lower level objects will block the application of the Exclusion principle.
88 See Van Inwagen [1994]. 
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hand, a singular property or object, and on the other, a plurality of properties or 
objects. 
3.16 Kim on the Drainage Problem: Inter-level Reduction
So far, we have seen how the Exclusion problem can be extended to apply not only 
to mental properties (and other non-physical properties) but also to broadly physical 
higher level properties, and how Kim’s distinction between levels and orders cannot 
be exploited in a manner that will help to dissolve this problem. In some of Kim’s 
most recent writings on the Exclusion argument, he seems to realize this and his 
solution to the drainage problem based on higher level irreducible properties 
appears to have been replaced by a strategy that advocates reduction across levels.89
If so, this would make Kim’s response to the Exclusion problem for higher level 
properties the same as his response to the Exclusion problem for mental properties. 
Using water as an example, Kim starts out by noting that H2O is the micro-structure 
of water at the atomic level. This fact is what justifies the identity between being 
water and being H2O. But H2O itself has a micro-structure, call it R, at a level 
below the atomic level. This will be at the level of sub-atomic particles. So being 
water is also identical to being R. R has a micro-structure, call it S, at the level 
below the sub-atomic level. This will be, say, at the level of quarks. So being water
is also identical to being S. These steps can repeated until we reach a fundamental 
or bottom level or forever if there is no fundamental level. This gives us a long, 
potentially infinite, line of identities: 
Being water = being H2O = being R = being S…
Kim then goes on to proclaim: ‘Voilà! These are the identities we need to stop the 
drainage.’ It is important, however, that for the identities to do that job, the 
proposed solution must be interpreted in the right way. In particular, the identities 
must be between properties at different levels and not just between same-level 
properties that are specified in terms of their increasingly smaller parts and their 
properties. To bring out this difference, consider how a reduction of a material 
object might proceed. Say that my dining table, call it Table, is composed of two 
                                               
89 Kim [2005], pp. 68-69. For a discussion of how Kim’s response to the drainage problem has 
changed over the years, see Moore 2010. 
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parts; a top, call it Top, and a bottom, call it Bottom. Top is itself composed of four 
pieces of wood, W1-W4, and Bottom composed of four legs, L1-L4. With this in 
mind, we might propose the following line of identities:
Table = the object composed of Top and Bottom = the object composed of 
W1-W4 and L1-L4. 
This line of identities can be extended to include the object composed of the parts of 
W1-W4 and L1-L4, the object composed of the parts of these parts, and so on. The 
line would either stop at the bottom level or go on forever, if there is no bottom 
level. If composition is not identity, the reduction here is entirely within a level 
since Table is not reduced to any objects at a lower level. Rather, Table (the higher-
level object) is simply specified in terms of increasingly smaller parts. Keeping in 
mind the Levels view, where we increase mereological complexity by moving up, 
we might say that the reduction proposed here is horizontal. We do not move up or 
down levels, merely sideways within a level. So if one is worried that Table is 
causally excluded by Top and Bottom, identifying Table with the object composed
of Top and Bottom is of no help. However, if composition is identity, we can 
replace the proposed line of identities with the following:
Table = Top and Bottom = W1-W4 and L1-L4.
Now Table has been reduced to objects at a level below it and the reduction is 
vertical, rather than horizontal. And now there can no longer be causal competition 
between, on the one hand Table, and, on the other hand Top and Bottom, or W1-W4 
and L1-L4. Table just is those lower level objects.
3.17 Causal Drainage and Inter-level Reduction of Properties
Reduction of properties can be either intra- or inter-level in the same way. For 
instance, say that the following is true: The property being an H2O molecule is 
identical to the property of having three atomic parts, two of which has the property 
being a hydrogen atom and one which has the property being an oxygen atom (of 
course, the parts have to instantiate certain relational properties as well, a 
complication I will set aside for the sake of simplicity in this example). The 
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property being a hydrogen atom is identical to the property of having three sub-
atomic parts, two of which has the property being an electron and one which has 
the property being a proton. And the property being an oxygen atom is the property 
of having twenty-four sub-atomic parts, eight with the property being an electron, 
eight with the property being a proton, and eight with the property being a neutron. 
Since the parthood relation is transitive, it follows that being an H2O molecule is 
the property of having thirty sub-atomic parts, twelve with the property being an 
electron, ten with the property being a proton, and eight with the property being a 
neutron. In other words, the property being an H2O molecule is composed of the 
properties being a hydrogen atom and being an oxygen atom, which in turn are 
composed of the properties being an electron, being a proton, and being a neutron. 
We therefore have the following identities:
The property being an H2O molecule = the property composed of the 
properties being a hydrogen atom and being an oxygen atom = the property 
composed of the properties being an electron, being a proton, and being a 
neutron.
As with material objects, we can extend the list by specifying the property being an 
H2O molecule in terms of its parts at the level of quarks, at the level below the level 
of quarks, and so on, until we reach the fundamental or bottom level. If there is no 
fundamental level, the list would be infinite. But again, unless composition is 
identity, this will get us only reduction within a level. Being an H2O molecule is not 
reduced to properties at a lower level but merely to different structural properties at 
the same level – it is horizontal or sideways reduction, not vertical or downward 
reduction. If the identities Kim has in mind are identities of this sort, i.e. identities 
between same level properties specified in terms of their parts and properties at 
various levels, then the identities do not stop causal drainage from higher to lower 
levels. We can still worry whether the property of the whole causally competes with 
the properties of the parts taken collectively. For reduction to block causal drainage, 
composition must be identity which generates the following identities:
The property being an H2O molecule = the properties being a hydrogen 
atom twice over and being an oxygen atom = the properties being an 
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electron twelve times over, being a proton ten times over, and being a 
neutron eight times over.
Here the higher level property reduces to genuinely lower level properties, not 
merely to other structural properties at the same level. Of course, for causal 
drainage to be effectively blocked, the identities must go all the way down, either to 
the bottom level, if such a level exist, or indefinitely, if there is no bottom level. 
3.18 Against Inter-level Reduction as a Solution to the Drainage 
Problem
Is such a reduction of higher level properties to lower level properties a viable 
solution to the drainage problem? As mentioned earlier, with the claim that 
composition is identity comes the puzzle of how one thing can be identical to many 
– how can one higher level property be identical to many lower level properties? 
But even putting that aside, I do not believe this kind of reduction of properties 
across levels will solve the drainage problem. Here is why: Assume there is no 
bottom level and that composition is identity. Now take a property H at any level L. 
Say that H is composed of lower level properties R and S. Which object instantiates 
H? Not any object at level L. The reason is that H is identical to lower level 
properties R and S and R and S are properties of objects at a level below L, L-1. 
Now consider these properties. Which object instantiates R? Not any object at level 
L-1. The reason is that R is itself composed of properties, say X and Y, at a level 
below L-1, L-2 (the same for S). Which object instantiates X? Not any object at 
level L-2 since X is composed of properties at a level below L-2, L-3. And we could 
go on like this without ever reaching an object which instantiates a property. In 
short, if there is no bottom level and composition is identity, no object ever gets to 
instantiate a property. In the original drainage problem, causal powers threatened to 
drain away. If we try to avoid this by reducing properties across levels, it seems that 
properties themselves (or at least their instantiations), threaten to drain away. And 
since objects are causes in virtue of instantiating properties, the result is the same –
if there is no bottom level, there is no causation. So identifying higher level 
properties with the lower level properties that compose them is of no help at all 
against Block’s argument that causal powers drain away if there is no bottom level.  
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Note that this new version of the drainage argument against property-composition 
being identity is independent of the Exclusion argument and assumes none of its
premises. In the way I set it up, it does, however, assume a substance-attribute 
model for properties according to which substances (objects or events) instantiate
properties. Could the proponent of the Exclusion argument avoid the problem by 
going for a bundle view, according to which material objects are bundles of 
properties (either universals or tropes)? Here’s an argument to the effect that a 
bundle view would avoid the drainage problem I’ve sketched above (I present it 
merely to reject it): If objects are bundles of properties, the instantiation relation 
would simply be an instance of the parthood relation – an object O has a property if 
that property is a part of the bundle of properties that is O. Since the parthood 
relation is transitive, this means that there is no problem with an object having both 
a composite property and its parts. For instance, if an object O has property H as a 
part and H itself has properties R and S as parts, then O also has R and S as parts. If 
properties decompose endlessly, this just means that O decomposes endlessly. And 
if composition is identity, this just gives us identities all the way down – H is 
identical to lower level properties R and S, R and S are identical to even lower level 
properties X, Y, Z, and so on. Unfortunately, this argument is unsound. On a bundle 
view, properties aren’t just parts of objects, they are compresent parts. That is, they 
are parts that occupy exactly the same spatio-temporal region. For instance, a red 
sphere with a mass of 1 has the properties being red, being spherical, and having 
mass 1 and those properties occupy exactly the same spatio-temporal region – the 
spatio-temporal region where the sphere is located. Without this qualification, the 
bundle view would have some strange consequences. For instance, the very same 
object would not just have a one mass, it would also have the mass of any of its 
proper parts. If a property is a property of an object only if it is a compresent part of 
the bundle that is that object, this is avoided. As an example, consider again Table 
that is composed of Top and Bottom. Say that Table has mass 2 and that Top has 
mass 1. If parthood of Table were sufficient for being a property of Table, Table 
would also have mass 1 according to the Bundle view, since the property mass 1 is 
part of Top and Top is a part of Table. But parthood of Table is not sufficient for 
being a property of Table. What is also required is that the property is a compresent 
part of Table. And mass 1 is not a compresent part of Table as it does not occupy 
the spatio-temporal region that Table does. Rather, mass 1 is a compresent part of 
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Top, and as such, only occupies a proper part of the spatio-temporal region that 
Table occupies. Hence, mass 1 is not a property of Table. This solves the problem 
of Table having many distinct masses.
In solving this problem, however, we’ve re-introduced the drainage problem for 
properties. Say that a bundle view is true and start with any composite property H at 
a level L which has lower level properties R and S as parts. Which object has H? 
That is, of which object is H a compresent part? No object, since H is identical to 
lower level properties R and S and they are not compresent parts of the same 
bundle. But which object has R as a compresent part? No object, since R is 
composed of even lower level properties, say X and Y, and X and Y are not 
compresent parts of the same bundle. And we could go on asking this question 
forever. No property would ever get to be a compresent part of any bundle of 
properties since every property is identical to lower level properties which 
themselves are not compresent parts of the same bundle. So whether one endorses a 
substance-attribute model for properties or a bundle view, the result is the same. 
Properties and causal powers drain away if there is no bottom level.90
3.19 Solving the Drainage Problem I
To sum up, the drainage problem presents Kim, and other philosophers who 
endorse the Exclusion argument against non-reductive physicalism, with an 
uncomfortable dilemma. On the one hand, if higher level properties do not reduce to 
lower level properties, they appear to be causally excluded by these lower level 
properties taken collectively. If there is no bottom level and every level has a level 
below it, this means that causal powers drain away and that there is no causation 
anywhere. On the other hand, if higher-level properties do reduce to lower-level 
properties and there is no bottom level, then for any object O at any level L, O does 
not instantiate any property since every property is identical to properties at a level 
                                               
90 Note that these arguments against inter-level reduction of properties do not depend on the Levels 
view being true, despite their reference to levels. Rather, if sound, they show the Levels view to be 
false. No object at level L instantiates properties (call them L-objects and L-properties) because 
every L-property is identical to properties at a lower level L-1 and no object on that level instantiates 
L-properties. But if there are no L-properties then it is difficult to see in what sense there could be 
any L-objects. And if there are neither L-properties nor L-objects, then it is difficult to see in what 
sense there is really a L-level. Of course, this is the result we want since, as I mentioned earlier, the 
composition-as-identity view is the view that only a single level exists.
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below L, which are not properties of O. Again, causal powers drain away and there 
is no causation anywhere. In either case, it looks as if it is left as an open question 
whether there is causation. And assuming that this is unacceptable, it seems we 
have a good reason for rejecting the Exclusion argument off-hand. The Drainage 
problem establishes a reductio against the Exclusion argument.
An advocate of the Exclusion argument can try to avoid this in a couple of ways. 
First, she might insist that, as a matter of contingent fact, there is a bottom level. 
This would defuse the worry about causal powers draining away, at least in our 
world. It is not clear, however, that there are empirical grounds for making such a 
claim. At the very least, it seems to be an empirically open question whether or not 
there is a bottom level.91 In any case, even if there is a bottom level and causal 
drainage is blocked in our world by that level, the Exclusion argument would still 
have the implausible consequence that it is entirely contingent whether or not there 
is causation. An alternative would be to go for the stronger claim that it is 
metaphysically necessary that there is a bottom level. But this is quite controversial 
and to my knowledge, rarely defended in the literature.92
Second, a proponent of the Exclusion argument might choose to reject the claim 
that broadly physical higher-level properties are causally competing with the lower 
level properties that compose them, even when they are considered collectively. So 
not only do some higher level properties have causal powers that do not reduce to 
the powers of any singular lower level property, they also have powers that does not 
reduce to the powers of any collection of lower level properties. How plausible is 
this? For some higher level properties, a case might be made. These are the 
structural properties where the specific structure of the parts matter to the causal 
powers of the property the parts compose. Take two kinds of molecules with 
different causal powers, butane and isobutene, which nevertheless have the same 
parts (four carbon atoms and ten hydrogen atoms).93 What makes these molecules 
different is the way their parts are structured. In this case, it might be argued that 
the structure of the whole has causal powers that the mere sum of the parts do not, 
                                               
91 See Block [2003] and Schaffer [2003] for some discussion of this.
92 An exception is Williams [2006].
93 The example is due to David Lewis [1986a].
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and those powers are exactly what distinguishes the powers of butane molecules 
from the powers isobutene molecules. Kim sometimes writes as if this is his view: 
[Micro-based properties] do not supervene on [their constituent properties] 
taken individually or as group. Rather, they supervene on specific 
mereological configurations involving these micro-properties – for a rather 
obvious and uninteresting reason: they are identical with these micro-
configuations.94
The structure of the carbon and hydrogen atoms that compose a butane molecule is, 
I take it, an example of what Kim has in mind when he talks of “specific 
mereological configurations”. But even if it is true of some structural properties that 
the structure itself has irreducible causal powers, it is unlikely to be true of all. 
Earlier I discussed the case of mass and how the mass of a higher-level object 
arguably compete with the masses of its part to exert certain downward force, and 
that to claim otherwise would be to accept that the law of gravitation is 
systematically violated. But even so, in that example, the way these lower level 
masses are structured does not seem to make a difference to the causal powers of 
the mass of the whole. An object composed of ten parts, each with a mass of 1, will 
have the same higher level mass (a mass of 10), whether its parts form a straight 
line, a square, a circle, and so on. If so, the structure of the parts cannot be what 
blocks the causal drainage from the higher to the lower level with respect to the 
causal powers of mass. And now we can simply run the drainage argument against 
the property mass. Start with an object O at any level. O does not instantiate mass 
M (where M is a determinate mass), since M is composed of masses at the level 
below, which are not properties of O. But no object at that lower level instantiates 
these lower level masses since they are themselves composed of masses at levels 
even lower, and so on – mass drains away. And this, I contend, is enough to 
constitute a reductio against the Exclusion argument.
3.20 Solving the Drainage Problem II
If the Exclusion argument is to have any hope of establishing reductionism about 
mental properties, something has to give. The proponent of the argument cannot 
consistently hold the following claims:
                                               
94 Kim [1998], pp. 117-118.
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(i) It’s an open question whether there is a bottom fundamental level.
(ii) It’s not an open question whether there is causation.
(iii) The Exclusion Argument, in its original form and applied to higher level 
properties in general, is sound. 
Since we are assuming that (i) and (ii) are true, the problem is with the Exclusion 
argument. But which premise? It will not help us to reject the premise that there is 
higher level causation since this will play right into the problem of causal powers 
draining away (if there is no bottom level, all levels are relatively higher levels). 
The claim that lower-level properties causally compete with the higher level 
properties they compose is at least justified in the case of mass. And reduction of 
higher-level properties to lower-level properties is also facing a form of the 
drainage problem, since the properties to be reduced would never get to instantiate 
if there is no bottom level. This leaves the Exclusion principle. However, when 
setting up the Exclusion problem we saw that this principle is motivated.  To reject 
it in a dialectically satisfactory manner we have to explain why those motivations 
are either ill-founded or do not really support the Exclusion principle as it stands. 
Here it seems to me that the latter strategy has more promise. We need a version of 
the Exclusion principle that allows for the kind of overdetermination that occurs 
when a higher level property causes an effect that is also caused by the properties 
that compose it, while still prohibiting the kind of overdetermination that occurs in 
the standard examples from the literature. 
3.21 Inter-level Reduction of Causal Powers
To bring out a relevant difference which might help us to draw the distinction 
between different forms of overdetermination, let me again focus on the case of 
mass and how a higher level mass, call it H, can cause effects also caused by a sum 
of lower masses, call it L, for instance cause a certain downward force to be exerted 
on a surface. I have already argued that both H and L are causing an exertion of 
downward force F on a surface when object O is placed on it. H cannot causally 
exclude L without violating the law of gravitation and L cannot causally exclude H
since this leads to causal powers draining away in a bottomless world. I have also 
argued that H cannot be identical to L since this leads to a different form of 
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drainage problem according to which a property like mass would drain away in a 
bottomless world. This, however, leads us to the problem of cumulative effects. If H
and L both exert downward force F, then the object that has H, and which is 
composed of the parts that each has one of the masses in L, would have a mass of H 
plus each of the masses in L. And that’s obviously not the case. If two parts each 
have a mass of 1, the object they compose will just have a mass of 2, not a mass of 
2 plus the mass of each part. But if (determinate) cumulative effects cannot be 
overdetermined, how can H and L both be sufficient causes of exerting force F? 
How can H and L both exert the very same token force, not just two distinct forces 
of the same amount, or two token-distinct forces of the same type? If H and L
bestow distinct powers to exert the same amount of downward force, this is a 
mystery. Assume that a composite object O with mass H is placed on a surface, that 
H bestows on O the power to exert downward force F under those conditions, and 
that this power is manifested as a result. If O’s two parts each have powers to exert 
a downward force of half an F, the sum of these powers is token-distinct from the 
power bestowed by H, and these powers also manifest when O is placed on the 
surface, then there seems to be no good reason why the combined force exerted on 
the surface wouldn’t be F times two (the F exerted by O in virtue of H plus half an 
F exerted by one of O’s parts plus half an F exerted by O’s other part). 
The mystery disappears, however, if we reject the assumption that H and L bestow 
distinct powers to exert downward force F. If instead, the power H has to exert 
downward force F is the very same power L has to exert downward force F, we 
should not expect that total downward force exerted on the surface when O is 
placed on it, is F times two. When O is placed on the surface, there is just one
power that is manifested, (a token of the type of power to exert downward force F) 
and hence just one downward force that is exerted. Given the empirical facts of the 
case (that O exerts downward force F, not F times two), it simply must be the case 
that H and L bestow on O the very same power to exert downward force F. We have 
reduction of powers across levels – the power bestowed by the higher level property 
reduces to the power bestowed by a sum of lower level properties.
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3.22 Reduction of Powers and Causal Overdetermination
Even though the power bestowed by the higher-level mass reduces to the power 
bestowed by the sum of lower level properties, the exertion of force F is still 
overdetermined. When object O is placed on a surface, the exertion of downward 
force F has two distinct sufficient causes, H and L, since both bestow a power on O 
that manifests. Also, it is systematic overdetermination since it occurs whenever an 
object exerts a force according to the law of gravitation (at least provided it has 
more than one proper part with mass). But it is different from the kind of 
overdetermination that occurs in the standard examples from the literature. Consider 
again the case of the two snipers whose bullets happen to hit Target and kill him at 
exactly the same time. Here, the death is overdetermined as well and the two bullets 
both have a power of the same type (the power to kill Target). But it cannot be the 
case that the bullets have the same token of this power. The obvious reason is that 
the power to kill Target had by one bullet could manifest without the power to kill 
Target had by the other bullet manifesting. This would happen if one of the bullets 
was fired slightly later or earlier or if one of the bullets wasn’t fired at all. If so, 
only one of the bullets would be a cause of his death. The other bullet would have a 
power to cause Target’s death that failed to manifest. In the case of the object and 
the sum of its parts both exerting a downward force on a surface, however, this 
should be not possible given that the composite object and the sum of its parts have 
the very same token of the type of power to exert downward force F. But this seems 
right. A composite object cannot exert downward force F on a surface without its 
parts also exerting that downward force. 
So, while both are cases of overdetermination, the sniper case involves the 
manifestation of two distinct tokens of a type of power (the power to kill Target), 
whereas the mass case involves the manifestation of just a single token of a power 
(the power to exert downward force F). We can call the former strong 
overdetermination and the latter weak overdetermination. 
(Strong Overdetermination): 
An effect is strongly overdetermined iff it is the manifestation of two 
distinct token-powers.
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(Weak Overdetermination):
An effect is weakly overdetermined iff it is the manifestation of a token-
power that is bestowed by two (or more) distinct properties.
Is this a relevant distinction, as far as a revision of the Exclusion principle is 
concerned? Given the original motivations for the Exclusion principle, the answer is 
arguably yes. Firstly, one problem with systematic overdetermination is that it 
seems to require extraordinary circumstances. It is quite a coincidence if, in a 
handful or even a single case, two snipers happen to hit a target at exactly the same 
time. But to assume that this happens in general is incredible. However, in cases of 
weak overdetermination, it is not at all incredible that there are two sufficient 
causes of a single effect since the overdetermining causes bestow the very same 
power, the manifestation of which is the overdetermined effect. Secondly, 
systematic overdetermination seems to involve more causes than needed which 
goes against principles of ontological simplicity and appears ad hoc. However, as 
the previous discussion has shown, we do need to allow for both H and L to be 
causes, since all other alternatives have unacceptable consequences, and arguments 
from simplicity apply only to positing entities that aren’t needed. There is nothing 
ad hoc about the proposal either. Rather, it follows from the evidence, partly 
empirical and partly philosophical, that H and L must have the same token-power to 
cause exertion of force F. Finally, as we saw, the fact that H and L have the same 
token-power to cause this effect explains how cumulative effects can be 
overdetermined at all. The reasons we have for prohibiting systematic 
overdetermination of the sniper-case variety therefore do not apply to the kind of 
overdetermination that occurs in the case of higher and lower level masses exerting 
force.  This opens the door for a dialectically satisfactory revision of the Exclusion 
principle. Recall, a rejection of any of the claims in the Exclusion problem should 
preferably be accompanied by either an explanation of why the reasons for 
accepting this claim are ill founded, or an explanation of why these reasons are 
really reasons for accepting a different claim. And this latter explanation is now 
provided. Since the worries about overdetermination pertain exclusively to strong 
overdetermination, they are insufficient to support an Exclusion principle that 
prohibits both strong and weak overdetermination. Hence, the Exclusion principle
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should be revised in such a way that it rules out only systematic strong 
overdetermination:
(Exclusion-Strong):
In general, if an effect E is the manifestation of token-power P 
bestowed by C, then all properties that do not bestow P are excluded 
from being a cause of E. 
Given that the higher level composite properties that causally compete with the sum 
of their parts to cause an effect do bestow the same token-power to cause that 
effect, this means that the Exclusion principle does not apply to either. Hence, the 
Exclusion problem applied to higher level properties dissolves.
Does the Exclusion problem for mental properties dissolve as well? That depends 
on whether or not the revised Exclusion principle applies to mental properties. If the 
causal powers bestowed by mental properties are token-identical to powers 
bestowed by some physical properties, the principle does not apply and mental 
properties fail to be causally excluded. In the next chapter I will defend the view 
that this is in fact the case. 
Now, the case of mass and exertion of downward force is special in the sense that 
the forces exerted add up in a straightforward manner. If the parts collectively exert 
force F and the whole exerts F, then we know that the total force exerted by the 
object must be F times two, unless the parts and the whole exert the very same 
token of force F. But in other cases, things are not quite as simple. Consider a 
different power an object might have in virtue of its mass, for instance, the power 
had by a bullet to kill Target. Say that the bullet hits Target and this power 
manifests. In this case, we can worry that the mass of the bullet (H) is causally 
competing with the masses of each of its parts considered collectively (L) to cause 
that effect. However, we can’t check empirically whether those effects have 
accumulated, since a killing is an event that can happen only once to a person at a 
time. So how are we justified in claiming that H and L bestow the same token of the 
power to cause Target’s death? After all, if they do not, Target would still just die 
once. Still, if we assume that the force-case and the killing-case are to be treated 
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similarly, then we do have a reason for thinking that H and L bestow the same token 
of the power to cause Target’s death, since we know that this must be so in the 
force-case. And this is not an unreasonable assumption. After all, it is presumably 
no coincidence that H and L bestow the same token of the power to exert downward 
force F. For instance, this may come down to the fact that the causally relevant 
instances of H and L are co-located or that one composes the other. Whatever the 
explanation is, however, it will apply to the power to cause Target’s death, as well 
as other powers that H and L share.
3.23 Concluding Remarks
Let me briefly sum up what has been argued in this chapter. The Exclusion problem 
for mental properties consists in four mutually inconsistent claims that are 
independently motivated: Mental Causation, Closure, Exclusion, and Distinctness. 
Advocates of the Exclusion argument opt for rejecting Distinctness – mental 
properties (and other non-physical properties) must be reduced to broadly physical 
properties. In the case of mental properties, these broadly physical properties will 
likely be complex neural properties. The Exclusion argument, however, faces the 
Drainage problem when applied to broadly physical higher level. I argued, contra 
Kim’s original discussion of this problem, that at least some higher level properties 
are facing causal exclusion by the sum of the lower level properties that compose 
them, and that this leads to the causal powers draining away if there is no bottom 
level. I also argued, contra Kim’s most recent discussion of this problem, that 
reduction of higher level properties to the lower level properties that compose them 
leads to a new form of the drainage problem. The conclusion is that some effects 
caused by higher level properties are also sufficiently caused by the sum of their 
parts. 
As this is overdetermination, the original formulation of the Exclusion principle 
must be false. However, there is an important difference between the 
overdetermination that the Exclusion principle is supposed to rule out and the kind 
of overdetermination involved in cases where higher level and lower level 
properties cause the same effect. In the latter case, the overdetermined effect is the 
manifestation of a single power bestowed by each of the overdetermining causes. I 
called this weak overdetermination. The case of higher level mass justifies this 
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claim – if a higher level mass and the sum of its parts bestow distinct tokens of a 
power to exert a downward force, the total force exerted by an object would not just 
be the combined force exerted by each of its part. But it is, so a higher level mass 
and the sum of its parts must bestow just a single token of the power to exert a 
certain downward force. This kind of overdetermination does not suffer from the 
problems that come with the standard cases of overdetermination from the 
literature, where the overdetermined effect is the result of two distinct powers 
manifesting. I called this strong overdetermination. Hence, the Exclusion principle 
should not rule out weak overdetermination. This means that the proponent of the 
Exclusion argument can block causal drainage, while consistently hold that the 
Exclusion argument establishes reductionism about mental properties. All this 
requires is that the overdetermination that occurs if mental and physical properties 
overdetermine behavioural effects are of the strong kind. 
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Chapter 4
Motivating and Defending the Subset View
Abstract: In this chapter I put some of the conclusions from the 
previous chapter to work. Since the exclusion principle prohibits 
only strong systematic overdetermination, the Exclusion problem 
would be solved if mental and physical properties weakly 
overdetermine their common effects. I introduce Sydney 
Shoemaker’s so-called Subset view, according to which this is the 
case. I discuss and reject the claims that the Subset view commits 
you to endorse that causes are proportional to their effects or that 
some form of functionalism is true of mental properties. Instead, I 
argue that the Subset view is motivated by the very statements that 
constitute the Exclusion problem. Finally, I consider some 
potential limitations of the Subset view.
4.1 Mental Causation and Weak Overdetermination
Given the fact that the Exclusion principle must be revised to allow for weak 
overdetermination, it is tempting to think that mental causation might be understood 
in a way that makes mental effects weakly overdetermined by mental and physical 
properties. What is required is that the powers to cause physical effects had by any 
instance of a mental property, must reduce (at the token-level) to the causal powers 
had by some instance of a physical property. Of course, this will trivially be the 
case on a reductive physicalist account of mental properties – if mental properties 
are identical to physical properties, they have the very same powers these physical 
properties have, both at the type and token-level. However, reduction of causal 
powers need not entail reduction of the property that has these powers. 
4.2 Reduction of Powers without Reduction of Properties
Let’s say that a set of powers form a causal profile for a property P if and only if it 
is the largest set of powers had by P. In other words, any proper subset of powers 
had by P will not be a causal profile for P since it is not the largest set of powers 
had by P. The property that has all and only the powers in the causal profile I will 
call the occupant of that causal profile.95 Now, note that it is a necessary condition 
                                               
95 Note that this is a more demanding notion of occupancy than is sometimes used in the literature, 
where a property is said to be an occupant of a causal power or causal role if it is the property that 
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for the identity between two properties that they have the exact same causal profile 
- if the profile of a property X contains at least one causal power not contained in 
the profile for property Y, then X and Y must be distinct. Mental properties are 
therefore distinct from physical properties if their causal profiles are distinct from 
any causal profile occupied by a physical property. 
Is it also a sufficient condition for the identity between two properties that they 
have the exact same causal profile? That is, is it the case that if X and Y are distinct,
the profile of X must contain at least one causal power not contained in the profile 
for property Y, or vice versa? If you say yes, you hold a causal theory of properties, 
according to which properties are fully individuated by their causal powers, at least 
throughout worlds with the same laws of nature. Physicalists and naturalists tend to 
accept some form of this view, and even if it is rejected as being true in general, 
even non-physicalists are likely to accept it for physical properties.96 If so, the 
difference between mental and physical properties is bound to show up as a 
difference in their causal profiles. The reason for this is that Distinctness is 
motivated by the argument from multiple realization – the instantiation of M
requires no particular physical property to be instantiated as M can be realized by 
different physical properties in different individuals. Now assume, for reductio, that 
mental property M has a casual profile that is identical to the profile of some 
physical property P. If so, every individual that instantiates M would thereby also 
instantiate P (since physical properties such as P are fully individuated by their 
causal powers). But if the argument from multiple realization is sound, this is false. 
So M cannot have a causal profile that is identical to the causal profile of some 
physical property.97 Note that this argument does not assume that a causal theory of 
properties is true of mental properties, just that it is true of physical properties
                                                                                                                                  
has this power or plays that role, or the occupant of a set of powers if it has the powers in that set. 
On my account, this would be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for being an occupant of 
these powers, since it does not rule out that the property has additional powers not in that set.
96 Physical properties at the same level of mereological complexity at least. The causal profile of a 
sum of lower-level physical properties may be identical to the causal profile of the higher-level 
physical property they compose, yet I would deny that the sum of lower-level properties is identical 
to that higher-level property for the reasons given in the previous chapter. In any case, we might say 
that the sum of lower-level properties differ from the higher-level property they compose with 
respect to their logical properties since a sum of properties is many, whereas a composite property is 
one. 
97 This argument also has as a consequence that the causal profile of M cannot include the causal 
profile of any particular physical property. I establish the same conclusion with a different argument 
shortly. 
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(towards the end of the chapter I consider how a rejection of the causal theory of 
properties for mental properties causes problems for physicalism). In any case, the 
upshot is that for the purposes of the arguments in this chapter, we can assume that 
it is a sufficient condition for the identity between two properties that they have the 
exact same causal profile. 
Or in other words, Distinctness (i.e. the claim that mental and physical properties 
are distinct) is true if and only if, for any mental property M and its causal profile, 
and any physical property P and its causal profile, M’s profile either contains some 
power not contained in P’s profile, or P’s profile contains some power not 
contained in M’s profile.98 This, however, is entirely compatible with M’s profile 
fully or partially overlapping with the profile of some P. If the causal profiles of 
mental properties only partially reduce to powers contained in the profiles of 
physical properties, mental and physical properties are distinct since mental 
properties occupy causal profiles that contain powers not contained in the profile of 
any physical property. In this case, the causal profiles of mental properties would 
extend beyond the profiles of physical properties. And even if the causal profile of 
any mental property fully reduces to powers contained in the profile of some 
physical property, mental properties are still distinct from physical properties if the 
profiles of the latter contain additional powers, not contained in the profile of 
mental properties. In this case, the causal profiles of physical properties would 
extend beyond the profiles of mental properties.99
4.3 In What Way are Mental and Physical Properties Distinct?
Mental and physical properties are distinct then, if mental properties have causal 
profiles that contain powers not contained in the profile of any physical property or, 
if there are no such powers in the profiles of mental properties, if the physical 
causal profiles to which the mental causal profiles reduce contain additional causal 
                                               
98 Is identity between causal profiles also a sufficient condition for identity between the properties 
that occupy these profiles? Consider two objects that have exactly the same causal powers. I take it 
that many would be inclined to accept that these two objects must have the exact same properties as 
well, at least if the objects exist in worlds with the same laws. Exceptions would involve properties 
whose nature is not exhausted by their causal profiles. In other words, properties supervene on their 
causal profiles with nomic necessity.  
99 Of course, it might be the case that the profiles of mental properties extent beyond the profiles of 
physical properties and vice versa.
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powers. Let’s first consider the possibility that mental properties are distinct from 
physical properties in virtue of having causal powers that no physical property has. 
This, for instance, would be the case according to emergentism about mental 
properties. It cannot, however, be the case according to non-reductive physicalism. 
First, assuming that physicalists universally accept the Closure principle (recall, this 
is roughly that claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause), the 
non-reductive physicalist must reject that mental properties are distinct from 
physical properties in virtue of having powers to cause physical effects that no 
physical properties have powers to cause.100 So if mental properties have causal 
powers not had by any physical property, they must be powers to cause non-
physical effects. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, on the physicalist 
account, causing a non-physical effect, for instance a mental property, is to cause 
the physical grounding base for this effect (see chapter 3.6). This means that if a 
property has a power to cause a mental (or otherwise non-physical) effect, this must 
be a power to cause a physical effect - the physical property or properties that this 
mental effect is grounded in. So, assuming physicalism, mental properties cannot be 
distinct from physical properties in virtue of having powers to cause mental effects 
that no physical property has the power to cause either, since this as well would 
violate the Closure principle. From a physicalist perspective then, distinctness 
between mental and physical properties is best based on the claim that the physical 
causal profiles of which the profiles of mental properties are part, contain additional 
powers. Naturally, this is not an argument exclusively about mental properties but 
can be applied to other non-physical properties as well. Call it the argument for 
additional physical powers (APP). This, it seems to me, is an argument that all non-
reductive physicalists should accept, in so far as they accept that mental properties 
(or other non-physical properties) have causal powers and that the Closure principle 
is true. I will say more about this later.
Notice that APP is an argument that is concerned with causal powers at the type 
level only. There is nothing in the argument that allows us to conclude that the 
token-powers of every mental property are identical to token-powers of some 
physical property. This is the case even if we consider instances or tokens of 
                                               
100 I chapter 6 I will discuss a form of non-reductive physicalism that challenges this.
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properties – an instance of a mental property may bestow tokens of certain causal 
powers on a particular that are distinct from tokens of powers bestowed by a 
physical property on this particular, despite these tokens being of the same type. 
4.4 The Subset View and the Exclusion Problem
That mental properties (and other non-physical properties in general) are distinct 
from physical properties in the manner concluded by APP, and that the causal 
powers of these properties reduce to some powers of physical properties, at both the 
type and token level is, in a nutshell, the view known as the Subset view. Prima 
facie, the Subset view applied to mental properties provides an attractive solution to 
the Exclusion problem. First, the view allows for mental causation since it holds 
that mental properties exist and have causal powers that sometimes manifest. 
Second, the view is compatible with the causal closure of the physical domain in the 
following way: Any case of mental causation involves the manifestation of a mental 
power (i.e. a power had or bestowed by a mental property). But since any mental 
power is identical to a physical power (i.e. a power had or bestowed by a physical 
property), any case of mental causation is also a case of physical causation. Hence, 
on this view, mental causation does not in any way threaten the principle of causal 
closure. Thirdly, as we have just seen, according to the Subset view, causation by 
irreducible mental properties does not violate the Exclusion principle since this 
prohibits only (systematic) strong causal overdetermination, and on the Subset view 
mental effects are merely weakly overdetermined. Fourthly, not only is the Subset 
view a non-reductive view since it claims that mental and physical properties 
occupy distinct causal profiles, it also fits nicely with the motivation for accepting 
Distinctness in the first place, which was provided by the argument from multiple 
realization. Recall, the argument from multiple realization states that a mental 
property cannot be identical to any physical property since the former can be shared 
by creatures that otherwise share no relevant physical properties. This fact can be 
accommodated by the Subset view. A mental property can be shared by two 
creatures with different physical properties if these physical properties bestow some
of the same powers (at the type level) and these powers are exactly the type of 
powers also bestowed by the mental property. 
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In the following, I will expand on the Subset view as a position in the philosophy of 
mind and defend it as a solution to the Exclusion problem. The point of departure 
will be Sydney Shoemaker’s influential formulation of the view. Of course, it is one 
thing to work out a position in detail and evaluate its potential theoretical benefits, it 
is another to argue that the position is true. Towards the end of the chapter I will 
show how the Subset view can be motivated. 
4.5 Shoemaker’s Subset View
Shoemaker does not initially focus his discussion on mental properties but instead 
on the general notion of realization. Take the relation that holds between two 
properties when one has a causal profile that is a proper subset of the profile had by 
the other. Call this the subset relation. According to Shoemaker, it is at least a 
necessary condition for realization that the realized property and its realizer stand in 
the subset relation.101 That is, one property is realized by another only when the 
former has causal powers that are a proper subset of the set of powers had by the 
latter.102 Again, the subset relation is here taken to hold between powers at both the 
type and token level. In Shoemaker’s most recent writings, the view is slightly more 
complicated as he introduces a distinction between forward and backward looking 
causal powers.103 Forward looking causal powers are simply causal powers as we 
have been talking about them so far. They are forward looking in the sense that they 
are specified in terms of potential future events – i.e. the effects they are powers to 
cause. Backward looking causal powers, on the other hand, are not specified in 
terms of effects but rather in terms of the properties or events that are causes of the 
                                               
101 Strictly speaking, the subset relation is a relation between sets of what Shoemaker calls causal 
features, to each of which corresponds a causal power that the property bestows on the its possessors 
(Shoemaker [2007], p. 24). For present purposes, this distinction is irrelevant. 
102 Shoemaker [2001], p. 78. Shoemaker makes an exception for conjunctive properties and their 
conjuncts which he argues also stand in a subset relation but which fail to stand in a realization 
relation. Hence, standing in the subset relation cannot sufficient for realization on his account. I will 
argue later that in any case, realization is best seen as a combination of the subset relation and the 
grounding relation. Another thing to note is that, in his most recent writings, Shoemaker 
distinguishes between two kinds of realization, what he calls same subject property-realization and 
micro-realization. The former is an intra-level relation since it involves realization of one property 
by another where both are properties of the same subject or individual. The latter is an inter-level 
relation that holds between microphysical states of affairs and higher level properties As such, 
micro-realization is similar to the notion of property-composition I’ve made use of earlier. In the 
following, the relevant notion of realization is same subject property-realization since the properties 
competing to cause the same effects in cases of mental causation are properties of the same subject, 
for instance a mental property competing with a neural property to cause a behavioural effect. So 
when I talk of realization, it should be understood as same subject property-realization.
103 Shoemaker [2007], p. 12.
                                                    
99                                                                                                                             
property that has these powers. For instance, the redness of a tomato is typically 
caused by exposing the still unripe tomato to sunlight. This is a backward looking 
power of the tomato. In turn, this colour can then cause certain reddish experiences 
in someone looking at the tomato, cause the tomato to be plucked, etc. These are 
forward looking powers of the tomato. According to Shoemaker, the subset relation 
holds both between sets of forward and backward looking powers of a realized 
property and its realizer. However, in the case of forward looking powers, it is the 
realizer that has the superset of powers and the realized property that has the subset 
of powers, whereas in the case of backward looking powers, it is the realized 
property that has the superset of powers and the realizer that has the subset of 
powers. I will later return to the question of why Shoemaker introduces this 
complication and provide some reasons for why it is better done away with. For 
now, I will ignore backward looking causal powers and focus exclusively on 
forward looking causal powers.
So a realizer has a set of causal powers, a subset of which contains the powers of 
the property it realizes. Shoemaker then goes on to claim that mental properties are 
realized by physical properties in this sense. In other words, the Subset view is 
correct for mental properties. What justifies Shoemaker’s claim that realization is 
best understood as involving the subset relation? Since realization is a technical 
notion, philosophers are, to a large extent, free to define it as they please. The value 
of a particular definition will depend on how well it fits the platitudes, if any, 
regarding the concept being defined, and the theoretical advantages the definition 
provides. For instance, in contemporary philosophy, the notion of realization 
typically comes as part of a non-reductive physicalist package, according to which 
realization is the relation that holds between physical and non-physical properties 
and which is sufficient for physicalism about these non-physical properties. At 
least, that is the sense of realization which is relevant for Shoemaker’s purposes. It 
has been a particularly popular notion among functionalists to describe the 
relationship between physical and functional properties.104 Often though, the term is 
introduced without any detailed account of the precise metaphysics of the relation. 
Defining realization, at least in part, as the subset relation, can be seen as an attempt 
                                               
104 See Putnam [1967] and Fodor [1974] for some early formulations of this.
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to put some metaphysical meat on these bones. Firstly, realization as the subset 
relation explains why realization is a non-reductive relation (the realized property 
and its realizer have numerically distinct causal profiles). Secondly, the claim that 
non-physical realized properties are grounded in their physical realizers, and 
thereby acceptable properties from a physicalist perspective, is at least made 
plausible by the Subset view, seeing that the powers had by the realizer (the 
superset) necessitates the powers had by the property it realizes (the subset) but not 
vice versa. Hence, realized properties asymmetrically supervene on their realizers 
and this is a sign of grounding.105 The fact that the Subset view explains and 
motivates the platitudes associated with the notion of realization is in itself a 
theoretical virtue of the view, in addition to its promise of solving the Exclusion 
problem.
4.6 Shoemaker on the Exclusion Problem
It is worth noting that Shoemaker’s proposed solution to the Exclusion problem in 
light of the Subset view differs somewhat from the one I sketched above. He has 
two arguments for why the Subset view solves the Exclusion problem. The first is 
based on the claim that mental properties, in a certain sense, are parts of physical 
properties according to the Subset view. This, of course, is not the sense in which 
lower level physical properties can be parts of higher level physical properties –
Shoemaker is not claiming that mental properties at a lower level compose higher 
level physical properties. Rather, the part-whole relation he has in mind pertains to 
the causal profiles occupied by mental and physical properties. A proper subset of a 
superset is a proper part of that superset. Since a mental property occupies a causal 
profile that forms a proper subset of the profile occupied by its physical realizer, 
this is the sense in which mental properties are parts of their physical realizers. With 
this in mind, consider a mental property M, its physical realizer R, and a 
behavioural effect E, which is the causal product of both. Shoemaker considers 
whether this is a case of causal overdetermination and goes on to answer in the 
negative, using the following analogy:
We can say […] that while the R instance causes E, it does so because it 
includes the M instance that causes E. We might compare this with the case 
                                               
105 I will consider the relationship between the Subset view and physicalism in more detail later. 
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in which Smith dies as the result of a salvo of shots fired by a firing squad, 
but in which the only shot in that salvo that hit Smith was the one fired by 
Jones – the salvo killed Smith, but it did so because it included a particular 
shot, Jones’, that killed Smith. This is obviously not a case of 
overdetermination.106
Shoemaker’s second argument for why the Subset view solves the Exclusion 
problem draws on insights originally developed by Stephen Yablo. Causes, 
according to Yablo, should be proportional to their effects. Call this the 
proportionality claim. What this means is that ‘roughly, they should incorporate a 
good deal of causally important material but not too much that is causally 
unimportant’.107 Yablo suggests that a way of testing whether a property 
incorporates enough, but not too much, causal material with respect to an effect, 
and so, whether it is suited as a cause of that effect, is with the help of two 
conditions. First, effects should be contingent on their causes – if the cause had not 
occurred, the effect would not have occurred either. Second, causes should be 
adequate for their effects – if the cause had not occurred, then, if it had occurred, 
the effect would have occurred as well. Satisfaction of the former condition (call it 
the contingency condition) indicates that the property does not incorporate too 
much unimportant causal material, whereas satisfaction of the latter condition (call 
it the adequacy condition) indicates that the property incorporates enough causal 
material.108 To illustrate this, Yablo applies the contingency and adequacy 
conditions to a case involving a determinable property competing with its 
corresponding determinate to cause an effect. Say that Sophie is a pigeon trained to 
peck at all and only red objects. One day she is presented with and pecks at an 
object with a specific shade of red, say scarlet. It seems there are several properties 
that are candidates for causing this effect. For instance, we might ask whether the 
causally efficacious property was the very determinate property scarlet, the less 
determinate property red, or the very indeterminate property being coloured. 
According to Yablo, the determinable property red is to be preferred as a cause of 
Sophie pecking over both scarlet and being coloured. The reason is that, intuitively, 
while the object being scarlet is enough, or adequate, for Sophie pecking, scarlet is 
                                               
106 Shoemaker [2007], p. 13. Note that I’ve changed Shoemaker’s notation from Q and P to R and M.
107 Yablo [1992], p. 274.
108 Yablo [1992], p. 274. Yablo’s account is more complicated than this and he has other conditions 
that should typically be met in order for a property to count as a cause of an effect (see pp. 276-277). 
They do not matter for present purposes so I will ignore them.
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too specific to be a proper cause of Sophie pecking. After all, Sophie pecks at many 
objects that are not scarlet, for instance crimson and pink objects. The fact that 
scarlet is too specific, or incorporates too much causally irrelevant material with 
respect to Sophie pecking, is revealed by a failure to satisfy the contingency 
condition. If the object in front of Sophie had not been scarlet, but rather some 
different shade of red, she would have pecked at it anyway. Being coloured, in turn, 
is not specific enough. After all, there are many coloured objects that Sophie does 
not peck at, for instance blue and green objects. The fact that being coloured is not 
specific enough, or does not incorporate enough causally relevant material, is 
revealed by a failure to satisfy the adequacy condition. If the object in front of 
Sophie had not been coloured, then if it had been coloured, she might not have 
pecked (since there are worlds where the object is coloured but blue or green 
instead of red). Red, on the other hand, is just right. Intuitively it incorporates the 
right amount of causal material with respect to Sophie pecking. This is indicated by 
the fact that red satisfies both the adequacy condition and the contingency condition 
– if the object in front of Sophie had not been red, then, if it had been red, she 
would have pecked at it, and, if the object in front of her had not been red, but 
rather some different colour, she would not have pecked at it. In other words, of the 
three candidates, the determinable property red is proportional to the effect of 
Sophie pecking, whereas the more determinate property scarlet and the less 
determinate property being coloured are not (or at least not as proportional as 
red).109
According to Shoemaker, Yablo’s proportionality constraints on causation also 
vindicate the causal efficacy of realized properties as they are understood on the 
Subset view:
Where the only causal features of property P1 that play a role in producing 
an effect are ones that belong to property P2, of which P1 is a determinate or 
realizer property, there seems a good sense in which considerations of 
proportionality favour the instantiation of P2 over the instantiation of P1 as 
a cause of the effect.110
                                               
109 This is very quick and involves several assumptions about the correct interpretation of 
counterfactuals and ordering of possible worlds that may be disputed. 
110 Shoemaker [2001], p. 81.
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For instance, say that we ask whether, on a given occasion, a behavioural effect, 
such as Jones reaching for an umbrella, is the causal result of a certain mental 
property, say Jones’ belief that it is raining, or its physical realizer. According to the 
Subset view, the mental property has certain causal powers, one of which is the 
power to cause Jones to reach for his umbrella. The powers had by the mental 
property are a subset of the powers had by the physical realizer. So the physical 
realizer also has the power to cause Jones to reach for his umbrella. However, the 
physical realizer has powers that are irrelevant with respect to this effect. Because 
of this, citing the realizer as a cause of Jones’ behaviour is to cite a property that is 
too specific. As in the case of scarlet and the effect of Sophie pecking, this is 
revealed by a failure to satisfy the contingency condition. Had Jones not instantiated 
the particular physical realizer that he actually did but still believed that it was 
raining, he would have reached for the umbrella anyway. Here, Jones’ mental 
property fares better - if Jones had not believed that it was raining, but rather had 
some different belief, say the belief that it was sunny, he would not have reached 
for the umbrella. In other words, if Jones’ mental property has a power to cause him 
to reach for his umbrella and this power manifests, then Yablo’s proportionality 
constraints tells us that this property is a cause of the behaviour, regardless of the 
fact that the physical realizer of this property, which has additional powers that are 
irrelevant for the effect in question, also has this power. 
I find Shoemaker’s reasons for thinking that the Subset view solves the Exclusion 
problem unconvincing and, as I will ultimately argue, they do not do full justice to 
the position. I will begin by considering the argument from the proportionality of 
causes and give some reasons for thinking that accepting this doctrine is 
unattractive from the perspective of the proponent of the Subset view. I will then 
reject these reasons and show that the Subset view can actually be motivated by 
endorsing the proportionality claim. After that, I consider to what extent this is 
compatible with Yablo’s original claims and whether or not this commits the 
proponent of the Subset view to adopt the proportionality constraints. Finally, I will 
argue that even if the proportionality claim is accepted, this does little work to solve 
the Exclusion problem.
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4.7 The Proportionality Claim and the Closure Principle
Recall that, on Yablo’s account, the determinate property scarlet fails to be a cause 
of Sophie pecking.111 This in itself may raise an eyebrow. Personally I think that it 
seems awfully hard to deny scarlet any causal efficacy at all with respect to 
Sophie’s pecking. After all, being scarlet is a way of being red and red is causally 
efficacious with respect to this effect. A bigger problem, however, is the following: 
If the considerations that lead one to draw the conclusion that scarlet is causally 
impotent with respect to Sophie’s pecking apply in the case of mental properties 
and their physical realizer, the conclusion should likewise be that the physical 
realizer of Jones’s belief that it is raining outside is causally impotent with respect 
to Jones’ behaviour (a conclusion that Yablo in fact draws). Based on the quote 
from Shoemaker above, he appears to accept this (as he says, in some cases we 
should favour the realized property over the realizer as a cause, indicating that he 
believes the realizer fails to cause the effect in such cases). But this is an 
unattractive conclusion. To say that, in a case of mental causation, the physical 
realizer fails to cause the effect is to embrace the denial of the Closure principle 
(assuming, uncontroversially, that there is no other sufficient physical cause of the 
effect). If this is Shoemaker’s view (I do not think it is), he has not adequately 
solved the Exclusion problem, unless he gives a story of why we accepted the truth 
of this principle in the first place. 
4.8 The Proportionality Claim and the Subset View
So adopting the proportionality constraints threatens to violate the closure principle. 
To see how a proponent of the Subset view might respond to this, let me first 
address an even more serious problem that, when dealt with, will throw some light 
on the status of the closure principle. This is the problem that accepting the 
proportionality claim threatens not just the truth of the closure principle, but the 
Subset view itself. Say that the proportionality constraints are what motivate the 
claim that a realized mental property has causal powers in the first place. For 
instance, a line of reasoning might go as follows: The proportionality constraints 
tell us that a realized mental or determinable property is a cause of certain effects. If 
a property is a cause of certain effects, then it must have the power to cause those 
                                               
111 Though he does allow that it is causally sufficient for Sophie pecking and thereby causally 
relevant. See Yablo [1992], p. 272.
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effects. So the proportionality constraints tell us that the mental property or a 
determinable property has causal powers. 
On the face of it, this way of getting to the powers of realized properties is not an 
attractive strategy for the proponent of the Subset view. Again, the problem is that 
the proportionality constraints arguably provide a unique cause of an effect among 
the candidates.112 For instance, in the case of Sophie pecking (where red is the 
cause according to the proportionality claim), any property more determinate than 
red will fail to satisfy the contingency condition, and any property less determinate 
than red will fail to satisfy the adequacy condition (being scarlet is too specific and 
being coloured is not specific enough). That the proportionality constraints pick out 
a unique cause can also be seen by considering Shoemaker’s claim that they favour 
the realized property over its realizer, when the powers responsible for producing an 
effect are all powers of the former. If so, among the properties that candidate to 
cause the effect, there will always be a property Q that has the smallest set of 
powers that include just those powers that are responsible for producing the effect. 
But if satisfaction of the proportionality constraints is what justifies that Q has those 
powers, and if Q is the unique property that satisfies the constraints, then it seems 
that the realizer of Q does not have those powers. And this is in direct contradiction 
of the Subset view, according to which P and its realizer stand in the subset relation. 
So if the proportionality constraints are taken to be the foundation on which the 
causal powers of realized properties is based, not only does this bring the proponent 
into conflict with the closure principle, it seems to be incompatible with the Subset 
view itself.
4.9 Reconciling the Proportionality Claim with the Subset View
To see how this worry can be dispelled, we should note that there might be other 
reasons to think that a property has causal powers, besides satisfying the 
proportionality constraints. If so, there might be other reasons to think that the 
realizer of a causally efficacious realized property also has the powers relevant for 
                                               
112 At least assuming that the higher-order determinable property has multiple same-level 
determinate realizers. If not, then the realizer satisfies the proportionality constraints whenever the 
realized property, and vice versa, and Yablo’s account of causation would deem both to be causes 
whenever one of them is. Of course, denying that a certain higher-order property has more than a 
single realizer removes one of the main motivation for thinking that these two properties are distinct.
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producing the effect in question. This opens the door for a reconciliation between 
the Subset view and the proportionality claim. For instance, Brian McLaughlin, 
realizing the potential conflict between the Subset view and the fact that the 
proportionality constraints generate unique causes, proposes on behalf of 
Shoemaker that a property P has a power to cause an effect if either (i): were the 
effect to occur under certain conditions, P would be the property proportional to 
this effect, or (ii) P necessitates a property that satisfies condition (i).113 So for 
instance, red has the power to cause Sophie to peck since, were a red object to be 
placed in front her, she would peck, and red would be the property proportional to 
this effect. Scarlet, however, despite failing to satisfy the proportionality constraints 
with respect to Sophie pecking, will nevertheless also have the power to cause 
Sophie to peck since scarlet necessitates red. This point generalizes to cases mental 
properties and their physical realizers, assuming the latter necessitates the former.
Now, I find McLaughlin’s proposal that a property has the power to cause an effect, 
merely in virtue of necessitating a distinct property with this power, unconvincing. 
The problem is that the claim is prone to counterexamples. For instance, it is 
plausibly the case that any object with a colour also has an extension. So being 
coloured necessitates being extended. In this case, on McLaughlin’s proposal, any 
causal power bestowed by the property being extended would also be a power 
bestowed by the property being coloured. And this is counterintuitive. A better 
proposal replaces necessitation with grounding: A property P has the power to 
cause an effect E, if it grounds a property Q that has this power. That this is so 
actually follows from the transitivity of the grounding relation. Say that the 
proportionality constraints reveal that an object has the power to cause Sophie to 
peck in virtue of instantiating the property red (where the ‘in virtue of’ locution 
expresses the grounding relation). If the object is red in virtue of being some 
determinate shade of red, say scarlet, then it follows that the object also has the 
power to cause Sophie to peck in virtue of having the property scarlet. This would 
be a sort of reversed version of what Kim calls the causal inheritance principle, 
according to which a higher-order realized property inherits the causal powers of its 
lower-order realizer. Here, however, it may be more appropriate to say that, by 
                                               
113McLaughlin [2007], p. 167. McLaughlin dubs the latter direct power bestowing, the latter indirect 
power bestowing. 
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grounding it, the realizer inherits the powers of the property it realizes.114 The 
reason being coloured fails to inherit the powers of being extended is that an object 
presumably isn’t extended in virtue of being coloured. This leaves us with the 
following argument for the Subset view: Assume that P grounds Q, that P is the 
unique property proportional to effects E1-E5, and that Q is the unique property 
proportional to effects E6-E10. From this is follows that P has the powers to cause 
E1-E5, and that Q has the powers to cause E6-E10. P is not proportional to effects 
E6-E10, but since P grounds a property that is proportional to these effects (Q), it 
nevertheless has those powers. So P has all the powers of Q. Q, however, does not 
have the powers to cause effects E1-E5 since, one, Q is not proportional to these 
effects (P is), and two, Q does not ground P (grounding is asymmetric and by 
assumption, P grounds Q). So P has powers that Q does not. Hence, the powers of 
Q form a proper subset of the powers of Q’s grounding base P – we have the Subset 
view. 
4.10 Yablo and the Subset View
Is the argument above compatible with Yablo’s view on causation? Earlier (chapter 
3.3) I stated that a property P is causally efficacious with respect to some effect E, 
if E is the manifestation of a power bestowed by P. If so, Yablo is wrong when he 
says that the causal efficacy of a determinable property excludes all determinates of 
this property from being causally efficacious. On the contrary, in so far as 
determinate properties ground their corresponding determinables and inherits their 
causal powers, the argument above shows that the causal efficacy of a determinable 
property entails the causal efficacy of all its determinates. Of course, Yablo may be 
seen as denying this claim about causal efficacy. His view may be that bestowing a 
power that manifests is insufficient for a property to be causally efficacious. What 
is required, in addition, is that the property satisfies the proportionality constraints. 
However, it is not clear to me what would motivate such a claim. First of all, note 
                                               
114 This is potentially misleading and it is important to understand it in the right way. When I say that 
a realizer inherits the powers of the property it realizes, I do not mean to say that the powers of the 
realized property are fundamental, relative to the powers of the realizer (though the metaphor of 
inheritance may suggest that). The direction of explanation from the power of the realized property 
to the powers of the realizer is epistemic, not metaphysical. The idea is that we are justified in 
thinking that a property has powers to cause certain effects because the property is proportional to 
these effects, and that this, in turn, justifies us in inferring that any property that grounds this 
property has those powers as well. This is the sense in which we might say that the realizer inherits 
the powers of the property it realizes. 
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that Yablo explicitly denies that satisfaction of the proportionality constraints is 
necessary for causation (or causal efficacy). What he says is this: 
Without claiming that proportionality is strictly necessary for causation, it 
seems clear that faced with a choice between two candidate causes, 
normally the more proportional candidate is to be preferred.115
Why is the more proportional property to be preferred? The preference might be 
purely pragmatic. For instance, it may be that, in general, the more proportional 
property has a higher degree of explanatory relevance than any determinate of this 
property. This seems justified in the case involving Sophie the pigeon. Someone 
trying to determine the cause of her pecking will typically be doing so for one of 
two reasons: Either to find out how best to make her peck or how best to stop her 
from pecking. In both cases, citing the determinable property red as a cause, rather 
than scarlet, will be more useful. If you want to make Sophie peck, it is easier to do 
so by placing red objects in front of her than scarlet objects (since red objects will 
typically be easier to find than scarlet objects). And if you want to stop her from 
pecking, you will need to remove all red objects from her surroundings, not just all 
scarlet objects. 
So here’s one possible answer to the question of why the more proportional 
property is to be preferred as a cause: It provides a better or more useful explanation 
of the effect. This, however, raises a new question: Why think that a preference for 
the more proportional property as an explanation of an effect has any bearing on the 
causal status of any determinate of this property? Is it not entirely possible that one 
property provides the most useful causal explanation of some effect, while it is just 
one of many sufficient causes of that effect? As far as I can tell, the answer is yes –
unless, that is, the original exclusion principle (the principle that, in general, an 
effect has no more than a single sufficient cause) is considered a valid constraint on 
metaphysics. In this case, preferring one property over another as a cause of an 
effect comes with a heavy metaphysical commitment – it commits one to exclude 
all other properties from being causally efficacious with respect to that effect. In 
other words, Yablo may want to deny that a property bestowing a power that 
                                               
115 Yablo [1992], p. 277.
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manifests is sufficient for causation, since it leads to systematic causal 
overdetermination. This worry, however, is unmotivated if we accept that 
systematic weak overdetermination is unproblematic, since this is the kind of 
overdetermination that follows from accepting the causal efficacy of a determinable 
property and each of its corresponding determinates (recall, the argument is that the 
property making out the grounding base, for instance a determinate property, 
inherits the powers of the determinable property it grounds. So the very same 
powers are bestowed by several properties). To sum up then, if it is accepted that 
satisfying the proportionality constraints is what justifies the claim that a 
determinable property has powers to cause certain effects (because this property 
would be proportional to these effects), and accepted that its corresponding 
determinate inherits these powers by grounding the determinable property, then I 
see no reason to insist that the determinate property fails to be a cause of the effects 
also caused by the determinable property, despite the fact that the determinate 
property fails to satisfy the proportionality constraints. 
While the focus above is on determinable properties and their determinates, the 
points apply to mental properties and their physical realizers as well. Say that a 
mental property M satisfies the proportionality constraints with respect to some 
behavioural effect E. Assuming physicalism, this mental property must have a 
property P as its grounding base, say a structural neural property, which thereby 
inherits the power to cause E from M.116 And when this power manifests, we should 
not be afraid to insist that both the mental property and the structural neural 
property are causally efficacious with respect to E. Of course, this is compatible 
with thinking that the mental property is a better causal explanation of E. As 
promised earlier, we can therefore dispel the worry that the Closure principle comes 
out false on the account that causes are proportional to their effects. Even if a 
mental property satisfies the proportionality constraints with respect to some effect 
and its physical realizer does not, the physical realizer still inherits the powers of 
the mental property (since the physical realizer ground the mental property), and so, 
                                               
116 Of course, P need not, and almost certainly will not, make out the complete grounding base for 
M. At one point, Shoemaker makes a distinction between core and total realizers: “A total realizer of 
a property will be a property whose instantiation is sufficient for the instantiation of that property. A 
core realizer will be a property whose instantiation is a salient part of a total instantiation of it”. We 
can make the same distinction with respect to core and total grounding bases. To use this 
terminology, P will likely just be a core grounding base for M, not a total grounding base.
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whenever the mental property is causally efficacious (i.e. whenever one of its 
powers manifest), the physical realizer will be causally efficacious as well (since it 
bestows the very same causal powers).
4.11 Is the Subset View Committed to the Proportionality of Causes?
Considering the argument above to the effect that the Subset view is motivated if 
we accept that causes are proportional to their effects and that properties inherit the 
causal powers of the properties they ground, we might wonder if this means that the 
proponent of the Subset view must accept the proportionality claim. McLaughlin 
thinks so, and since he is inclined to reject it, this means that he is inclined to reject 
the Subset view.117
There are a couple of reasons why one might think that the proponent of the Subset 
view is necessarily committed to accepting the proportionality constraints. One (and 
this seems to be McLaughlin’s reason), without them, the Subset view leads to 
unacceptable causal overdetermination. The idea, I take it, is something like the 
following: The Subset view holds that determinable/mental properties can be 
causally efficacious. It seems, however, that whenever a determinable/mental 
property is causally efficacious with respect to some effect, its underlying 
determinate property/physical realizer is a distinct sufficient cause of this effect, 
which would be unacceptable. The only way to solve this problem is by appeal to 
the proportionality constraints which not only generate unique causes, and so deny 
that there is genuine causal competition, but also award the causal victory to the 
determinable/mental property. Hence, the proponent of the Subset view is 
necessarily committed to the proportionality claim. However, as should be clear 
from the previous discussion, I do not consider this a sound argument. First of all, it 
assumes that the original exclusion principle is a valid constraint on a metaphysical 
theory, and appeals to it to establish that the proponent of the Subset view must 
necessarily accept the proportionality claim. But as I argued in the previous chapter, 
the original exclusion should be rejected. Second of all, as I argued above, there 
may be other reasons, besides the fact that a property satisfies the proportionality 
constraints, for thinking that a property has powers to cause an effect. For instance, 
                                               
117 McLaughlin [2007], p. 165.
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when one property grounds another property that satisfies these constraints with 
respect to some effect, the former plausibly inherits the power to cause this effect 
from the latter. In fact, as we saw, it seems that the proponent of the Subset view 
must endorse something like this, since the Subset view itself will otherwise be 
undermined. This means that adopting the proportionality claim does not even 
prevent the Subset view from leading to causal overdetermination. Of course, since 
it leads only to weak overdetermination, this is no reason for concern.
A second reason for thinking that the proponent of the Subset view is necessarily 
committed to the proportionality claim would be if one thinks that the 
proportionality constraints provide the only way to motivate that a class of realized 
properties have causal powers. Recall, the argument from earlier which motivates 
the Subset view – first step is to get the causal powers of the realized property with 
the help of the proportionality constraints, second step is to argue that these causal 
powers are inherited by any property that grounds this realized property. If the 
proportionality constraints are rejected, the worry is that the first step cannot be 
carried out. And if there are no other ways to get the causal powers of realized 
properties, the Subset view fails since it states that the causal profile of any realized 
property is non-empty. However, it is doubtful if the proportionality constraints, in 
general, are needed to motivate the claim that a class of realized properties have 
non-empty causal profiles. Consider for instance mental properties. When 
motivating the claim of Mental Causation (the claim that mental properties are 
sometimes causes), I did not appeal to any specific conditions on what is to count as 
a cause. Rather, Mental Causation was established pre-theoretically and did not 
need technical philosophical arguments about the nature of causation to be 
vindicated. I do not wish to rule out that the proportionality constraints can provide 
justification for the existence of causal powers of some properties. For instance, it 
may be that the reason we are inclined to think that determinable properties have 
non-empty causal profiles is that they satisfy the proportionality constraints with 
respect to some effects. However, there may still be other ways of establishing these 
causal profiles and in any case, the proportionality constraints are not needed in the 
case of the causal profiles of mental properties. For this reason, the proponent of the 
Subset view should not feel forced to accept the proportionality claim. 
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4.12 The Proportionality Constraints and the Exclusion Problem
So where does this leave the proportionality claim with respect to the Exclusion 
problem? Recall, Shoemaker indicates that they help the proponent of the Subset 
view solve this problem, as they “make it unmysterious that the causal efficacy of a 
multiply realized property is not preempted by that of its realizer properties”.118
However, as far as I can tell, the proportionality constraints actually do little work 
here. As we have seen, they do not motivate the claim that a realized property has a 
non-empty causal profile, at least not in the case of mental properties. If anything, 
they threaten to make it mysterious why the efficacy of the realizer is not pre-
empted by the efficacy of the realized property – if a property must satisfy the 
proportionality constraints with respect to some effect to be a cause of that effect, it 
seems that the realizer is excluded from causing an effect whenever the property it 
realizes satisfy the proportionality constraints. Of course, as I’ve just argued, there 
is no real mystery here. However, the mystery is not dispelled by any appeal to 
causes being proportional to their effects. Rather, what is doing the work is the fact 
that the causal powers of the realized property are identical to powers had by the 
realizer. This means that whenever the realized property is causally efficacious (i.e. 
whenever one of its power manifest), the realizer will be causally efficacious as 
well. But the claim that the powers are realized properties are identical to powers of 
the properties that realize is already at the heart of the Subset view. No further 
assumptions about the nature of causation are therefore needed to provide this 
solution to the Exclusion problem. In the end, this is all the better for the proponent 
of the Subset view. The proportionality claim is a controversial one and it is a virtue 
of the Subset view that this claim does not come as part of the package its 
proponents offer, and that the claim is not needed to solve the Exclusion problem.
4.13 The Argument from Parts and Wholes
Putting aside the argument from the proportionality of causes, let me return to 
Shoemaker’s other argument for why the Subset view solves the Exclusion 
problem. Recall, this turns on an analogy between the realization relation and the 
part-whole relation. Roughly, the argument goes as follows: In a sense, realized 
properties are parts of their realizers. Parts and wholes do not overdetermine their 
                                               
118 Shoemaker [2001], p. 93.
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common effects. Hence, a realized property and its realizer do not overdetermine 
their common effects.119
One worry about this argument is that the analogy between, on the one hand, mental 
properties and their physical realizers, and on the other, parts and wholes, is 
somewhat metaphorical. Mental properties and their physical realizers do not 
literally stand in a part-whole relation, rather it is their profiles that do so.120 So 
even if one agrees that there is no Exclusion problem for parts and wholes, it might 
be argued that this tells us little about the Exclusion problem as it pertains to mental 
properties and their realizers. 
There is another worry though, that, when addressed, helps to dissolve the first 
worry as well. This worry is that it is controversial to simply assume that parts and 
wholes do not overdetermine their effects. As I argued in the previous chapter, 
exclusion worries naturally arise for composite properties and objects since 
reduction of higher level properties to lower level properties is problematic 
(primarily due to the possibility of there being no fundamental bottom level). But if 
part-whole reduction is ruled out and we assume that a composite property or object 
is not causally excluded by the sum of its parts or vice versa, then parts and wholes 
do overdetermine their common effects, in the trivial sense that they are 
numerically distinct causes of the same effects. The solution I proposed to this 
problem was to accept that parts and wholes weakly overdetermine their common 
effects and that the considerations that lead us to adopt the Exclusion principle fail 
to rule this out. In other words, allowing for weak overdetermination is the key to
resolving the Exclusion problem for parts and wholes. But if this is correct, 
Shoemaker’s argument cannot be quite right. Recall, weak overdetermination 
involves the manifestation of a power shared by several properties. So the fact that 
parts and wholes share the powers to cause their common effects is what prevents 
the Exclusion principle from kicking in. Now, Shoemaker tries to dissolve the 
Exclusion problem for mental properties by arguing that mental properties stand in 
a part-whole relation according to the Subset view. They do this because the powers 
                                               
119 Shoemaker [2007], p. 13.
120 If properties are construed as being identical to sets of powers, rather than being the entities that 
bestow these powers, then realized properties would literally be parts of their realizer. This, 
however, is not Shoemaker’s view, nor is it a view I consider here.
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of a realized property are proper parts of the powers of its realizer, which means 
that they share the powers that are powers to cause their common effects. But the 
reason there is no Exclusion problem for parts and wholes is exactly that they share 
the powers that are powers to cause their common effects. So the fact (if it is a fact) 
that mental properties and their realizers stand in a part-whole relation, is in itself 
not what helps to solve the Exclusion problem for mental properties, as Shoemaker 
would have it. Instead, the two Exclusion problems, one for mental properties and 
their realizers, one for parts and wholes, have a common solution – they are both 
solved by the fact that the causally competing properties share the powers to cause 
their common effects. As promised, this also dispels the worry that the analogy to 
parts and wholes breaks down since mental properties do not literally stand in a 
part-whole relation to their physical realizers. As it turns out, whether or not this is 
so is irrelevant as far as a solution to the Exclusion problem is concerned. What 
matters is that the properties competing to cause an effect share the relevant power. 
To sum up then, Shoemaker underplays the potential of the Subset view to solve the 
Exclusion problem. There is no need to rely on controversial assumptions about the 
nature of causation or potentially dubious analogies to parts and wholes. The 
resources needed to solve the Exclusion problem are already part of the Subset view 
and how it construes the relation between realized properties and their realizers. 
4.14 The Subset View and Physicalism
Early in his book, Shoemaker makes the following claim about properties that are 
not physical, he says the following:
[…] if physicalism is true, all of these properties must in some sense be determined, 
constitutively rather than just causally, by physical properties or physical states of affairs. 
[…] we can express the determination claim by saying that instantiations of the properties 
in question are realized in the instantiation of physical properties of some sort or in physical 
states of affairs of some sort.121
I take it that by ‘constitutive determination’, Shoemaker has in mind a relation 
along the lines of the grounding relation introduced in chapter 1. We can now see 
                                               
121 Shoemaker [2007], p. 1.
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why the realization relation cannot simply be identified with the subset relation. The 
reason is that the subset relation in itself is neutral on whether properties that have 
the subset of powers are grounded in the properties that have the superset of powers 
- it is entirely consistent to claim that mental properties stand in a subset relation to 
some physical properties while denying that the former are grounded in the latter.122
If the quote from Shoemaker above is correct, however, the realization relation is 
not neutral on whether realized properties are grounded in their realizers. If it was, 
realization could not express grounding (or ‘constitutive determination’). 
That the subset relation is neutral on issues of metaphysical dependence is, of 
course, to be expected if the grounding relation is primitive and not reducible to any 
other relation. Because of this, a claim of grounding between two kinds of 
properties will always be in addition to any other claim about the relation one takes 
to hold between the two, for instance a claim that the properties in question stand in 
a subset relation. Given this (and assuming that grounding and realization is not the 
very same relation123) we might wonder how realization can be an expression of 
grounding. It can be so only if the realization relation breaks down into several 
necessary but individually insufficient conditions, one of them being the grounding 
condition. We already know that the subset relation is another (per Shoemaker’s 
stipulation). And it seems plausible that the two are jointly sufficient for realization 
on Shoemaker’s account. At least, the only properties standing in the subset relation 
that Shoemaker excludes as also standing in the realization relation are conjunctive 
properties and this is arguably on the basis that conjunctive properties intuitively do 
not ground their conjunct properties.
With this in mind, we might ask how the Subset view of realization relates to the 
general thesis of physicalism. One thing to note is that, like physicalism, the Subset 
                                               
122 As mentioned earlier, Shoemaker takes conjunct properties and the conjunctive properties they 
are conjuncts of, to stand in a subset relation without standing in a realization relation. While 
Shoemaker is not explicit about what justifies this exception, we can now see that it is motivated in 
so far as it is intuitively false that conjunctive properties ground their conjuncts. Rather, the 
metaphysical dependence is the other way around – a red square object has the property being red 
and square in virtue of having the properties red and square, not vice versa. But if conjunctive 
properties do not ground their conjuncts, then they cannot realize them, despite the two standing in a 
subset relation.
123 An uncontroversial assumption, I take it, since realization is exclusively an intra-level relation 
between properties. The grounding relation can almost certainly hold between other kinds of entities 
and between entities at different levels. 
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view can be restricted to a certain class of non-physical properties and be the view 
that the properties in that specific class are realized by physical properties in 
accordance with the definition of realization given earlier. In this case, the Subset 
view is compatible with the existence of additional anti-physical properties that 
falsify unrestricted physicalism. But even so, there’s a further question of whether 
or not the Subset view is a form of physicalism about the properties it claims are 
realized by physical properties. Earlier (chapter 1, fn. 30), I mentioned that 
physicalism about a restricted class of non-physical properties is best understood as 
the claim that these properties are ultimately grounded in nothing but fundamental 
non-mental physical properties.124 In other words, physicalism about realized 
properties is true if and only if there is a chain of metaphysical dependencies, or 
“grounding-links”, that connects these realized properties with fundamental 
physical properties, and none of the latter properties are mental. Since, per 
definition of the realization relation, there is such a link going from realized 
properties to their realizers, it follows that physicalism about realized properties is 
true if and only if there is a chain of grounding-links from the realizers of realized 
properties to fundamental physical properties, and that none of the latter are mental. 
Or simply: Physicalism about realized properties is true if and only if physicalism 
about their realizers is true. On the Subset view, realizer-properties in our world are 
physical properties, though typically they will be broadly, rather than 
fundamentally, physical. For instance, the realizers of mental properties will 
presumably turn out to be complex neural properties. Strictly speaking, physicalism 
may fail for such broadly physical properties, either because there are emergent 
causal laws in virtue of which these broadly physical properties have causal powers 
not grounded in the powers of the lower level fundamental properties of which they 
are composed, or because there are mental properties among the fundamental 
properties that compose them. So the Subset view is a form of physicalism about 
realized properties, only if it is assumed that this is not the case. In this respect, 
however, the Subset view is in the same boat as other physicalist positions. Take 
reductionism about mental properties, for instance, which holds that mental 
properties are identical to physical properties. Again, the physical properties that 
make out that the reduction base for mental properties are typically taken to be 
                                               
124 If there is no fundamental level, the counterpart view would be that the class of properties in 
question will ultimately be grounded in an infinite line of scientific non-mental properties.
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broadly physical neural properties. Formulated in this fashion, reductionism is 
entirely compatible with the failure of physicalism since physicalism may fail for 
broadly physical properties. Yet, this is usually a possibility that is put aside - the 
assumption that physicalism is uncontroversially true for broadly physical 
properties is almost always taken for granted. 
Having seen how the Subset view can be a form of restricted physicalism about 
realized properties, we can move from this to unrestricted physicalism or 
physicalism simpliciter by adding to the Subset account of realization that all
properties not physical (either broadly or fundamental) are realized by physical 
properties.
4.15 The Problem of Backward Looking Powers
This conclusion that the Subset view is a form of physicalism relies on the 
stipulation that realization entails grounding. It also, per stipulation, entails that 
realized properties and their realizers stand in the subset relation. On Shoemaker’s 
most recent account of the subset relation, however, there is a tension between these 
two necessary conditions for realization – if two sets of properties stand in the 
subset relation, they cannot stand in the grounding relation. I will briefly explain 
why that is and how the problem can be solved.
As I mentioned earlier, Shoemaker’s current view is that a realized property has 
forward looking causal powers that form a proper subset of the forward looking 
causal powers of its realizer and backward looking causal powers that form a 
superset of the backward looking causal powers of the realizer. Shoemaker’s 
motivation for introducing the notion of backward looking causal powers is based 
on the following example (which Shoemaker attributes to Richard Boyd):  Say that 
two chemical compounds X and Y have different constituents, but nevertheless 
have exactly the same forward looking causal powers. That is, X and Y have 
powers to cause exactly the same effects. According to Shoemaker, it would be 
counter-intuitive to say that being compound X and being compound Y is the same 
property since the ingredients from which the compounds are made differ. So 
forward looking causal powers cannot be all that individuates a property. What 
distinguishes X and Y are instead their backward looking causal powers – their 
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causal origins. X is caused by mixing substances A and B; Y is caused by mixing 
substances C and D.125
This connects with the Subset view in the following way: If a realized property is 
multiply realizable, it can be caused in more ways than any of its particular 
realizers. For instance, say that you have two cans of spray-paint, one with scarlet 
paint and one with crimson. You can cause an object to be red by spraying it with 
either can, but you can only cause it to be scarlet by spraying it with the can 
containing scarlet paint. This is why the set of backward looking causal powers at 
the level of realized properties, will be a superset of the set of backward looking 
causal powers at the level of their realizers. If this is so, however, it seems that 
realized properties fail to supervene on their realizers since the instantiation of a 
specific realizer R is compatible with the instantiation of several distinct realized 
properties with different backward looking causal powers. All that the subset 
relation requires is that these properties have the same forward looking causal 
powers (which form a subset of the powers of R) and that they share the backward 
looking causal powers that form the subset that contains exactly the backward 
looking causal powers of R.126 It does not rule out that each of these realized 
properties have their own distinctive backward looking causal powers that they do 
not share. Hence, it seems possible that a minimal physical duplicate of our world 
would fail to include the realized properties of our world but instead include 
different realized properties that differ from the actual realized properties with 
respect to some of their backward looking causal powers. But as was argued in 
chapter 1, if the realized properties of our world are grounded in their realizers, this 
entails that they supervene upon them. Since it now seems that they do not, we can 
infer that realized properties are not grounded in their realizers in our world. This, 
however, means that, contrary to Shoemaker’s claim, the realization relation cannot 
express the kind of metaphysical dependence of the non-physical on the physical 
that the physicalist is looking to endorse – the stipulative definition of realization is 
                                               
125 Shoemaker [1980], p. 267.
126 This point is raised by McLaughlin in his [2007].
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unstable if the subset relation is taken to include both backward and forward 
looking causal powers.127
One way to counter this would be to argue that there are no realized properties that 
have the same forward looking causal powers but which differ with respect to 
backward looking causal powers. Of course, this cannot merely be the claim that, as 
a matter of actual fact, there are no such properties. Rather, it would have to be the 
much stronger claim that such properties are impossible. It is hard to see how such 
an argument could be made once it is admitted that the compounds brought about 
by mixing different substances are indeed distinct, despite them having exactly the 
same forward looking causal powers. It is one thing to insist that properties in 
general are individuated purely in terms of their forward looking causal powers, it is 
another to admit that some are not (being compound X for instance), while insisting 
that other must be (realized properties). A simpler solution to the problem would be 
to go for the former claim and back off from the claim that being compound X is a 
different property from being compound Y. And really, this is hardly a major bullet 
to bite. After all, being compound X and being compound Y share all their forward 
looking causal powers. That is, once the substances are mixed, there is no possible 
way of telling the two compounds apart without independent information about 
their causal origin. It is thus unlike a case of, say, gold versus fools gold where a 
sample of each may share all of their superficial properties but where expert 
analysis allows us to distinguish between them. In light of this, it does not seem to 
me counter-intuitive to insist that being compound X and being compound Y are the 
very same property, despite the fact that their causal origins differ.128
                                               
127 It should be noted that McLaughlin raises the issue in a different context. In short, McLaughlin 
thinks that Shoemaker needs the claim that realized properties supervene on their realizers in order 
to solve the Exclusion problem for mental properties. Hence, McLaughlin’s worry is that if 
supervenience fails, Shoemaker’s view fails to deal with this problem. I personally do not think that 
the solution offered by the Subset view hinges on realized properties supervening on their realizers. 
As I argued earlier, the crux of the solution offered by the Subset view is that behavioural effects are 
the manifestation of powers had by both mental properties and their physical realizers. This solution 
would be available even if realized properties failed to supervene on their realizers, as long as 
realized properties and their realizers overlap with respect to the powers that are powers to cause 
behavioural effects. The main worry, as I see it, is rather that the Subset view fails to be a form of 
physicalism if the relevant supervenience fails. 
128 Shoemaker has stated (in personal communication) that he now accepts that the subset relation is 
a relation that holds only between the forward looking causal powers of the properties involved.
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Without the claim that properties are individuated, in part, by their backward 
looking causal powers, supervenience of realized properties on their realizers can be 
restored. Since the forward looking causal powers of realized properties form a 
subset of the powers of their physical realizers, any physical duplicate of our world 
will include the properties that have exactly the powers in that subset. And this, in 
turn, allows for realized properties to be grounded in their realizers.
4.16 The Subset View and Functionalism about Mental Properties
Obviously the Subset view is committed to there being sets of powers that are 
causal profiles of mental properties. Say that R1 and R2 are putative physical 
realizers for mental property M. If so, and given the Subset view, R1 and R2 must 
overlap with respect to some powers that form a subset of each of their causal 
profiles. But why think this subset of powers is a causal profile for any property? Or 
to out it another way, why think there is any property that is the occupant for this 
set of powers. After all, it seems that it might just be a subset of powers that are had 
by R1 and R2 and not by any other property. Shoemaker answers this question by 
adopting a certain form of functionalism. The causal profiles of mental properties 
are given by folk psychological causal definition. A set of powers, with respect to 
which the causal profiles of R1 and R2 overlap, is a causal profile for a unique 
property M because folk psychology defines M as being the property that has 
exactly those powers. Shoemaker’s functionalism thus distinguishes itself from 
traditional formulations of both role and filler functionalism.129 Roughly, role 
functionalism is the view that mental properties are second-order properties, defined 
in terms of causal roles that are then played or occupied by their first-order realizer. 
To use a crude but common example from the literature, pain may be defined as the 
second-order property of having some first-order property that causes subjects to 
exhibit aversive behaviour under certain conditions (for instance, then they are 
subjected to tissue-damage). A first-order property that plays this role is a realizer 
of pain. Since the definition of pain (and mental properties in general) poses no 
restrictions on the number of first-order properties that can play the relevant role, 
role functionalism allows for multiple realization. It is unclear, however, how it 
allows for mental properties to have causal powers since it is part of the description 
                                               
129 See McLaughlin [2006] for a comprehensive discussion of the differences between role and filler 
functionalism.
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of a mental property that the causal work is done by its first-order realizer – mental 
properties are described in terms of causal tasks performed by other properties. If 
so, the notion of realization as it is employed by the role functionalist and the 
proponent of the Subset view cannot be the same – if mental properties are 
epiphenomenal, their powers cannot form a proper non-empty subset of the powers 
had by some physical property. 
Filler functionalism contrasts with role functionalism in that the filler-functionalist 
definitions of mental properties explicitly assign causal powers to them. For 
instance, rather than pain being the property of having some other property that 
causes aversive behaviour, pain is defined, on the filler functionalist account, as 
being the property that itself causes aversive behaviour. So far this is in line with 
Shoemaker’s view. Shoemaker, however, is not a traditional filler functionalist. The 
reason is that filler functionalists claim that the functional descriptions of mental 
properties provide grounds for identifying mental properties with physical 
properties. If pain is the property that causes aversive behaviour and our best 
neuroscience informs us that neural property N is the property that causes aversive 
behaviour, then we can infer that pain is identical to N.130 One thing to note is that, 
due to the possibility of multiple realization, filler functionalists regard the 
traditional functional description of pain (and other mental properties) as improper 
since there is no unique property that causes aversive behaviour. Hence, there is no 
unique reduction-base for mental properties. This problem is dealt with by replacing 
generic functional descriptions of mental properties with descriptions relative to 
certain structures or species. The description ‘the property that causes aversive 
behaviour’ may not refer since it fails to pick out a unique property among all actual 
and possible properties. However, it may succeed in picking out a unique neural 
property among, say, the properties instantiated by members of the human species. 
In this case, the property that causes aversive behaviour in humans (call it ‘pain-in-
humans’) can be reduced to this neural property.131 This also means that, like role 
functionalism, traditional filler functionalism is incompatible with the Subset view 
                                               
130 We find this argument in Lewis [1972].
131 As we saw in the previous chapter, this is essentially also Kim’s solution to the problem of 
multiple realization that reductionists face.
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since the causal profiles of mental properties are not proper non-empty subsets of 
the causal profile of some physical properties. 
The difference between Shoemaker’s functionalism and traditional filler 
functionalism is that Shoemaker takes functional definitions to give genuine causal 
profiles for mental properties. Filler functionalists, on the other hand, take 
functional definitions to give only part of a causal profile, the causal profile that is 
the profile of the physical property that is the reduction-base for the mental property 
picked out by the functional definition. In other words, on the filler functionalist 
account, there is no occupant for the set of powers given by the functional 
description, since there is no property that corresponds to all and only those powers 
(recall, on my definition, a property is an occupant of a causal profile if and only if 
it has all and only the powers that make out that profile). To see this, consider again 
the case of pain (or pain-in-humans) and its reduction-base neural property N. 
Obviously the functional description of pain will be a great deal more complex than 
merely stating that it is the property that causes aversive behaviour. But whatever 
the complete functional description will turn out to include, it will surely not 
include reference to all the powers of N. For instance, N can cause certain other 
neural properties and will show up in a certain way on a CAT scan, none of which 
are powers that will be part of the functional description of the mental property 
pain.132 So if pain is identical to the property that causes these effects, then the 
functional description does not provide a causal profile for pain (or any other 
property for that matter) but merely part of a causal profile. Not so on Shoemaker’s 
account. Here the functional analysis gives a causal profile – the profile for the 
relevant mental property. Of course, it also gives part of a causal profile – part of 
the causal profile of the physical property that realizes it. But this is simply to 
repeat that the powers of the mental property form a subset of the powers of its 
realizer.
It might be argued that the functional description of mental properties will be 
improper on Shoemaker’s account as well since there is no unique property that 
causes aversive behaviour. Rather, it is caused by pain and all the different realizers 
                                               
132 At least not if the functional descriptions are provided by common-sense folk psychology. 
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of pain. Going for structure-specific functional descriptions is of no help here. Even 
if the functional description manages to pick out a unique physical property that 
causes aversive behaviour among members of a certain species, the same effect will 
also be caused by a distinct non-physical property pain, given that Shoemaker 
denies psycho-physical reduction. What is needed to ensure a referent for the 
functional description is rather a stop-clause after the causal roles. For instance, 
rather than pain being the property that causes aversive behaviour, it is the property 
that causes aversive behaviour and nothing else (again, the complete functional 
description will obviously by much more complex). Understood in this manner, folk 
psychological functional descriptions pick out unique properties and give causal 
profiles with mental properties as occupants. They no longer pick out the physical 
realizers since these have causal powers beyond the powers referenced in the 
functional descriptions. 
4.17 Must a Proponent of the Subset View Accept Shoemaker’s 
Functionalism?
As we saw, both role and filler functionalism, in their traditional forms at least, are 
incompatible with the Subset view. But what is the relationship between 
Shoemaker’s functionalism and the Subset view? Does one support the other or is 
Shoemaker endorsements of functionalism and the Subset view entirely 
independent? In his discussion of the Subset view and problem of mental 
causation133, McLaughlin includes Shoemaker’s functionalism as part of the 
package that comes with the Subset view. If one is sceptical about the prospects for 
functionalism, including the modified kind of filler functionalism that Shoemaker 
endorses (as McLaughlin is), then this might be seen as a reason for being sceptical 
about the prospects of the Subset view. I will argue, however, that the Subset view 
is motivated independently of arguments for functionalism and that there is no 
reason to think that one position supports the other.
Firstly, note that while Shoemaker may endorse that we get the causal profiles of 
mental properties from folk psychological definitions, he presumably does not 
endorse the claim that the causal profiles of realized properties in general are given 
                                               
133 McLaughlin [2007].
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by folk definitions. This should be clear from the fact that Shoemaker takes 
determinable properties to be realized by their determinates. Surely there are 
determinable properties for which it is quite implausible that folk definitions give 
the causal profile, for instance, highly scientific kinds such as being an enzyme or 
having wave impedance. Since Shoemaker takes the Subset view to hold for all 
realized properties, it cannot be the case that the kind of functionalism he endorses 
for mental properties is required for the Subset view in general (as I suggested 
earlier, it may be the case that the causal profile of determinable properties is 
determined (in part at least) by applying the proportionality constraints to them). 
4.18 Motivating the Subset View Independently of Functionalism
Still, it might be thought that while the truth of functionalism (of the kind endorsed 
by Shoemaker) is not strictly speaking  required for the truth of the Subset view, the 
former still provides a strong reason, perhaps even the main reason, for thinking 
that the Subset view is true for mental properties. If so, denying functionalism 
would remove a strong, perhaps the main, motivation for accepting the Subset view 
for mental properties. I do not share this worry since I believe the Subset view is 
motivated independently of any functionalist commitments. To see how, consider 
the following four claims that sum up the Subset view (or at least a central part of 
it):
i) Mental properties have powers to cause physical effects.
ii) These causal powers are also had by physical properties.
iii) These physical properties have additional causal powers, not had by 
mental properties.
iv) The powers shared by mental and physical properties are identical at 
both the type and token level. That is, the token-powers had by an 
instance of a mental property are numerically identical to token-
powers had by some instance of a physical property.
And now consider this slightly reformulated version of the Exclusion problem.
i*) There is mental-to-physical causation (Mental Causation).
ii*) Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (Closure).
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iii*) Mental properties are distinct from physical properties
(Distinctness).
iv*) Behavioural effects are not systematically and strongly
overdetermined (Exclusion).  
When put in this way, there is a striking similarity between the four claims 
constituting the Subset view and the four claims constituting the Exclusion 
problem. In fact, as I will proceed to argue, each of the claims constituting the 
Subset view is entailed by each of the claims constituting the Exclusion problem, at 
least given certain assumptions a physicalist is likely to accept. If so, the reasons for 
accepting each of the four claims constituting the Exclusion problem are indirectly 
reasons for accepting the Subset view.
First, take the claim that there is mental-to-physical causation. A property causing 
an effect E involves the manifestation of one of its powers (namely the power to 
cause E). So if there is mental-to-physical causation, then mental properties must 
have powers to cause physical effects – i) is entailed by i*).
Second, the Closure principle tells us (roughly) that every physical effect has a 
sufficient physical cause. Any physical effect E caused by a mental property M (at 
time t) must therefore also be caused by a physical property P (at t). But if P is a 
cause of E, then P must have the power to cause E as well. Hence, for any power M
has to cause some physical effect E, there is a physical property P which also has 
that power – ii) is entailed by ii*). 
Third, Distinctness tells us that mental properties are distinct from physical 
properties because the former can be multiply realized. If so, this means that any 
mental property M must have a causal profile that is different from the causal 
profile of any physical property. Since the powers of any mental property M are 
also had by some physical property P, M and P must be distinct, either because M
has additional powers not had by P or vice versa. As I argued earlier, the former 
cannot be the case – powers had by M to cause non-physical effects (for instance 
mental effects) are really powers to cause the physical grounding base for these 
non-physical properties and M cannot have powers to cause physical effects not had 
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by any physical property since this would violate the Closure principle. It follows 
that if Distinctness is true, it must be the case that the physical properties that have 
the powers also had by mental properties, have additional causal powers – iii) is 
entailed by iii*).
Fourth, the Exclusion principle tells us that effects are not systematically and 
strongly overdetermined. On a non-reductive physicalist account, the effects of 
mental properties are systematically overdetermined by mental and physical 
properties (every time a power bestowed by a mental property is manifested, the 
Closure principle tells us that a power bestowed by a physical property must 
manifest as well). If so, they cannot be strongly overdetermined, i.e. they cannot be 
the manifestation of two token-distinct powers. So the causal powers contained in 
the profile of a mental property must reduce to powers contained in the profile of 
some physical property at both the type and token level – iv) is entailed by iv*). 
Since each of the four claims constituting the Subset view is entailed by one of the 
four claims constituting the Exclusion problem, the justification for the latter claims 
transmits to the former. And since we are assuming that the four claims constituting 
the Exclusion problem are individually motivated, this means that the Subset view 
is motivated. Note that since the four statements that constitute the Exclusion 
problem are motivated independently of functionalist commitments, this means that 
the Subset view is motivated independently of such commitments.
4.19 Kim on the Subset View
Some might object to the dialectic of an argument that establishes the Subset view 
with the help of the statements constituting the Exclusion problem. Kim, for 
instance, has recently made the following point against the Subset view:
Consider a mental property M. How does M get to have a physical property, 
P, as one of its realizers? According to the subset definition, the causal 
powers of M must be a subset of the causal powers of P. How is that 
possible? We may assume that most of P's causal powers are powers to 
cause other physical events but we can allow, at this point, that P's causal 
powers may include causal powers to cause nonphysical events as well. But 
for the present strategy to work for the mental causation problem, the causal 
powers of M must include at least some of P's physical causal powers. This 
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amounts to the supposition that M has causal powers to cause physical 
events. How do we show that? Well, showing that that is possible, or 
showing how that is possible, is exactly the problem of mental causation. 
We seem to be back to square one, and very quickly, in a small circle!134
In other words, Kim is objecting that the Subset view is assuming what it sets out to 
show, namely that there is mental causation. As such, the claims that constitute the 
Exclusion problem, in particular MC (the claim that there is mental causation), 
cannot function as evidential basis for the Subset view. Instead, the explanation 
should be reversed – MC should fall out of the Subset view, which requires that the 
view is motivated independently of MC. Kim makes the point even clearer 
elsewhere:
For a positive resolution of the mental causation problem, I believe we 
should reach the statement that mental properties are causally efficacious as 
a conclusion, not start with it as an assumption. What troubles me is that 
Shoemaker’s procedure seems to be the opposite; for him, mental causal 
efficacy is a “starting assumption”.135
I believe Kim’s point should be resisted here, not just by the proponent of the 
Subset view but by anyone interested in solving the Exclusion problem. First, 
consider Kim’s claim that a solution to the Exclusion problem (or as Kim calls it, 
the problem of mental causation) should have the statement that mental properties 
are causally efficacious, or MC for short, as a conclusion. This seems unreasonable 
if the Exclusion problem is a paradox with MC as one of its claims. A paradox can 
be solved (or dissolved) by rejecting one of the mutually inconsistent claims 
constituting it, or by showing that the inconsistency between the claims is merely 
superficial or apparent, typically by disambiguating one of the claims. One does 
not, however, solve a paradox by giving an account or argument that has one of its 
claims as a conclusion. While such an account might help to strengthen the 
motivation for accepting that particular claim, it does not help to solve the paradox 
of which that claim is part. Indeed, the Exclusion problem is a paradox only if the 
claims that constitute it, including MC, are already motivated. So while Kim is 
correct in saying that MC is a starting assumption for the Subset view, this should 
                                               
134 This is from an email correspondence published online at: 
http://brainbrain.blogspot.com/2006/07/kim-vs-subset-view-of-higher-level.html
135 Kim [2010], p. 107.
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not be held against the view – in fact, any theory that promises to provide a solution 
to the Exclusion will have already assumed that we have good reasons for thinking 
that MC holds true. Consider for instance what Kim himself says in earlier writings:
[..] I doubt that very many of us who have been “worried” about mental 
causation have actually been concerned about the possibility that our 
thoughts and desires might turn out to have no powers to move our limbs. 
[…] [The Exclusion problem] is the problem of showing how mental 
causation is possible, not whether it is possible. […] In raising the how-
question, we are assuming, “defeasibly, but firmly” as Burge says, that the 
whether-question has already been affirmatively answered.136
I bring this up, not to make an ad hominem point against Kim, but because it strikes 
me as exactly the right thing to say about MC, or any other statement that is part of 
a paradox. 
4.20 Motivating Reductionism over Non-Reductionism
Once it is accepted that the statements that make up the Exclusion problem are 
already motivated and that they are all, in that sense, “starting assumptions” for any 
view that is concerned with solving the Exclusion problem, then it becomes clear 
that they can provide evidential basis for mind-body theories that incorporate the 
claims that constitute the Exclusion problem, or other claims that are entailed by 
them. Of course, this is not to say that none of them can be given up. It may be that 
there are overruling reasons for thinking that one of the claims should be rejected. 
For instance, early arguments for psycho-physical reduction were not primarily 
based on worries about the possibility of mental causation, but were rather 
arguments from ontological parsimony.137 If one is convinced by such arguments, 
then one may prefer to reject Distinctness in any case, whether or not this is 
necessary to account for mental causation. However, given that the Exclusion 
principle must be amended to allow for weak systematic overdetermination (as the 
argument in previous chapter showed) and given that this, in turn, allows for the 
Exclusion problem to be solved without rejecting any of the claims that constitute 
it, it is crucial that an argument to the effect that one of the claims of the Exclusion 
problem should be rejected must be independent of wanting to solve this problem. 
                                               
136 Kim [1998], p. 61-62.
137 As an example, see Smart [1959].
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Rejecting a prima facie plausible statement S, on the basis that one wishes to 
maintain statements P, Q, and R, is a sound move only if S is incompatible with P, 
Q, and R. If it is not, then one needs to provide independent reasons to doubt S in 
order to reject it. As far as rejecting the claim that mental and physical properties 
are distinct, however, I think it is fair to say that proponents of the Exclusion 
argument have not done much to provide such arguments. Kim, for instance, is 
explicit about the fact that he takes the Exclusion argument to be the only real 
argument for reduction of mental properties.138 And Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 
make the point that if the choice is between a reductive form of functionalism 
(filler-functionalism) and a non-reductive one (role-functionalism), the fact that the 
former allows for the causal efficacy of mental properties is what settles the issue in 
favour of this position.139 In both cases, reductionism is established as superior to 
anti-reductionist alternatives on the grounds that the former allows for mental 
causation. If what I’ve argued in this and the previous chapter is sound, this is a 
poor argument for reductionism since the Subset view allows for mental causation 
as well and denies that mental properties are reducible to physical properties.
What of Kim’s proposal to replace generic mental properties, such as pain, with 
structure-specific mental properties such as pain-in-humans, pain-in-dolphins, pain-
in martians, and so on? I take it that were it not for the fact that this replacement 
paves the way for psycho-physical reduction, nobody would have ever seriously 
proposed it. This brings us back to the question of what motivates reduction. If 
reductionism is attractive for reasons that have nothing to do with mental causation 
(for instance, considerations about ontological parsimony) then this may provide 
motivation for accepting the claim that there are only structure-specific mental 
properties. And by implication, this solves the Exclusion problem. However, in so 
far as psychophysical reduction is motivated by a desire to solve the Exclusion 
problem, replacing generic mental properties with structure-specific mental 
properties fail to be motivated independently of wanting to solve the Exclusion 
problem. As such the motivation for accepting structure-specific mental properties 
is a poor one since we don’t need to accept those to solve the Exclusion problem.
                                               
138 Kim [2005], p. 125.
139 Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson [1996], p. 101.
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Could a similar objection not be raised against the amendment to the Exclusion 
principle that I proposed in the previous chapter? Recall, the claim there that was 
the original exclusion principle is ambiguous as it does not distinguish between 
strong and weak overdetermination, and that once the original exclusion principle is 
appropriately amended to prohibit only strong systematic overdetermination, the 
Exclusion problem can be solved. Now, perhaps the reductionist could argue that 
this amendment is equally motivated by a desire to solve the Exclusion problem. If 
so, it seems the reductionist is at least as well off since we just have two different 
proposals to amend different statements of the Exclusion problem – the reductionist 
proposes an amended version of the Distinctness (amended from the claim mental 
properties are distinct from physical properties to the claim that structure-specific 
mental properties are distinct from physical properties) which they then go on reject 
(in the grounds that the argument from multiple realization fails to go through), and 
I propose an amended version of the exclusion principle (which prohibits strong 
systematic overdetermination but allows for weak systematic overdetermination) 
which I then argue is compatible with the other statements of the Exclusion problem 
(and result in the Subset view). However, there is an important difference between 
the two proposals since I offered reasons for rejecting the original exclusion 
principle that are independent of the desire to solve the Exclusion problem. Part of 
the reason the original exclusion principle should be rejected is that properties at 
different levels weakly overdetermine their common effects. The argument for this 
claim was entirely independent on any reason one might have for wanting to solve 
the Exclusion problem. Rather, it was based on the possibility of there being no 
fundamental bottom level and the mundane empirical fact that composite objects 
have a mass that is the additive sum of the mass of their parts at a given level. So 
unless the reductionist can show this argument to be unsound or come up with 
similar independent reasons for amending Distinctness, the proposal to amend the 
exclusion principle is more attractive. 
4.21 Limits of the Subset View
As we have seen, on Shoemaker’s account, it is a necessary condition for realization 
that a realized property and its realizer stand in the subset relation. Since the subset 
relation is a relation between causal profiles or sets of causal powers, an obvious 
way in which the view is limited is with respect to epiphenomenal or non-causal 
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properties, i.e. properties that have no causal powers. Examples of such plausibly 
include logical or mathematical properties, for instance the property being a prime 
number. Obviously, if such properties have no causal profiles, then they cannot 
enter into the subset relation and by implication cannot enter into the realization 
relation. Perhaps there is a way of making sense of realization between logical or 
mathematical properties but if so, it would have to be spelled out in a different 
manner than the one proposed by Shoemaker. 
Another potential limitation comes in the form of properties that are only partly 
individuated in terms of their causal powers. In other words, they are properties that 
have a non-causal aspect in addition to their causal powers. Phenomenal properties 
may be such properties. Many would argue that they are properties that have a 
certain phenomenal or qualitative aspect that cannot be accounted for in purely 
causal terms.140 Note that one can accept this while still insisting that phenomenal 
properties have causal profiles. For instance, the phenomenal property being in pain
may have a non-causal qualitative aspect (the “what’s-it-likeness” of experiencing 
pain), in addition to being the cause of pain-behaviour. If phenomenal properties 
have causal profiles, then they are not only able to enter into the subset relation with 
physical properties; we know that they must do so, given the truth of the closure 
principle and the exclusion principle. However, as we have seen, a further condition 
for realization is that the realized properties are grounded in their realizers. And 
there are well-known reasons for thinking that phenomenal properties fail to 
supervene on physical properties and, by implication, fail to be grounded in 
physical properties. For instance, according to the so-called zombie argument, there 
are possible worlds that are duplicates of the actual world with respect to physical 
properties but in which our human counterparts are “zombies” with no phenomenal 
experiences. This is not ruled out by the mere fact that any phenomenal property 
has a causal profiles that is a proper subset of the profile of some physical property. 
At best, this ensures is that the zombie-world contains “zombie-properties”, i.e. 
properties that have the same causal profile as phenomenal properties have in our 
world, but which bestow no phenomenality on the creatures that instantiate them.141
                                               
140 See for instance Block [1978], Kim [2005], chap. 6 and Nagel [1974].
141 Of course, if it is denied that phenomenal properties have causal profiles at all, then they are in 
the same boat as logical and mathematical properties and will not even be able to enter into the 
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It is, perhaps, too strong to say that phenomenal properties are properties to which 
to the Subset view does not apply at all. After all, the Subset view does apply to the 
aspect of phenomenal properties that can be captured in causal terms. However, the 
Subset view cannot fully account for them.
Phenomenal properties then, in so far as they are partly or fully individuated by 
their phenomenal character, will plausibly fail to be realized by physical properties 
since they plausibly fail to be grounded in physical properties, and this is revealed 
by a failure to supervene on physical properties. Still, just because there are 
properties to which the Subset view either does not apply (because these properties 
have no causal profiles) or to which it applies but for which physicalism 
nevertheless fails (because these properties have a non-causal, in addition to a 
causal aspect), does not mean that the theory should be rejected. Despite the 
potential limitations, the position still provides an attractive account of how 
irreducible mental properties can have causal efficacy, given the closure principle 
and the exclusion principle. 
                                                                                                                                  
subset relation. Personally I’m not sure what the motivation would be for such a claim once the 
Subset view is accepted.
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Chapter 5
The Subset View and Overdetermination of Causal Powers
Abstract: In this chapter I consider a new version of the 
Exclusion Problem, and whether the Subset view should be 
rejected on the basis of it. The starting point is an argument 
developed by Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives against the 
existence of determinable properties as they are construed 
according to the Subset view. Gillett and Rives contend that if 
determinable properties exist, they would overdetermine the 
causal powers of objects and that this would be an ontologically 
unparsimonious position. This argument can be extended to 
realized properties in general, including mental properties. I 
ultimately argue that worries about parsimony with respect to 
overdetermination of causal powers should be given little weight 
when adjudicating the truth of the Subset view. The reason is that 
such overdetermination plausibly occurs in other areas. Hence, 
we should be suspicious about very general metaphysical 
principles that prohibit it.
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 3.7, I considered some of the reasons for endorsing the original 
formulation of the exclusion principle. One of those reasons was that a position 
which entails the denial of the exclusion principle would be unparsimonious. 
Principles of parsimony, however, apply only to entities that it is unnecessary to 
posit. And, as I argued, it is necessary to allow for weak overdetermination in the 
case of some higher-level properties and the lower-level properties that compose 
them. This lead to an amended version of the exclusion principle according to 
which only strong systematic overdetermination is prohibited, and which therefore 
allows for weak overdetermination of behavioural effects by mental properties and 
their physical realizers. In this chapter I will discuss an objection to the effect that 
the move from allowing weak overdetermination by properties at different levels to 
allowing weak overdetermination by properties at the same level is illegitimate, and 
that a position that allows for the latter should be rejected on the grounds that it is 
unparsimonious. 
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This objection is based on an argument by Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives against 
the existence of determinable properties. However, their argument applies to all 
pairs of properties that stand in the subset relation. On the Subset view, this 
includes mental properties and their physical realizers. I will begin by giving a brief 
sketch of the distinction between determinable and determinate properties. Then I 
will present Gillett and Rives’ argument and show how it plausibly escapes the 
conclusions from chapter 3. Finally I will consider an alternative response on behalf 
of the Subset view.   
5.2 Determinable and Determinate Properties
Paradigm examples of determinable properties include properties like colour, mass, 
and height. Corresponding determinates to these determinables include properties 
like red, a mass of 2 kilograms, and a height of 2 meters. While much has been 
written about the various features of the relation between determinables and 
determinates, the crucial feature is arguably that determinates specify their 
corresponding determinables.142 Being red is a specific way of being coloured, 
having a mass of 2 kilograms is a specific way of having mass, and being 2 meters 
tall is a specific way of having height. Determinate properties can themselves be 
determinables relative to other properties. For instance, red is both a determinable 
and a determinate property – it is a determinable relative to the property scarlet and 
it is a determinate relative to the property colour. It seems plausible, however, that 
not all properties are determinable. The property a height of exactly 2 meters is 
presumably not a determinable property relative to any determinate, since there is 
no way of having height that is more specific than having a height of exactly 2 
meters. In what follows, when I talk of determinate properties it is implied that they 
are maximally determinate properties of this sort, i.e. determinate properties that 
allow for no further specification. 
According to Shoemaker, the Subset view can be applied to determinable properties 
and their corresponding determinates. That is, any instance of a determinable 
property is realized by some instance of one of its corresponding determinates. For 
example, the redness of an apple is realized by some more determinate shade of red, 
                                               
142 For a comprehensive discussion of other features of the determinable-determinate relation see 
Funkhouser [2006]. 
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say scarlet. This means that determinable and determinate properties stand in the 
subset relation – the token-powers of any instance of a determinable property form 
a proper subset of the token-powers had by some instance of one of its 
corresponding determinates. Of course, this makes effects of determinable causes 
weakly overdetermined since any one of these effects is the manifestation of a 
power that is bestowed by at least two distinct properties; a determinate property 
and its corresponding determinable. However, as long as the exclusion principle 
prohibits only systematic strong overdetermination, i.e. token-effects that are the 
manifestation of two distinct token-powers, this is unproblematic.
5.3 Gillett and Rives’ Objection
The objection raised by Gillett and Rives is that such a view is ontologically 
unparsimonious. Following Gillett and Rives’ terminology, optimists about 
determinable properties (that is, philosophers happy to posit their existence) face a 
serious metaphysical problem as their position involves overdetermination of the 
causal powers of the objects in the world. Pessimism, the view that determinable 
properties do not exist, on the other hand, has no such result. Coupled with a 
metaphysical principle about ontological parsimony, this, Gillett and Rives contend, 
shows that pessimism is to be preferred over optimism:
The worry is that while we should clearly accept that being one gram and 
being a charge of +1,6 x 10 ^(-19) coulombs are properties which contribute 
powers to individuals, it is not clear that we should also take determinable 
properties such as being a mass and being charged to contribute powers in 
addition to the determinates that always accompany them. For to do so 
would be a kind of “double counting”, to use David Lewis’ phrase, of the 
causally efficacious properties. We shall call this the ‘Parsimony Worry’.143
Obviously the Subset view of determinable properties does not fare well in the light 
of this worry, as it is at the heart of this account that the powers had by a 
determinable property such as red are also had by its corresponding determinate 
scarlet. Thus, as Gillett and Rives point out:
                                               
143 Gillett and Rives [2005], 486-487. Note that Gillett and Rives have a different definition of what 
it is for a property to be causally efficacious from the one I use. To them, a causally efficacious 
property is one that actually bestows some power on an object (Gillett and Rives [2005], p. 486). 
Hence, on Gillett and Rives’ account and contrary to my definition, causal efficacy need not involve 
the manifestation of any power. This is purely a terminological dispute.
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[…] the Subset View incorporates a massive ‘double-counting’ of the 
properties that contribute powers and an associated overdetermination of 
causal powers. And both of these features heavily offend against any 
principle of ontological parsimony.144
As a consequence, Gillett and Rives propose that we give up the Subset View, and 
realism about determinable properties in general, in favour of eliminativism about 
determinable properties – if determinable properties do not exist, they do not 
overdetermine the powers of objects. 
Why is it a problem for a theory that it incorporates ‘double-counting’ of properties 
and overdetermination of powers? Presumably because there is an implicit premise 
in Gillett and Rives’ argument to the effect that the world is such that properties do 
not overdetermine the powers of objects. Or at least, that properties do not 
systematically or in general overdetermine the powers of objects, in the way they 
would do if instances of determinable properties have powers also had by some 
instances of their corresponding determinates. That is, the Parsimony Worry rests 
on a metaphysical principle which tells us that, in general, distinct properties do not 
bestow the same causal powers. We can call this the principle of No 
Overdetermination of Powers (NOP).
This, of course, is the original exclusion principle with a twist. While the original 
exclusion principle focuses on causal overdetermination of effects, Gillett and 
Rives’ principle, focuses on the non-causal overdetermination of powers. According 
to the Subset View, a red object has certain causal powers in virtue of having the 
property red. However, it also has those very same causal powers in virtue of 
having some determinate shade of red, say the property scarlet. These causal 
powers are thus grounded twice, and are metaphysically overdetermined. And this 
is what NOP prohibits. 
Now, the conclusion from chapter 3, which refutes the original formulation of the 
exclusion principle, refutes NOP as well. Some higher-level composite properties 
bestow token powers that are identical to token-powers bestowed by the sum of 
                                               
144 Gillett and Rives [2005], 491.
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lower-level properties that compose them, so NOP is false. Nevertheless, we can 
restrict NOP on Gillett and Rives’ behalf and apply it only to pairs of properties of 
the same object, i.e. properties at the same level. Hence, the appropriate formulation 
of the principle of no overdetermination of powers is the following:
(NOP*): In general, distinct properties do not bestow the same powers on the 
same objects or individuals.
Since a determinable property and its determinate realizer are properties of the same 
objects, and so on the same level, this weaker formulation of the NOP-principle is 
all Gillett and Rives’ need to run their argument against the existence of 
determinable properties - the fact that there is overdetermination of powers by 
properties at different levels does not refute NOP*. 
Does this present an ad hoc restriction on the initial formulation of NOP? I think 
not. In so far as there is a substantial metaphysical distinction between levels and 
orders, it seems reasonable to think that what holds for properties at different levels 
may not hold for properties at different orders within a level.145 For instance, 
worries about causal drainage are exclusively worries about the causal powers of 
properties at different levels, and does not apply to properties within a level. If so, it 
would not be obviously ad hoc to insist that a refutation of NOP based on examples 
involving properties at different levels, fails to extend to a refutation of NOP*. In 
other words, NOP* can be a plausible metaphysical principle even if it is conceded 
that NOP is not.
5.4 A New Exclusion Problem
As I mentioned above, Gillett and Rives endorse eliminativism about determinable 
properties in the light of NOP*. Now, that may not be such an unpalatable 
conclusion. Perhaps we can live with there being no determinable properties. The
problem I will consider here is that Gillett and Rives’ argument can be easily 
extended to target mental properties as well, as they are construed by the proponent 
                                               
145By orders here I just mean any kind of division of same-level properties that stand in some 
interesting metaphysical relation, and not just the division between first- and second-order 
properties.  
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of the Subset view.146 They too have causal powers that are identical to powers had 
by their physical realizers, and so, have powers that are overdetermined. If one 
shares Gillett and Rives’ ‘Parsimony Worry’ about determinable properties, it 
seems that one should be equally worried about mental properties being 
unparsimonious. I do not mean to suggest that Gillett and Rives’ endorse, or need 
endorse, eliminativism about mental properties. However, if NOP* is accepted, a 
new version of the Exclusion problem can be generated, with the premises 
formulated in terms of causal powers, rather than causes:
(Mental Causation): Mental properties bestow powers to cause physical effects on 
some individuals.
(Closure): Any power to cause a physical effect is also bestowed by a 
physical property.
(Distinctness): Mental properties are distinct from physical properties.
(NOP*): In general, distinct properties do not bestow the same powers 
on the same objects or individuals.
Of course, on the Subset view, the fact that the causal powers of any mental 
property M are also powers of some physical property P is part of what makes it the 
case that P is a realizer of M. And the Subset view also endorses Distinctness.  This, 
however, is in tension with NOP*. So the proponent of the Subset view cannot 
accept all four claims. 
5.5 Rejecting NOP*
I will now go on to argue that NOP* should be rejected. The strategy for doing so 
will be to show that there are cases where overdetermination cannot plausibly be 
avoided when accounting for the powers of objects, and that these cases are not 
highly theoretic or exceptional but rather commonplace and systematic. These cases 
involve the grounding of what I call joint powers. Since overdetermination of 
powers not only occurs, but is commonplace, this means NOP* must be false. This, 
                                               
146 If mental properties just are determinable properties with physical properties as their 
determinates, Gillett and Rives’ argument need not be extended but would apply directly to mental 
properties. Some philosophers have explored this possibility, in particular Yablo in his [1992]. For 
some dissenting views, see Ehring [1996] and Menzies [2008]. I will say more about the problems 
associated with treating the relation between mental properties and their realizers as an instance of 
the determination relation in the next chapter.
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in turn, makes it much less clear why anyone endorsing the Subset View, should be 
worried about the overdetermination of powers that follows from her position.
5.6 Varieties of Powers - Simple, Compound, and Joint
I have been assuming throughout that properties ground the causal powers of an 
object (or event) by bestowing them on that object - objects have their causal 
powers in virtue of instantiating certain properties. For instance, say that Alice the 
pigeon has been trained to peck at objects if they are scarlet. In this case, the power 
had by scarlet objects to cause Alice to peck is grounded in the property scarlet, 
which bestows on those objects the power to cause Alice to peck. Call a power that 
is bestowed by a single property in this way a simple power.
Powers are not always simple. In many cases a plurality of properties work together 
to bestow a single power.147 How might such powers be grounded? To answer this 
question, we need to consider how causal powers are individuated. The most 
obvious answer is that they are individuated in terms of the effects they are powers 
to cause. This can be summed up in the following slogan: If two objects have 
powers to cause the same effects in the circumstances, then they have exactly the 
same powers.
With this in mind, we can make sense of powers being composed of other powers:
(Power Parthood): A power P to cause effect E has power P1 as a proper part iff 
P1 is a power to cause effect E1, where E1 is a proper part of 
E.
And this allows for a straightforward way in which a multitude of properties 
together can bestow a power:
(Multi bestowing): Properties X1, X2, …, Xn together bestow power P if power P 
is entirely composed of powers P1, P2,…, Pn and X1 bestows 
P1, X2 bestows P2, …, and Xn bestows Pn.
                                               
147 One example of this is when a plurality of lower-level properties bestow a plurality of power that 
are identical to a power also bestowed by the higher-level property they compose. 
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Here is an example to illustrate how this works. Take Vera, a pigeon which has 
been trained to peck when presented with scarlet objects and lift her wings when 
presented with round objects. Scarlet round objects thus have the power to cause the 
total effect of Vera pecking and lifting her wings. This power (the power to cause 
Vera to peck and lift her wings) is not had or bestowed by any single property and 
is therefore not a simple power. Rather, it is bestowed by two properties, scarlet and 
round, in the way described by (Multi bestowing). The power to cause Vera to peck 
and lift her wings is entirely composed of two distinct simple powers, the simple 
power to cause Vera to peck and the simple power to cause Vera to lift her wings. 
The former is bestowed by scarlet, the latter by round. And that is how scarlet and 
round together ground the power to cause Vera to peck and lift her wings. Call a 
power that is composed of simple powers in this way a compound power. 
Compound powers thus have the following two characteristics: One, they require 
the instantiation of a plurality of properties to be bestowed, and two, each property 
involved in bestowing a compound power bestows a power to cause just a proper 
part of a total effect (i.e. no single property involved bestows the power to cause the 
total effect). 
I take the example with Vera to show that cases of compound powers are possible. 
And while that particular example is somewhat artificial, instances of compound 
powers are commonplace in the actual world as well. A cup of coffee has the power 
to reflect light at a certain wavelength in virtue of being black and the power to 
burn the tongue in virtue of being hot which compounds to the power to reflect light 
at a certain wavelength and burn the tongue, a football has the power to travel a 
certain distance in virtue of having velocity and the power to attract other objects in 
virtue of having mass, which compounds to the power to travel a certain distance 
and attract other objects, and so on.148 Note that compound powers need not pose 
any problem for NOP* as long as the powers bestowed by each property involved 
in bestowing a compound power are distinct. And since powers are individuated by 
                                               
148 You might think that while such cases are actual, they are as artificial as the case of Vera the 
pigeon. After all, who would ever think to count the effect of reflecting light at a certain wavelength 
and burning the tongue as one effect and the power to cause such an effect as one power? I fully 
concede this point. Compound powers are easy to come by as they are simply mereological sums of 
distinct powers. 
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the effects they are powers to cause, powers are distinct if they are powers to cause 
distinct effects. In other words, if properties X1 and X2 bestow powers P1 and P2
respectively, which entirely compose compound power P, they do so in a manner 
that is kosher from the perspective of NOP*, if P1 and P2 are each powers to cause 
distinct effects E1 and E2. And in all the cases of compound powers mentioned 
above, the proper parts of the relevant total effects are distinct. Vera pecking is 
different from Vera lifting her wings, a cup of coffee reflecting certain wavelengths 
is different from tongue-burning, and a football travelling through the air is 
different from a football attracting other objects. In neither of the cases mentioned 
do two distinct properties bestow a power to cause the same effect. Rather, in every 
case, distinct properties each bestow a power to cause a distinct proper part of a 
total effect - a total effect that neither property on its own bestows a power to cause. 
Sometimes, however, properties come together to bestow a power in a very 
different manner. Imagine Agnes, a pigeon trained to peck at objects only if they 
are both scarlet and round.149 Intuitively, the properties scarlet and round together 
bestow the power to cause Agnes to peck, just like scarlet and round together 
bestow the power to cause Vera to peck and lift her wings. Unlike the latter case, 
however, the effect of Agnes pecking is not composed of distinct parts which 
scarlet and round each bestow a power to cause. For instance, ex hypothesi, it is 
simply not the case that scarlet bestows the power to cause Agnes to peck just 
halfway. Instead, the power to cause Agnes to peck is an all or nothing affair. Either 
scarlet and round are both instantiated by an object, in which case the object has the 
power to cause Agnes to peck, or either scarlet or round or both are not instantiated 
by the object, in which case it has neither the power to cause Agnes to peck nor the 
power to cause any proper part of that effect. I will call a power that is bestowed by 
a multitude of distinct properties in this way a joint power. Joint powers thus have 
the following two characteristics: One, they require the instantiation of a plurality of 
properties to be bestowed (this characteristic is shared with compound powers), and 
two, none of the properties in this plurality bestow just a power to cause a proper 
part of the relevant effect (scarlet, for instance, does not bestow the power to cause 
Agnes to peck just halfway).
                                               
149 This example is due to McLaughlin. See McLaughlin [2007].
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Before moving on to the question of how joint powers of objects are grounded, note 
first that, like instances of compound powers, instances of joint powers are 
commonplace. I (and many others) drink coffee only if it is black and hot, so a cup 
of coffee has the power to cause me to drink it in virtue of having the properties 
black and hot. Yet neither property on its own bestows the power to cause any part 
of this effect (if the coffee was white and hot or black and cold, it would not have 
the power to cause any part of me drinking it). A football has the power to break a 
window in virtue of having both mass and velocity, yet neither property on its own 
bestows a power to cause any proper part of this effect (if the football has a mass 
but no velocity or a velocity but no mass, it would not have the power to cause any 
proper part of the breaking), and so on. 
How are joint powers of objects grounded? For instance, how do the properties 
scarlet and round ground the power of scarlet round objects to cause Agnes to 
peck? One response would be to insist that it is a brute fact that they do so – scarlet
and round together bestow the power to cause Agnes to peck, and there is no deeper 
metaphysical fact that explains this. However, this seems to me an unhappy 
conclusion, in so far as we expect that the nature and causal powers of a plurality of 
properties depends on the nature and causal powers of the individual properties that 
make out this plurality. This, for instance, is the case for compound powers, which 
are bestowed by a plurality of properties in virtue of each of these properties 
bestowing a proper part of this power. In other words, while compound powers are 
bestowed by a plurality of properties, they are ultimately grounded in the causal 
powers of singular properties. Since this model fails to apply in the case of joint 
powers, the question is whether an alternative account is available. I can think of 
two ways joint powers might be grounded in a way that does not rely on a plurality 
of properties ‘brutely’ bestowing them. As I will now argue, both provide 
counterexamples to NOP*.
5.7 Grounding Joint Powers in Conjunctive Properties
First, it might be thought that the property which grounds the power of scarlet round 
objects to cause Agnes to peck is the conjunctive property scarlet and round (and 
similarly, what grounds the power of footballs to cause windows to break is the 
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conjunctive property mass and velocity, what grounds the power of cups of coffee 
to cause me to drink them is the conjunctive property hot and black, and so on for 
other cases of joint powers). This account side-steps the issue over how a plurality 
of properties can bestow a joint power, since it claims that any joint power is 
bestowed by a singular conjunctive property. Still, the proposal arguably manages 
to incorporate the two main characteristics of joint powers. First, if conjunctive 
properties are grounded in their conjunct properties (a view, I take it, that many of 
us would be inclined to hold), joint powers do involve a plurality of properties, in 
this case the properties which form the conjunctive property, which in turn bestow 
and hence ground the joint power. Second, as it is the conjunctive property scarlet 
and round which alone bestows the power to cause Agnes to peck, neither of the 
properties involved in bestowing a joint power bestows just a power to cause a part 
of the relevant effect (the conjunctive property scarlet and round bestows a power 
to cause the total effect of Agnes pecking and not only a part of the pecking, and the 
conjunct properties scarlet and round do not bestow a power to cause any part of 
this effect at all). 
But while the introduction of conjunctive properties allows for the grounding of 
joint powers, it also seems to violate NOP*. Again, assume that scarlet objects have 
the power to cause Alice to peck and that scarlet bestows this power. Some of these 
objects are also round and so, have the conjunctive property scarlet and round. 
Now, say that a scarlet round object is placed in front of Alice and causes her to 
peck. I take it as undeniable that the salient or relevant cause of this effect is the 
property scarlet (at least in normal contexts). However, it seems awfully rough to 
insist that the conjunctive property scarlet and round is completely inefficacious 
with respect to this effect. The reason, I think, is that there is an intuitive sense in 
which conjunctive properties, assuming here that they exist, include their conjunct 
properties. It is the same reason why it seems awfully rough to insist that scarlet is 
completely inefficacious with respect to effects caused by red. In some sense, to be 
scarlet is to be red, just like being scarlet and round is to be scarlet (among other 
things – it is also to be round of course).150 Hence, to completely exclude 
                                               
150This is not to say that the sense in which to be scarlet is to be red is the same sense in which to be 
scarlet and round is to be scarlet. As we saw, one of the platitudes about the determinable-
determinate distinction is that determinates specify their corresponding determinables. So to be 
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determinate/conjunctive properties from being causally efficacious with respect to 
effects caused by their determinables/conjunct properties just doesn’t sound quite
right.151 If conjunctive properties stand in the subset relation with their conjunct 
properties, however, we can accommodate these intuitions. The conjunctive 
property scarlet and round does cause Alice’s pecking since its causal profile 
includes the causal profile of scarlet. However, it is not a salient cause of the 
pecking since the profile also includes relatively many causally irrelevant powers, 
for instance, the powers that form the causal profile for the property round. Again, 
this is analogous to my comments on the case of Sophie pecking at all red objects –
red is the salient or explanatorily relevant property, however, scarlet is still a cause 
of this effect as well. But of course, to say that conjunctive properties and their 
conjunct properties stand in the subset relation is to accept that they overdetermine 
some causal powers – the powers bestowed by the conjunct properties are also 
bestowed by the conjunctive property that it is a conjunct of. So NOP* must be 
false.152
To sum up then, if you introduce conjunctive properties in order to ground joint 
powers of objects, the powers bestowed by any of the conjunct properties will be 
bestowed twice on those objects, once by that conjunct property and once by the 
conjunctive property which grounds the joint power. And since joint powers are 
commonplace this means overdetermination of powers is commonplace. NOP* 
must be false.  
5.8 A Potential Pessimist Rejoinder
What would it take for the Gillett and Rives to avoid this conclusion? Given the 
assumption that the conjunctive property scarlet and round grounds the power to 
                                                                                                                                  
scarlet is to be red in a specific way. But to be scarlet and round is not to be scarlet in a specific way. 
Rather, to be scarlet and round is to be partly scarlet. 
151 Of course, Gillett and Rives do not think determinable properties exist so obviously they do not 
think they can be causes. They cannot say the same for conjunctive properties, however, since we 
are assuming here that they are the properties that ground joint powers.
152 Another reason to think that conjunctive properties and their conjunct properties stand in the 
subset relation is that this explains why conjunct properties supervene on the conjunctive properties 
they are conjuncts of. Why is it that an object with the property scarlet and round necessarily has the 
property scarlet? Again, intuitively the relation of metaphysical dependence is reversed –
conjunctive properties depend on their conjunct properties. So the supervenience cannot be 
explained by reference to the grounding relation. If, however, these properties stand in the subset 
relation this is no mystery since the causal profile of scarlet is included in the causal profile for 
scarlet and round.
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cause Agnes to peck (which is not bestowed by any of the individual conjunct 
properties), rejecting the existence of the conjunctive property scarlet and round is 
not an option, as to do so would leave at least one power ungrounded.153 If one is 
determined to get rid of the overdetermination of the powers of scarlet round 
objects it therefore seems that the only option is to insist that scarlet round objects 
have neither the property scarlet nor the property round. As silly as this sounds, this 
would actually be in line with Gillett and Rives’ advice regarding determinable 
properties, i.e. keep the property which bestows the powers in the superset 
(determinate properties/conjunctive properties) and eliminate the properties 
bestowing the powers in any subset of this superset (determinable 
properties/conjunct properties). And granted, a consequence of such a move would 
be that the power of scarlet round objects to cause Agnes to peck is no longer
overdetermined. However, it is highly counter-intuitive to insist that scarlet round 
objects have neither the property scarlet nor the property round but only the 
conjunctive property scarlet and round, that a football flying through the air have 
neither mass nor velocity but only mass and velocity, or that the coffee I’m drinking 
has neither the property hot nor the property black but only the property hot and 
black, and so on. For this reason it seems that the proponent of NOP* would do 
better to look elsewhere to ground joint powers.
5.9 Grounding Joint Powers in Properties Bestowing Conditional 
Powers
Alternatively, an account of how joint powers are grounded without the 
introduction of conjunctive properties may be found in Shoemaker’s account of 
conditional powers. A conditional power is a power bestowed by a property on an 
object only if certain other properties are also had by that object. To use one of 
Shoemaker’s favourite examples, being knife-shaped bestows on an object a power 
to cut wood, only if that object also has the property of being suitably rigid. If the 
object is made of paper or whipped cream, for instance, it won’t have the power to 
cut wood, even if knife-shaped. Similarly, scarlet may be said to bestow the power 
to cause Agnes to peck on objects conditionally, in particular conditioned on those 
                                               
153 I am assuming that this conjunctive property is maximally determinate. Otherwise Gillett and 
Rives’ would reject its existence on the grounds that it is a determinable property. Of course, they 
would have to replace with the conjunctive property that is a maximally determinate of the property 
scarlet and round, in which case the problem reappears. 
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objects also having the property round (and similarly, mass bestows on footballs the 
power to cause windows to break conditioned on those footballs also having 
velocity, being black bestows on cups of coffee the power to cause me drink them 
conditioned on those cups also being hot, and so on for other cases of joint powers). 
Like the account considered in the previous section that grounded joint powers in 
conjunctive properties, this account succeeds in incorporating the two main 
characteristics of joint powers. First, joint powers will involve a plurality of 
properties, the property conditionally bestowing the joint power and the property 
that this bestowal is conditioned on. And second, neither of the properties involved 
bestows just a power to cause a part of this effect (scarlet bestows the power to 
cause the total effect of Agnes pecking and round does not bestow the power to 
cause any part of this effect at all but functions instead as a sort of background 
condition which enables scarlet bestow the joint power). The problem from the 
perspective of the proponent of NOP* is that it seems just as correct to say that 
round bestows on some objects the power to cause Agnes to peck, conditioned on 
those objects being scarlet. After all, there is nothing about the case that suggests 
scarlet, as opposed to round, is better suited as a full-blown causally sufficient 
property, rather than a mere background condition.154 Instead, the case at hand is 
entirely symmetrical - scarlet and round are each equally good candidates for 
conditionally bestowing the power to cause Agnes to peck. The natural conclusion 
to draw from this is that scarlet bestows conditionally on some objects the power to 
cause Agnes to peck (conditioned on those objects having the property round), and 
that round bestows conditionally on those very same objects the power to cause 
Agnes to peck (conditioned on those objects having the property scarlet). But if 
scarlet and round both conditionally bestow the power to cause Agnes to peck on 
the same objects, and if this example is representative of joint powers in general, 
then we have a counterexample to NOP*. We have distinct properties bestowing the 
very same power on the same objects.
                                               
154 This is assuming that there is even a genuine metaphysical distinction to be made between 
properties functioning as background conditions and causally sufficient properties which may be 
disputed.
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5.10 Further  Potential Pessimist Rejoinders
How can the pessimist avoid this conclusion? One way would be to simply deny 
that scarlet and round both bestow the power to cause Agnes to peck. As a matter 
of fact, the proponent of NOP* could argue, only one of them bestows the power to 
cause Agnes to peck while the other is merely a background condition. This, 
however, is terribly ad hoc and smacks of metaphysical arbitrariness. What, we 
might ask, determines which property gets to bestow the power to cause Agnes to 
peck? As noted above, the case appears to be entirely symmetrical and there seems 
to be no relevant factors that could decide this question. At best it would be 
arbitrary which property would win out. Of course, this worry has a distinctive 
epistemic flavour. After all, it may turn out there are factors of which we are simply 
unaware which would decide the question. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the 
pessimist would want his argument to hinge on the mere possibility that, despite 
appearances and as a matter of fact, either scarlet or round simply does not bestow 
the power to cause Agnes to peck. Until such factors should reveal themselves to 
us, it is reasonable to assume that both scarlet and round bestow this power, and 
hence that NOP* is false.
Another, initially more promising, strategy that might be pursued would be to deny 
that powers are entirely individuated by the effects they are powers to cause. In 
particular, the proponent of NOP* may insist that conditional powers are partly 
individuated by the conditions that must obtain for them to be bestowed. I take it 
that this is how many of us tend to think of causal powers. For instance, a boulder 
and a paper clip may both be able to cause a plane of glass to break when placed on 
it, yet we might balk at the claim that this is the very same type of power, since the 
boulder will manifest this power in a wide range of both normal and abnormal 
conditions, whereas the paper clip will only manifest this power when the plane of 
glass is already under considerable stress. This indicates that powers are partly 
individuated in terms of the conditions in which they are bestowed, in which case 
the boulder and the paper clip have different types of powers to cause the very same 
effect. We can see how this also leads to scarlet and round bestowing distinct
powers, since the conditions that must obtain for those powers to be manifest are 
different. Scarlet bestows the power to cause Agnes to peck in conditions where 
round is instantiated, and round bestows the power to cause Agnes to peck in 
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conditions where scarlet is instantiated. These are simply two distinct types of 
powers bestowed by two distinct properties. And if scarlet and round bestow 
different conditional powers, grounding joint powers in properties bestowing 
conditional powers no longer gives us a counterexample to NOP*, since NOP* only 
tells us that distinct properties do not bestow the same powers to the same object. A 
new problem arises, however. Rather than having more properties than we need to 
account for the power to cause Agnes to peck, we now have more powers than we 
need to account for the effect of Agnes pecking. The manifestation of the power 
bestowed by scarlet (the power to cause Agnes to peck conditioned on round) is 
sufficient for Agnes pecking. And likewise for the power bestowed by round (the 
power to cause Agnes to peck conditioned on scarlet). Therefore (again given the 
symmetry of the case), if Agnes is put in front of a scarlet round object and pecks, 
we must reasonably conclude that both powers were manifested. So when Agnes 
pecks, we have two distinct properties that are each causally sufficient and
efficacious for this pecking. But of course, this is just a case of strong causal 
overdetermination. In other words, if the properties bestowing a joint power are 
each bestowing distinct powers, joint powers would indeed not be overdetermined. 
However, the manifestation of joint powers would involve systematic and strong 
causal overdetermination. But this cannot be a better result than the 
overdetermination of powers that follows if scarlet and round bestow the same
power conditionally. Getting rid of overdetermination of powers on pain of 
accepting overdetermination of effects is hardly an attractive trade-off. A possible 
way out of this would be to insist that, as a matter of fact, only scarlet or round gets 
to be causally efficacious for the effect of Agnes pecking. But again, given the 
symmetry of the case it is difficult to see why this is not simply an ad hoc solution 
which faces the same problem as insisting that, as a matter for fact, either scarlet or 
round does not bestow the power to cause Agnes to peck.155
                                               
155 Philosophers sympathetic both to the notion of conditional powers and the idea that powers are 
partly individuated in terms of the conditions in which they are bestowed, may find it worrying to 
discover that this leads to strong causal overdetermination whenever joint powers are manifested. 
Maybe they even find it so worrying that they start to suspect that something must be wrong about 
an argument that has this conclusion. There’s a way to avoid the conclusion though. In the case of 
Agnes pecking, scarlet and round bestow different types of conditional powers on scarlet round 
objects (assuming that powers are partly individuated in terms of the conditions in which they are 
bestowed). However, any token of one of these powers may be identical to a token of the other. So 
for any particular scarlet round object, it has just one token-power to cause Agnes to peck, though 
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5.11 Concluding Remarks on the Grounding of Joint Powers
The upshot of this is that joint powers cannot be grounded without NOP* being 
false. If joint powers are grounded in conjunctive properties, these conjunctive 
properties will overdetermine the powers bestowed by their conjunct properties. 
And if joint powers are grounded in properties bestowing conditional powers, the 
joint powers themselves will be overdetermined by the property bestowing the 
conditional power and the property this bestowal is conditioned upon. Either way, 
NOP* is false and an argument resting on NOP* will be unsound.
5.12 Weakening NOP* 
Seeing that NOP* turns out false on both accounts of how joint powers might be 
grounded, the pessimist about determinable properties may consider whether she 
can establish her position with less. Perhaps she does not need to commit to the 
claim that, in general, distinct properties bestow the same powers to the same 
object. All she needs to establish pessimism is the weaker claim that realized 
properties do not overdetermine the powers also bestowed by their realizers. If this 
can be established, Gillett and Rives can still run their argument against the 
existence of determinable properties (as they are construed according to the Subset 
view), and the Exclusion problem formulated in terms of causal powers would still 
present a paradox. The trick, of course, is to show that a further weakening of the 
original NOP principle is justified and not merely ad hoc. For instance, to explicitly 
restrict NOP to realized properties and their realizer and claim that they cannot 
overdetermine any causal powers would be to beg the question against the 
proponent of the Subset view. There has to be a substantive and relevant difference 
between the overdetermination of powers involved in grounding joint powers and 
the overdetermination of powers involved in positing the existence of realized 
properties, if the pessimist wishes to allow only for the former.
Here is a potential difference that someone sympathetic to the Parsimony Worry 
may exploit: If joint powers are grounded in properties bestowing conditional 
powers, overdetermination of powers cannot be avoided. This is because the 
                                                                                                                                  
this is a token-power of two different types of powers. Of course, this does not help the proponent of 
NOP* since this token-power will be determined by two distinct properties, scarlet and round. 
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overdetermining properties each bestow powers that the other does not. For 
instance, the joint power to cause Agnes to peck is bestowed both by scarlet and 
round. However, since scarlet bestows powers that round does not, and vice versa, 
both properties must be posited to account for all the powers of scarlet round 
objects. To deny the existence of either scarlet or round to avoid the 
overdetermination of their joint powers would leave some powers ungrounded. 
Contrast this with the grounding of the powers putatively bestowed by realized 
properties. Since these are a subset of the powers that are bestowed by the realizer, 
we don’t need to ground them by positing realized properties. There would be no 
powers ungrounded even if the existence of realized properties was denied.156
The weakened version of NOP* that follows from this line of reasoning would then 
be something like this:
(NOP**): In general, distinct properties do not bestow the same powers on the 
same objects or individuals, except in cases where they do so as a 
result of grounding all the powers of those objects and individuals.
This version of NOP would allow the pessimist to accept the overdetermination 
involved in grounding the joint powers of objects in properties bestowing 
conditional powers, while at the same time preventing realized properties from 
overdetermining the powers bestowed by their realizers. Nevertheless, I believe 
such a strategy brings us to a point where the pessimist is in a dialectically awkward 
position. To see this, it is important to note that the proponent of the Subset view 
will have their own reasons for being an optimist with respect to realized properties. 
This is especially clear in the case of mental properties and philosophy of mind, 
where eliminativism is generally frowned upon. Indeed, the reasons for thinking 
that mental properties have causal powers presuppose that these properties exist and 
that eliminativism about mental properties is false. Now, I do not wish to deny that 
                                               
156 If joint powers are grounded in conjunctive properties, this difference between the 
overdetermination involved in grounding joint powers and the overdetermination involved in 
positing realized properties would no longer be present. The reason is that, like realized properties, 
conjunct properties have only causal powers that form a subset of some other properties (conjunctive 
properties). And since these conjunctive properties must be posited to ground joint powers, we 
wouldn’t need to posit the conjunct properties. As I mentioned earlier, this would be quite counter-
intuitive. 
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principles of parsimony can play a role in constraining metaphysical theories or 
even deny that it can trump what looks like good reasons for positing entities of a 
certain kind. However, the proponent of the Subset View is well within her right to 
find it unfair that the pessimist about realized properties asks her to give up a view 
that, as I argued in the previous chapter, is motivated by a combination of empirical 
and philosophical evidence, purely on the basis of a general metaphysical principle 
that has not only been weakened to allow for overdetermination of powers by 
properties at different levels, but now has also been weakened to allow for some
overdetermination of powers by properties at the same level. It may be reasonable 
to ask philosophers to adhere to a certain general methodological principle, it is 
much less reasonable to ask them to adhere to this principle, and then go on to list 
several areas where the principle may be overruled. 
In other words, I do not think that proponent of the Subset View should feel 
embarrassed about endorsing the following formulation of the NOP principle:
(NOP***): In general, distinct properties do not bestow the same powers on the 
same object, except in cases where these properties stand in the 
realization relation and we have good reasons for thinking that the 
realized properties exist.
Of course, this leaves it open for someone to argue that a certain class of properties 
fails to be exempted. For instance, pessimists about determinable properties, such as 
Gillett and Rives, may wish to deny that we have good reasons for thinking that 
they exist.157 Likewise, someone may think that mental properties exist but that they 
fail to be realized by physical properties, in the sense of realization endorsed by the 
Subset view. In both cases, the Subset view would be false. What the discussion in 
this chapter shows, however, is that such arguments must be largely independent of 
the Parsimony Worry. There is no straight-forward route from principles of 
parsimony to the denial of the Subset view.
                                               
157 It’s worth noting that Gillett and Rives’ spend a large part of their paper following this strategy as 
they discuss, and reject, David Armstrong’s argument that an adequate account of laws of nature 
requires determinable properties. 
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5.13 Concluding Remarks
I conclude that Gillett and Rives’ pessimist argument against determinable 
properties fails. In its original form, it relies on a metaphysical principle that is 
false. And a modified version of the argument that tries to get by with a weaker 
principle places the pessimist in a dialectically awkward position as the proponent 
of the Subset view can provide a weakened version of NOP herself which is 
compatible with her position. This also means that the Exclusion problem framed in 
terms of causal powers fails to get off the ground. To reject the Subset view, 
principles of parsimony ultimately play little role. Rather, a rejection must involve 
arguments that directly target the reasons for endorsing the Subset view.  
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Chapter 6
Alternative Non-Reductive Solutions to the Exclusion 
Problem
Abstract: In this chapter I discuss two current alternative non-
reductive solutions to the Exclusion problem. The first is an 
argument from causation according to which a difference-making 
account of causation makes false the closure principle. I defend 
this solution against the charge that this contradicts the empirical 
evidence for closure but nevertheless argue that the Subset view 
is superior since it can explain mind-body supervenience and can 
take onboard many of the insights of a difference-making 
account of causation. The second is an argument from the 
metaphysics of properties according to which adopting an 
ontology of tropes will allow us to reduce mental causes to 
physical causes, without contradicting the argument from 
multiple realization. I ultimately reject this solution on the 
grounds that it requires us to accept the implausible claim that 
mental and physical tropes stand in a determinable-determinate 
relation. 
6.1 Introduction
In chapter 3.21-22, I argued that a consequence of the drainage problem is that we 
must allow for weak overdetermination of some effects by properties at different 
levels. In chapter 5, I extended this point to apply to certain same-level properties, 
namely properties having powers to cause joint effects. All in all, these 
considerations make an Exclusion principle that prohibits this kind of 
overdetermination highly implausible. Furthermore, the reasons for accepting the 
Exclusion principle in the first place do not apply to weak overdetermination. 
Hence, the original formulation of the Exclusion principle is ambiguous: It does not 
distinguish between strong and weak overdetermination and once disambiguated, it
becomes clear that the evidence supports only a formulation in terms of strong 
overdetermination. In chapter 4, I argued that with this amended version of the 
Exclusion principle, the statements constituting the Exclusion problem actually 
entails the Subset view. And since each of these statements is individually 
motivated, this means that the Subset view is motivated. 
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This, of course, assumes that once the Exclusion principle is suitably amended, no 
further disambiguation or amendments of these statements is required. In this 
chapter, I will discuss two recent dissenting views. One view holds that the Closure 
principle (roughly the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical 
cause) must be amended; another that the notion of a property employed in MC (the 
claim that mental properties are causally efficacious) and Distinctness (the claim 
that mental and properties are distinct) is ambiguous. Both hold that this 
amendment/disambiguation is the key to solving the Exclusion problem without 
giving up the claim that mental and physical properties are distinct. This in itself is 
not a problem for the proponent of the Subset view. After all, it may well be that 
there are several distinct reasons for thinking that the Exclusion problem fails to 
present a genuine paradox. What is a problem is that, as I will argue shortly, the 
non-reductive views that fall out of these alternative solutions to the Exclusion 
problem are incompatible with the Subset view. Hence, the proponent of the Subset 
view must show why these alternative non-reductive views are wrong, or at least 
show that the Subset view is superior to them. It is the purpose of this chapter to do 
just that.
6.2 Amending the Closure Principle – Causal Sufficiency versus 
Causal Efficacy
Some philosophers have pointed out that there is an important difference between a 
property being causally sufficient for an effect E and that property being a cause of 
E. For instance, Yablo, in his discussion of determinable and determinate 
properties, insists that pairs of determinates and determinables compete only for the 
role of being a cause or causally efficacious, with respect to a certain effect, not for 
the role of being causally sufficient for this effect.158 If so, causal sufficiency must 
be a weaker notion than causal efficacy. Yablo then goes on to argue that a 
determinate property may be causally sufficient for an effect that is actually caused 
by its corresponding determinable (recall, Yablo’s view is that a causally 
efficacious property with respect to some effect is the property that is proportional 
(or most proportional) to that effect, and that, in some cases, determinable 
properties satisfy this condition better than any of their determinates). Yablo brings 
                                               
158 Yablo [1992], p. 274. 
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up this distinction in order to falsify the following version of the Exclusion 
principle:
(Exclusion*): 
If a property X is causally sufficient for an effect E, then no property 
distinct from X is causally relevant to E.159
This principle obviously cannot be right if a determinate property can be causally 
sufficient for an effect caused by its corresponding determinable.    
In a couple of recent papers (one co-written with Christian List), Peter Menzies has 
argued that Yablo’s points can be applied, even in cases where the properties in 
question do not stand in a determinable-determinate relation.160 Like Yablo, 
Menzies’ conclusion is that once the distinction between causal sufficiency and 
causal efficacy is appreciated, the Exclusion principle formulated in terms of causal 
sufficiency can be rejected, and like Yablo, Menzies arrives at this via a conception 
of causes as difference-makers. 161 According to Menzies and List, difference-
making can be analysed counterfactually in the following way:
(Difference-making): C makes a difference to E (and so, is a cause of E according 
to the difference-making account of causation) if and only if: 
1) If C is instantiated, then E is instantiated. 
2) If C is not instantiated, then E is not instantiated. 
This account differs from a standard counterfactual account of causation since 
Menzies and List offer a non-standard semantics of counterfactuals. On a standard 
Lewis-Stalnaker interpretation, 1) is true if C and E are both actually instantiated. 
On Menzies and List’s account, however, it is in addition required that in all 
possible worlds relevantly similar to the actual world in which C is instantiated, E
                                               
159 Yablo [1992], p. 247.
160 Menzies [2008] and Menzies & List [unpublished].
161 The idea that causes are difference-makers is common to a range of theories about causation, 
including Yablo’s theory that causes should be proportional to their effects, traditional 
counterfactual accounts (Lewis [1973]), interventionist accounts (Woodward [2003]), and 
contrastive accounts (Schaffer [2005]). Yablo is explicit that the proportionality claim (the claim that 
causes are proportional to their effects) is an attempt to capture this idea. 
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is instantiated. Likewise, for 2) to be true, it must be the case that in all worlds 
relevantly similar to the actual world in which C is not instantiated, E is not 
instantiated either.162 One advantage of this interpretation is that it allows Menzies 
and List to flesh out the notion of causal sufficiency.163 For a property to be 
causally sufficient for effect E, it is enough that the first counterfactual is satisfied. 
That is, C is causally sufficient for E if and only if, in every possible world 
relevantly similar to the actual world in which C is instantiated, E is also 
instantiated. This explains why, in the Sophie case, scarlet is sufficient for Sophie 
pecking without being a cause of this effect. It is sufficient because in worlds 
relevantly similar to the actual world in which the object in front of Sophie is 
scarlet, she pecks at it. It is not, however, a cause of the pecking, since there are 
possible worlds relevantly similar to the actual world in which the object is not 
scarlet, but in which Sophie nevertheless pecks, for instance, worlds in which the 
object is crimson or pink. 
To appreciate how this applies to mental properties and their physical realizers, 
consider a case where a mental property M is causing the instantiation of a certain 
behavioural property E, and where a physical property P realizes M. Assuming 
physicalism, M supervenes on P. This makes P causally sufficient for E, since in all 
possible worlds relevantly similar to the actual world, in which P is instantiated, M
is instantiated and causes E. There are, however, relevantly similar worlds in which 
P is not instantiated but in which the behavioural effect E nevertheless occurs, for 
instance, worlds in which a different physical realizer of causally efficacious mental 
property M is instantiated. In other words, whenever a mental property is causing an 
effect, the physical property that realizes this mental property will be causally 
sufficient for this effect.
6.3 The Difference-making Account of Causation and the Exclusion 
Problem
Menzies view raises some questions, in particular about how to understand the 
notion of possible worlds that are relevantly similar to the actual world. Let me put 
                                               
162 Menzies and List [unpublished], p. 6.
163 Something Yablo does not do, preferring, as he says, to remain neutral on how best to understand 
the notion (Yablo [1992], fn. 5).
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those questions aside however, and instead focus on how Yablo and Menzies 
propose to solve the Exclusion problem. First, note that both Yablo and Menzies 
assume that the Exclusion principle operative in the Exclusion problem is 
Exclusion* - that is, a principle according to which the causal sufficiency of a 
property with respect to effect E, excludes all other properties from being causally 
relevant with respect to E. Causal relevance, whatever this exactly amounts to, 
includes being causally efficacious with respect to E. So according to Exclusion*, if 
a property is causally sufficient for an effect E, then no other property can be a 
cause of this effect.164 However, the relevance of this Exclusion principle, as far as 
the Exclusion problem is concerned, is questionable. For one thing, despite the fact 
that Menzies and List explicitly attribute it to Kim, it is nowhere to be found in 
Kim’s writing (that I have been able to find anyway). Instead, what Kim says is 
this: 
To acknowledge mental event m (occurring at t) as a cause of physical event 
p but deny that p has a physical cause at t would be a clear violation of the 
causal closure of the physical domain […].  But to acknowledge that p has 
also a physical cause, p*, at t is to invite the question: Given that p has a 
physical cause p*, what causal work is left for m to contribute?165
In other words, Kim’s worry is not that mental property M (or mental event m, qua 
instantiating mental property M) is excluded from being causally efficacious with 
respect to physical effect E due to there being a physical property which is merely 
causally sufficient for E. The worry is rather that the causal efficacy of M is 
threatened due to there being a physical property which is a sufficient cause of E. 
Assuming that this worry is based on the prior acceptance of some version of the 
Exclusion principle, it cannot be the version that Yablo and Menzies aim to refute. 
Instead, it must be a version framed in terms of sufficient causes, which is also the 
version I used when originally setting up the Exclusion problem – in general, a 
property being a sufficient cause of E excludes other properties from being causes 
of E.
                                               
164 Yablo [1992], p. 247, Menzies [2008], p. 196, and Menzies and List [unpublished], p. 1. 
165 Kim [1998], p. 37. While Kim frames the problem in terms of events, this can easily be translated 
into a problem about the causal efficacy of mental properties.
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What do Yablo and Menzies have to say about this weaker version of the Exclusion 
principle? Yablo does not directly address the issue, though as I pointed out in 
chapter 3, the proportionality constraints on causation arguably vindicate it. The 
reason is that they generate unique causes among sets of causally competing 
determinate properties and their less specific determinables.166 So if a property 
satisfies the proportionality constraints, every determinate and determinable of this 
property will fail to do so, and so, fail to be a cause of the effect in question. 
Menzies explicitly considers whether or not to accept an Exclusion principle framed 
in terms of sufficient causes, as opposed to causally sufficient properties. While he 
hesitates to adopt this principle outright (as he says, he is uncertain if the principle 
in general is true or false), he does go on to argue that, in the specific case of mental 
causation, the causal efficacy of a physical realizer excludes the causal efficacy of 
the mental property it realizes, and vice versa.167
Of course, if both Yablo and Menzies accept an Exclusion principle framed in terms 
of causes or causally efficacious properties, rather than in terms of causal 
sufficiency, and if this is the principle that Kim (and myself) rely on when 
generating the Exclusion problem, one might wonder how Yablo and Menzies 
expect to solve the Exclusion problem by rejecting a stronger principle. The answer 
is that both Yablo and Menzies frame the Closure principle in terms of causally 
sufficient properties as well. When setting up the Exclusion problem, this is how 
Menzies defines the Closure principle:
(Closure*): For every physical effect E that has a cause, there is a physical 
property P that is causally sufficient for E.168
                                               
166 Yablo is well aware of this, stating, as mentioned above, that determinable and determinate 
properties compete for the role of being a cause. This is what leads him to deny that scarlet is 
causally efficacious with respect to Sophie’s pecking. As I argued in chapter 4, I think this is too 
strong and not something Yablo should feel forced to commit to, partly because Yablo already 
denies that satisfaction of the proportionality constraints is necessary for causation (though for 
different reasons). Menzies and List, on the other hand, clearly take difference-making (as they spell 
it out) to be both necessary and sufficient for causation. 
167 Menzies [2008], p. 212-215. 
168 Menzies [2008], p. 198. Yablo’s version of this is basically identical to Menzies’, though he 
frames it in terms of events and calls it the principle of physical determinism. See Yablo [1992], p. 
247.
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Since being causally sufficient does not entail being a sufficient cause (or even a 
partial cause) on Yablo and Menzies’ accounts, the truth of Closure* is compatible 
with the failure of Closure – even if some physical effects do not have physical 
causes (at time t), it may nevertheless be the case that for every physical effect, 
there is a physical property that is causally sufficient for that effect. In other words, 
while Exclusion* is stronger than Exclusion, Closure* is weaker than Closure. This 
leaves room for a solution to the Exclusion problem that does not involve the 
rejection of any of its premises: Accept Exclusion and Closure* (the weaker 
versions of these principles), and reject the stronger Exclusion* and Closure. This 
leaves us with four claims: First, that mental properties are distinct from physical 
properties (Distinctness). Second, that some physical effects have mental properties 
as causes, either as sufficient causes or as part of their sufficient causes (MC). 
Third, that these physical effects (in general) have just a single sufficient cause 
(Exclusion). And finally fourth, that there is a physical property (or set of physical 
properties), that is causally sufficient for each of these physical effects (Closure*). 
Again, if causal sufficiency does not entail being a cause, these four claims are 
entirely compatible. 169
6.4 Replacing Closure with Closure*
Obviously, the crucial, and controversial, step in Yablo and Menzies solution to the 
Exclusion is the rejection of the stronger principle, Closure. As I stated in chapter 3, 
however, a satisfactory solution to the Exclusion problem cannot simply amount to 
a rejection of one (or more) of the problematic premises. It must be supplemented 
with a story of why we came to believe that premise in the first place, or why the 
evidence for it is really only evidence for a weaker principle. Unfortunately, Yablo, 
does not discuss the stronger version of the closure principle, and so, does not give 
his reasons for thinking it legitimate to reject it and replace it with the weaker 
Closure*. Let me therefore put Yablo aside and focus on Menzies, who explicitly 
rejects the stronger version of the closure principle by way of a simple 
counterexample. Imagine that we have excellent empirical reasons for thinking that 
an individual instantiating mental property M is the difference-maker for whether or 
not that individual exhibits behaviour B. In this case, Menzies is prepared to take 
                                               
169 For similar arguments see Woodward [2008] and Raatikainen [forthcoming].
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this at face value and as evidence that the stronger closure principle fails. As he 
says:
[…] M and a neural property that realizes it cannot both be difference-
making causes of B. So our epistemic situation is one in which we have to 
decide between the well-confirmed that M is the cause of B and the purely 
conjectural hypothesis that there exists some physical P that is a difference-
making cause of B. It would not be irrational under these circumstances to 
favour the first hypothesis over the second, concluding that the strengthened 
causal closure principle is false in this case.170
A couple of things should be noted here. First, saying that the stronger version of 
the closure principle is a ‘purely conjectural hypothesis’ is somewhat unfair. As I 
pointed out in chapter 3, the stronger version of the closure principle is itself 
supposedly backed up by empirical evidence, and if it was purely conjectural, it is 
unlikely that so many have worried about the Exclusion problem, rather than simply 
giving up the closure principle. Second, it is important to note that Menzies is not 
merely pointing out that mental properties turn out causally efficacious on the 
difference-making account of causation. As noted earlier, giving an account of 
causation that vindicates the causal efficacy of mental properties is all well and 
good. However, it does not in itself provide a solution to the Exclusion problem – in 
fact, as I stressed earlier, the causal efficacy of the mental is a starting assumption 
for generating the problem in the first place. Rather, the crucial point to note is that 
Menzies’ account of causation has as consequence that when a mental property is 
causally efficacious, its physical realizer is not. This is why the case that Menzies 
asks us to imagine provides a counterexample to the stronger version of the closure 
principle.
That said, some might object that Menzies is doing little to actually solve the 
Exclusion problem. After all, it could be argued that what he is doing is using three 
claims to show that a fourth is false: Given the truth of Exclusion and Distinctness, 
a case of mental causation provides a counterexample to Closure. But this is old 
news. The Exclusion problem constitutes a paradox exactly because any three of its 
premises can be used to establish the denial of a claim that has independent support. 
Granted, Menzies’ account of causation may vindicate the Exclusion principle and 
                                               
170 Menzies [2008], p. 216.
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thereby provide novel and additional support for that principle, but that in itself 
does not help to solve the Exclusion problem. Recall, a dialectically satisfactory 
solution to the problem that involves the rejection, disambiguation, or amendment 
of one of the premises must come with a story of why the evidence for the rejected, 
disambiguated, or amended premise must be rejected or why it fails to support the 
premise under attack. While Menzies does not himself address this issue, I believe a 
case can be made on his behalf that his account has the resources to make plausible 
the claim that the evidence for Closure is really only evidence for the weaker 
Closure*. 
6.5 The Empirical Evidence for Closure
Firstly, given Menzies’ non-standard interpretation of the counterfactuals used to 
analyse causation, it is easy to see how a causally sufficient property might be 
mistaken for a causally efficacious property. Consider the following case: Jones has 
a pigeon and two objects that differ only in their colours - say that one is scarlet and 
one is lime-green. Jones determines that the pigeon consistently pecks at the scarlet 
object and fails to peck at the lime-green object. In this case, it seems Jones has 
some evidence for the claim that scarlet is the causally efficacious property with 
respect to the pecking. However, the case is entirely compatible with scarlet merely 
being causally sufficient for this effect, since the pigeon may be responding to the 
property red, rather than scarlet. Now, it might be argued that if Jones is a thorough 
researcher, he will take into account that the objects at his disposal also differ with 
respect to their determinable properties (one is red, the other green), and therefore 
will take into account the possibility that, in fact, it is red causing the pecking, 
rather than scarlet. Presumably, Jones would then test for this by presenting the 
pigeon with a variety of red but non-scarlet objects and check if pecking ensues. In 
other words, it is unlikely that Jones would make a mistake with respect to which 
property is causing the pecking. But now consider a scenario where Jones is part of 
a context in which some types of properties are typically ignored. For instance, say 
that Jones is a neuroscientist, that the ‘objects’ at his disposal are test-subjects, and 
that the property tested for causal efficacy with respect to some effect E is neural 
property N. As before, Jones discovers that whenever his test-subjects instantiate N, 
it consistently results in effect E (say, a certain kind of behaviour) and that 
whenever N fails to be instantiated, the effect fails to occur as well. Again, it seems 
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that in this case, Jones has some evidence for the claim that N is causing E. But now 
add that N is a realizer for mental property M and that, in fact, it is M that makes the 
difference between the effect occurring or not. Should we expect that Jones (or his 
colleagues) considers this possibility? I think not. It is not unlikely that Jones would 
fail to do so and therefore fail to test for the causal efficacy of mental property M
with respect to E. As a neuroscientist, Jones is looking for neural causes and 
potential non-physical psychological causes will simply fall outside the scope of his 
research.171 Even if Jones discovers that some test-subjects not instantiating N, but 
rather N*, still exhibit the relevant behavioural effect E (just as it can discovered 
that a pigeon pecks at other red but non-scarlet objects), this is unlikely to lead to 
the conclusion that there might be a causally efficacious higher-order property, 
realized by causally inefficacious but nevertheless causally sufficient properties N
and N* (inefficacious and sufficient with respect to E, naturally). Instead, Jones is 
more likely to conclude that N and N* are distinct properties causing the same type 
of effect. In other words, scientific disciplines are typically methodologically 
“closed off” from other disciplines. For instance, a chemist will look for chemical
causes, a biologist for biological causes, a neuroscientist for neural causes, and so 
on. However, they will generally not consider potential causally efficacious 
properties treated by other disciplines. If scientific disciplines in general are closed 
off from causally efficacious properties treated by other disciplines, then we should 
expect that they systematically mistake properties that are merely causally sufficient 
for properties that are causally efficacious. And if so, it is no surprise that natural 
science appears to produce evidence for the stronger closure principle. 
Secondly, the success of natural science, which was one of the main motivations for 
accepting Closure, is not discredited by the considerations above. Say that, indeed, 
neuroscience mistakenly and systematically classifies merely causally sufficient 
neural properties, with respect to certain behavioural effects, as causally efficacious. 
This will in no way impugn on the ability of neuroscience to make successful 
predictions about which effects will occur given the instantiation of certain neural 
properties. What is required for this is that there are stable correlations between the 
                                               
171 Even if the possibility of a mental cause did occur to Jones, consider what would happen if he 
was to ask the neuroscience department that employs him for additional research funding to 
investigate whether behaviour has psychological, rather than neural causes. He would almost 
certainly be turned down.
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instantiation of certain neural properties and certain effects. And if certain neural 
properties are causally sufficient for behavioural effects caused by the mental 
properties they realize, this is guaranteed by satisfaction of the first counterfactual 
in the difference-making analysis of causation. 
To sum up then, given Menzies account of causation and causal sufficiency, the 
empirical evidence arguably supports nothing more than the weaker formulation of 
the closure principle, Closure*. And replacing Closure with Closure* has as a result 
that the Exclusion problem fails to constitute a paradox. Therefore, a case can be 
made that Menzies provides a dialectically satisfactory solution to the Exclusion 
problem.
6.6 Difference-making and the Subset View
As I mentioned earlier, the truth of the Subset view is compatible with there being 
alternative sound solutions to the Exclusion problem. But is Menzies’ view one of 
them? The crucial question is this: Is it compatible with Menzies’ account that 
mental properties and their physical realizers stand in the subset relation? That is, 
can Menzies accept that the token-powers had by an instance of any mental 
property are identical to token-powers had by the instance of a physical property 
that realizes it? What I have to say here is very much the same as I said when 
discussing Yablo’s view and whether or not it is compatible with the Subset view. If 
a property is a cause of an effect when it bestows a power to cause E that manifests, 
then Menzies’ view is clearly incompatible with the Subset view, for it is part of the 
latter view that whenever a mental property manifests a power and causes an effect, 
its physical realizer manifests the very same power, and thereby also causes the 
effect. And Menzies denies that a physical realizer causes the effects also caused by 
the property it realizes. 
The incompatibility, however, can be more or less severe. Consider the claim that 
mental and other non-physical properties and their physical realizers stand in the 
subset relation. In other words, the token-powers had by any mental or otherwise 
non-physical property are also had by the physical property that realizes it. Menzies 
can accept this as long as he denies that manifesting a power to cause E is sufficient 
for causing E. And presumably he would deny this since a property can manifest a 
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power to cause E without being a difference-maker for E, the latter condition being 
necessary for causation on Menzies’ account. This, it seems to me, is not a severe 
disagreement (though as I argued in chapter 4, I find it hard to see the motivation 
for denying that realizers do cause behavioural effects if they manifest powers to 
cause these effects). After all, the proponent of the Subset view and Menzies would 
then agree on the metaphysics of the realization relation and mental causation, they 
just disagree on how best to classify the properties involved. According to Menzies, 
whenever a mental property manifests a power to cause an effect for which it is also 
a difference-maker, its physical realizer manifests the very same power, though 
only the former deserves the title of being a cause of E. According to the Subset 
view, whenever a mental property manifests a power to cause an effect for which it 
is also a difference-maker, its physical realizer manifests the very same power, and 
both deserve the title of being a cause of E. There might even just be two notions of 
causal efficacy – one demanding notion according to which causes must satisfy the 
criteria for difference-making, another less demanding according to which 
manifesting a power to cause E is enough. Both are legitimate notions of causal 
efficacy and can peacefully coexist. Correspondingly, the amendment of the 
Closure principle that Menzies’ endorses is not a major one. While it is false that 
every physical effect has a physical cause in the more demanding sense, it will be 
true that every physical effect has a physical cause in the less demanding sense.172
While I am inclined to think that the criteria for difference-making reveal 
explanatory features of a property, I will not argue against the above interpretation 
of Menzies’ view, nor does it seem to me to pose a serious challenge to the Subset 
view.
On the other hand, Menzies view may be interpreted in a different manner that is 
more troublesome from the perspective of anyone endorsing the Subset view. In 
particular, Menzies may deny that physical realizers have powers to cause effects 
                                               
172 Note that while manifesting a power to cause E is weaker than causing E on the difference-
making account of causation, it is stronger than being causally sufficient for E. On Menzies’ 
account, blinking my eyes is causally sufficient for my hair growing (any world relevantly similar to 
the actual world in which I blink are worlds where my hair grows). However, the event of blinking 
my eyes presumably involves no property that manifests a power to cause the growth of my hair. 
This means that on the interpretation of Menzies’ view proposed here, he could accept the following 
Closure principle: For every physical effect E, there is a physical property P that manifests a power 
to cause E. 
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caused by the mental properties they realize. This would present a more substantial 
disagreement with the Subset view. Now the disagreement would not just be over 
how to classify the properties involved in a case of mental causation, it would be 
over both the metaphysics of mental causation and the realization relation – when a 
mental property manifests a power to cause E, it’s physical realizer does not. 
Hence, standing in the subset relation cannot be necessary for realization. This 
interpretation of Menzies’ view is the more interesting one since it is clearly one 
that the proponent of the Subset view cannot accept. In the following, I will 
consider some reasons for rejecting it. 
6.7 Against Menzies’ Account
Since the latter interpretation of Menzies’ view is incompatible with the Subset 
view, it is in the interest of the proponent of the Subset view to argue against it, or 
at least show that the Subset view presents a more attractive alternative. I see at 
least two potential problems for Menzies’ account. The first is that it leaves mental-
on-physical supervenience unexplained. On the Subset view, the reason why a 
mental property M is always instantiated when its physical realizer P is instantiated 
is that the two properties stand in the subset relation. But this explanation is 
unavailable to Menzies since M has token-powers that P does not. Unless Menzies 
has an alternative account of realization that explains the supervenience, it seems 
that he is forced to posit it as a brute modal fact. This, surely, is an unattractive 
consequence of his view. 
A related worry is that the view sounds very much like a form of emergentism. 
Note that if we accept Menzies’ definition of causal sufficiency, it arguably follows 
from emergentism that there are causally sufficient physical properties for effects 
that are caused by mental properties. Say that P does not realize M but is instead the 
emergence base for M. Since there are strong modal connections between emergent 
properties and their emergence bases, it will plausibly be the case that in possible 
worlds relevantly similar to the actual world in which P is instantiated, the effects 
of M will occur (since M emerges from P in those worlds). On the other hand, 
assuming that M has multiple emergence bases, there will be worlds relevantly 
similar to the actual world in which one of these is instantiated instead of P, and in 
which the effects of M therefore occur. So P is causally sufficient for M’s effects on 
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an emergentist account. This also means that an emergentist can accept the weaker 
closure principle, Closure*. If Menzies’ view is different from emergentism it must 
be because the causal laws in virtue of which M causes certain effects are non-
fundamental. Contrary to the emergentist’s claim, they must ultimately be grounded 
in laws posited by completed physics and if so, must supervene on them. But this 
introduces another modal fact that should be explained. Why is it that whenever we 
have the fundamental physical laws, we are guaranteed to have the causal laws that 
govern the behaviour of mental properties? On the Subset view, since there are no 
causal powers at the level of mental properties not already present at the level of 
their physical realizers, the laws that govern the latter are enough to account for the 
behaviour of the former. Hence, mental causal laws are simply identical to physical 
causal laws and trivially supervene upon them.173 On Menzies’ view, on the other 
hand, it appears to be somewhat of a mystery why there are laws connecting mental 
and physical properties (assuming that Menzies’ does not want to posit these laws 
as fundamental). 
6.8 Concluding Remarks on Menzies’ View
From a physicalist perspective, the Subset view presents a more attractive position 
than the position endorsed by Menzies, since it gives an explanation of why mental 
properties supervene on physical properties. It is worth noting as well that the 
Subset view can take onboard some of the important insights of the difference-
making account of causation. As I mentioned in chapter 4.10, the proportionality 
constraints on causation may be interpreted as locating the more relevant cause, 
from an explanatory perspective, among the candidates. Likewise, Menzies’ 
account of difference-making may be seen as serving the same purpose – in 
ordinary explanatory contexts, citing the property that makes the difference for an 
effect will provide the most useful causal explanation of this effect. And this the 
Subset view can easily allow for. The proponent of the Subset view need not deny 
the importance of difference-making for explanatory purposes.
                                               
173 Again, this is assuming that emergentism about broadly physical properties is false and that any 
causal laws that govern the behaviour of these properties are grounded in fundamental physical laws. 
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6.9 Disambiguating ‘Property’
Let me now turn from Yablo and Menzies’ attempts to solve the Exclusion problem 
by amending the closure principle, to an approach that seeks to solve the problem 
by disambiguating the notion of a property. The approach, developed independently 
by David Robb and Douglas Ehring (in the following I focus on Robb’s solution), is 
based on a trope theory of properties.174 First, I will sketch the trope theory and 
explain why Robb takes it to solve the Exclusion problem. Second, I will present an 
objection against his solution raised by Sophie Gibb and consider a response on 
behalf of Robb. Third and finally, I will extent Gibb’s objection in order to show 
that Robb’s solution is unlikely to work. 
6.10 The Trope Theory 
The Trope theory is a view about the nature of properties and objects.175 As for the 
former, the Trope theory claims that properties are abstract particulars, rather than 
universals. These abstract particulars are called tropes. Being particulars, tropes 
have unique location. For instance, the redness of my shirt is present where my shirt 
is and nowhere else. Objects themselves are typically taken to be bundles of tropes. 
An object o thus has a certain trope, if and only if that trope is part of the bundle of 
tropes that is identical to o. As pointed out in chapter 3.18, the notion of parthood is 
given a specific interpretation by trope theorists as that of compresent parthood. 
Compresent parts occupy the same spatial region. For instance, the redness that is 
part of the bundle of tropes that is identical to my shirt occupies the same spatial 
region as each and every other trope that is a compresent part of this bundle. 
The particularity of tropes raises the question of how trope theorists account for the 
apparent fact that distinct objects may nevertheless be identical in some respect. 
How is it that objects that are wholly distinct may nevertheless be of the same type? 
Typically this is analysed in terms of the sharing of properties – two wholly distinct 
objects are identical in some respect in virtue of sharing at least one property. For 
instance, two distinct square objects are identical with respect to their shape-
property, squareness, which they share. If properties are universals, the identity can 
be taken at face value. Since universals are fully present at each of their instances, 
                                               
174 See Robb [1997] and Ehring [2003].
175 For a comprehensive defence of the position, see Campbell [1990].
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there is some property of each and every square object that is literally the same and 
which all square objects literally share. But since tropes are particulars, there is 
nothing about different square objects that is literally the same, nor can tropes 
literally be shared by distinct objects. Instead, trope theorists tend to analyse the 
apparent identity, or sharing of properties, in terms of resemblance between 
tropes.176 Two square objects are identical in some respect in the sense that they 
each have two resembling square-tropes as compresent parts. Such resembling 
tropes form resemblance-classes and these classes play the role of type-properties in 
a trope ontology. For instance, the class of all exactly resembling square-tropes is 
identical to the type-property square. Different objects are of that type if and only if 
they have a trope as a compresent part that is a member of this class. 
6.11 The Trope Solution to the Exclusion Problem
The presentation of the trope theory reveals an ambiguity in the notion of a 
property. It can either refer to the qualities or features of a particular object, for 
instance the redness of my shirt, in which case ‘property’ refers to a trope. Or, it can 
refer to types of properties, for instance the quality or feature that all red objects 
have in common, in which case ‘property’ refers to a class of resembling tropes.177
Robb proposes to exploit this ambiguity in order to solve the Exclusion problem. 
Consider first the claim that mental and physical properties are distinct 
(Distinctness). What does the word ‘properties’ refer to in this claim – tropes or 
classes of resembling tropes? Recall, Distinctness is motivated by the argument 
from multiple realization which tells us that different individuals may share a 
mental property M without sharing any relevant physical properties. On a trope 
ontology, this is interpreted as the claim that, one, different individuals each have 
distinct M-tropes as compresent parts and that each of these tropes are members of 
M (the class of all resembling M-tropes), and two, that these individuals have no 
relevant physical tropes that are members of the same class of resembling tropes. 
Assuming a trope ontology, the argument from multiple realization thus makes 
claims about the resemblance relations between pairs of tropes had by different 
                                               
176 Resemblance must be taken a primitive here rather than as a relational type, to avoid an infinite 
regress. If resemblance was a relational type, the question arises why certain tropes are members of 
this type. To answer that it is in virtue of resembling would be to introduce a new type with members 
that resemble, and so on.
177 On an account of properties as universals, there is no such distinction to be made. The redness of 
my shirt is the very thing that each red object have in common. 
                                                    
169                                                                                                                             
individuals. There are pairs of M-tropes, each had by some individual, that 
resemble, while there is no pair of relevant physical tropes, each had by one of these 
individuals, that resemble. Note that this blocks reduction at the type-level only. 
Mental type M (i.e. the set of resembling M-tropes) cannot be identical to physical 
type P (i.e. the set of resembling P-tropes), since two individuals can have each 
have a trope that are members of the M-set, without having relevant tropes that are 
members of the same P-set (i.e. a set of resembling physical tropes).
So much for Distinctness. The word ‘properties’ also figure in the claim that mental 
properties are sometimes causes (MC). What does the word refer to here – tropes or 
classes of resembling tropes? According to Robb, it’s the former. As he says: “[…] 
it is hard to see how a class could be causally relevant to producing an effect. Types 
as classes just do not seem like the right sort of entities to do this work.”178 This 
means that MC is the claim that mental tropes are sometimes causes. If tropes, 
rather than classes of tropes, are causally efficacious, this also means that the 
Exclusion principle and the Closure principle should also be formulated in terms of 
tropes. The Exclusion principle would then be the claim that if trope C is a 
sufficient cause of effect E, then all other tropes distinct from C is excluded from 
causing E, and the Closure principle would (roughly) be the claim that for every 
physical effect, there is a physical trope that is a sufficient cause of that effect. 
Now, in the original formulation of the Exclusion problem, MC, Exclusion, and 
Closure, together entail the denial of Distinctness. This is a problem since it seems 
we have good reasons for thinking that Distinctness is true. However, given a trope 
reading of these claims, they entail only that any mental trope is identical to some 
physical trope. And as we just saw, on a trope ontology, Distinctness does not make 
a claim about tropes, but rather about classes of tropes. This dissolves the Exclusion 
problem. The trope theorist can accept that any class of mental tropes is distinct 
from any class of physical tropes, while still insisting that any causally efficacious 
mental trope is identical to some physical trope, thereby securing mental causation 
without compromising Exclusion or Closure. 
                                               
178 Robb [1997], p. 192.
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6.12 The Trope Solution and the Subset View
Prima facie, the trope solution to the Exclusion problem is attractive since it does 
not require us to reject or amend any of the four claims constituting the problem. 
But is it compatible with the Subset view? First, note that the proponent of the 
Subset view can accept the kind of trope ontology sketched above. The Subset view 
would then be that the subset relation holds between pairs of mental and physical 
tropes – that is, the causal profile of any mental trope will form a proper non-empty 
subset of the profile of the physical trope that realizes it. However, according to the 
trope solution, the relation between these two tropes is not realization but identity. 
And this is incompatible with the Subset view since the causal profiles of these two 
tropes will then be identical as well. Of course, accepting a trope ontology does not 
necessarily commit one to accept the trope solution. Nevertheless, if a trope 
ontology is accepted, this makes it less obvious why one should accept the Subset 
view. Recall, in chapter 4 I motivated the Subset view via the four statements of the
Exclusion problem, one of them being the amended version of the Exclusion 
principle. To briefly recap, the motivation had four steps, one for each of these 
statements:
i) Mental properties have powers to cause physical effects (from MC).
ii) These powers are also had by physical properties (from Closure).
iii) These physical properties have additional causal powers, not had by mental 
properties (from Distinctness).
iv) The powers shared by mental and physical properties are identical at both 
the type and token level. That is, the token-powers had by an instance of a 
mental property are numerically identical to token-powers had by some 
instance of a physical property (from the amended Exclusion principle 
which prohibits strong systematic causal overdetermination).
Note, however, that the third step is invalid assuming a trope ontology. On a trope 
ontology, Distinctness between mental and physical types will not show up as 
difference in the causal profiles for these types, for the simple reason that types are 
not the kind of entities to have causal profiles at all. Rather, a difference between 
mental and physical types will show up in a difference between the members of the 
classes that are identical to these types. Thus, the most that can be inferred from the 
                                                    
171                                                                                                                             
argument from multiple realization is that any mental type M (i.e. the class of 
resembling M-tropes) must have at least one member that is not a member of 
physical type P (i.e. the class of resembling P-tropes). This, however, tells us 
nothing about the relation between the causal profiles of mental and physical tropes. 
All we know is that mental tropes have causal powers (from MC), that these powers 
are also had by some physical trope (from Closure), and that these powers are 
identical at both the type and token level (from the amended Exclusion principle). 
Now, all this would be true if mental and physical tropes stand in the subset 
relation. However, it would also be true if mental tropes are identical to physical 
tropes. The problem is that the four statements constituting the Exclusion problem 
gives us no reason to prefer one over the other. 
Of course, the proponent of the Subset view may argue that there are independent 
reasons for preferring the Subset view over the reductionist view entailed by the 
trope solution (reductionist at the level of tropes, not at types, naturally). For one 
thing, it may be that there are reasons to think that a trope ontology is false, in 
which case the trope solution would never even get off the ground. Alternatively, it 
may be possible to extend the original argument from multiple realization to mental 
tropes and argue that a mental trope can be realized by different physical tropes -
the very same mental trope that Jones has when he is in pain could have been 
realized by a different physical trope than it actually is. It might even be the case 
that mental tropes are multiply realized – the mental trope Jones has now and which 
is realized by some physical trope, is the very same mental trope he had a few 
minutes ago where it was realized by a different physical trope.179 Such an 
argument would have to say more about the persistence conditions of tropes, though 
in any case, I think most will agree that the soundness of this version of the 
argument from multiple realization is a lot less intuitive than is the case with the 
original version. Fortunately, there is a more straightforward route to the denial of 
the kind of trope reduction entailed by the trope solution. As I will argue, this kind 
of reduction either won’t work or it will work but probably not in the case of mental 
tropes.
                                               
179 This would not even require that the different realizers of a mental trope are members of different 
resemblance classes – they could all be physical tropes of the same type.
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6.13 Gibb: Trope-identity Entails Type-identity
Let me first present an argument by Sophie Gibb that purports to show that identity 
between tropes entails identity between the resemblance classes of which these 
tropes are members.180 Later I will consider a reply on behalf of Robb that I argue is 
unlikely to work in the case of psychophysical trope reduction. 
Gibb’s argument rests on the assumption that all and only classes of exactly 
resembling tropes play the role played by universals and are genuine types. In other 
words, two tropes T1 and T2 exactly resemble if and only if they are of the same 
type. Hence, if two mental tropes M1 and M2 are of the same type, they must 
exactly resemble each other. According to the trope solution, each of these mental 
tropes is identical to some physical trope.  Say that M1 is identical to P1 and M2 is 
identical to P2. But if two tropes are identical, it should be the case that they enter 
into the same resemblance relations. That is, if M1 exactly resembles M2, then P1 
must exactly resemble M2 (since P1 = M1). And if M2 exactly resembles P1, then 
P2 must exactly resemble P1 as well (since M2 = P2). Given Gibb’s assumption 
that all and only classes of exactly resembling tropes are types, this means that P1 
and P2 are of the same type. And likewise for all the physical tropes that form the 
reduction-base for mental tropes of type M. This, however, is in direct contradiction 
to the argument from multiple realization according to which two individuals can 
share a mental type (i.e. each have a mental trope that is a member of the same 
resemblance class) without sharing any relevant physical type (i.e. among the 
physical tropes had by these two individuals, there are no relevant pair that are 
members of the same resemblance class). What Gibb’s argument shows is that if 
two individuals share a mental type, there is guaranteed to be a relevant physical 
type they both share as well. 
6.14 From Exact to Inexact Resemblance between Tropes of the Same 
Type
Gibb herself considers and rejects a possible rejoinder from the proponent of the 
trope solution. If tropes have aspects, then two tropes may resemble exactly with 
respect to one aspect and not another. In particular, a class of mental tropes may 
                                               
180 Gibb [2003].
                                                    
173                                                                                                                             
resemble each other exactly with respect to their mental aspect and fail to resemble 
exactly with respect to their physical aspect. This would then allow for multiple 
realization since the class of physical tropes that form the reduction base for a 
mental type would have members that fail to resemble exactly with respect to their 
physical aspect and so, fail to form a genuine physical type. Gibb offers two reasons 
for thinking that this presents an unattractive patch on the trope solution. Firstly, 
Gibb does not believe properties are the kind of entities that have aspects. As she 
says: “The claim that there are property aspects seems to be based upon a 
misguided ontology and hence should be rejected”. 181 Secondly, even if properties 
do have aspects, it would not help the proponent of the trope solution since the 
Exclusion problem would then simply reappear at the level of aspects. For any case 
of mental causation, we could ask whether the causally efficacious trope was 
efficacious in virtue of its mental aspect or in virtue of its physical aspect. The 
closure principle pushes us towards going for the latter option, which in turn makes 
the claim that there are mental causes questionable (at least, a mental trope would 
not be causally efficacious in virtue of its mental aspect). So the trope solution is 
untenable whether or not properties have aspects. If they do not, then following 
Gibb’s argument, it seems there can be no multiple realization, which is the prime 
motivation for accepting the distinctness between mental and physical types. If 
properties do have aspects, then the trope solution can allow for multiple 
realization, however the Exclusion problem is simply moved to the level of aspects 
rather than tropes. In either case, it is bad news for the trope solution.
I think more can be said here on behalf of the trope solution, though ultimately I 
agree with Gibb that it does not solve the Exclusion problem. First, we might 
question Gibb’s assumption that only classes of exactly resembling tropes can form
genuine types. Consider trope-reduction applied to determinable tropes. This would 
be the view that any determinable trope is identical to a maximally determinate 
trope. For instance, a certain red-trope is identical to a scarlet-trope, another red-
trope identical to a crimson-trope, another to a pink-trope, etc. The type red would 
then be the class of all scarlet-tropes, plus all crimson-tropes, plus all pink-tropes, 
and so on for all other shades of red. Do the members of this class exactly resemble 
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each other? No. Pink, for instance, does not exactly resemble scarlet. If it did, pink 
and scarlet would not be different shades of red. But to infer from this that this 
precludes red from being genuine type seems too quick. Even if different shades of 
red do not exactly resemble each other, there is still an intuition that they form a 
unity – ‘red’ really does designate a genuine type in nature and scarlet-trope has a 
nature that is closer to that of crimson-trope than, say, a mass-trope.182 The best way 
to make sense of these intuitions is to allow that the tropes forming the type red
resemble each other to a high, though not exact, degree. Of course, some of them 
will exactly resemble each other, namely those tropes that form a maximally 
determinate type, say scarlet. But this is not a necessary requirement for tropes to 
be parts of the class red.
Now, the question is, is this point applicable to mental and physical tropes? That is, 
could it be that a mental type is a class of physical tropes that resemble to a high, 
though not exact, degree? If so, Gibb’s argument for why trope-reduction rules out 
multiple realization fails to go through. This argument relies on the assumption that 
two mental tropes of the same type must exactly resemble each other, which then,
contra the argument from realization, means that the physical tropes to which they 
reduce must exactly resemble each other as well. But if mental tropes do not need to 
exactly resemble each other to be of the same type, then we can allow that different 
mental tropes of the same type reduce to physical tropes that are different types, just 
like two tropes both of the same type red can reduce to tropes that are of different 
types, scarlet and crimson. To answer this question, consider what it takes for one 
thing to resemble another. Resemblance is always with respect to something. For 
instance, two persons may resemble each other with respect to their height or mass 
or hair-colour. Of course, height, mass, and hair-colour are here properties of these 
persons. Two individuals are similar or resemble each other in virtue of sharing at 
least one property. But what if the resemblance is between properties or tropes 
themselves? Of course, different tropes can resemble, in some sense of the word at 
least, with respect to extrinsic relational properties. For instance, the mass-trope and 
the height-trope that are compresent parts of the bundle of tropes that is identical to 
                                               
182 Those with qualms about the reality of colours can substitute with some other determinable
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my body are both in my office as I write this. However, this is not the sense of 
resemblance that is relevant here. As Gibb says: 
[…] resemblance is an internal relation. A trope is a member of a certain 
resemblance class because of what it is. Whether or not two tropes resemble 
each other wholly depends on their particular natures.183
In other words, to the extent that there is a notion of resemblance with respect to 
extrinsic properties, it is not the notion of resemblance the trope theorist has in mind 
when she talks of tropes resembling each other.
6.15 Determination Dimensions and Resemblance between Tropes
To flesh how resemblance depends on the nature of tropes, it is useful introduce a 
framework for properties developed by Eric Funkhouser.184 Properties, Funkhouser 
claims, have determination dimensions. These are variables that individuate the 
property in question. Some properties have just a single determination dimension. 
For instance, mass is determined by a mass unit and nothing else – if two mass-
tropes have the same value of mass unit (say 1 kilogram), then they are exactly the 
same mass. Or given a trope ontology, they resemble exactly. There is simply no 
further question of whether or not these two mass-tropes are the same since there is 
no further dimension along which they can differ. Other properties have more than 
one determination dimension. For instance, colours are plausibly individuated along 
three dimensions – hue, saturation, and brightness. If two tropes have exactly the 
same values of hue, saturation, and brightness, then they are exactly the same 
colour, or they resemble exactly. Funkhouser illustrates this mathematically as 
points in an n-dimensional space.185 In the case of mass, the space is 1-dimensional. 
There is but a single axis and every point on that axis corresponds to a class of 
exactly resembling mass-tropes, for instance the class of all one kilogram-tropes. In 
the case of colour, the space is 3-dimensional and every point in that 3-dimensional 
space corresponds to a class of exactly resembling colour-tropes, for instance the 
class of all scarlet-tropes. Are all types represented as a point in the relevant 
property-space? If the answer is yes, Gibb would be right that only classes of 
exactly resembling tropes are genuine types. But we can now see how this leaves no 
                                               
183 Gibb [2003], pp. 470-471.
184 In Funkhouser [2006].
185 Funkhouser [2006], pp. 554-555.
                                                    
176                                                                                                                             
room for less than maximally determinate types. For instance, the determinable type 
red cannot be represented as a point in property-space for colour, since the 
determination dimensions for the members of this class do not take the same values 
– a scarlet-trope and a crimson-trope will both be members of the type red, yet their 
determination dimensions take slightly different values, and so, each of these tropes 
will be represented as different points in the property-space. Instead, determinable 
types will be extended over an area of the relevant property-space. Within this area 
will be the points that correspond to all determinates of the determinable type. A 
trope T is thus a member of all the types that are represented as areas of the relevant 
property-space that includes the point that represents the class of exactly resembling 
T-tropes.
Given Funkhouser’s framework for properties, we can see more clearly how 
resemblance between tropes depends on their nature. The nature of a trope is the 
value of its determination dimensions. Two tropes exactly resemble each other if 
they have the same determination dimensions and those dimensions have the exact 
same value. They resemble to a relatively high, though not exact, degree if they 
have the same determination dimensions and those dimensions take very similar, 
though not exactly the same, values. They resemble to a relatively low degree if 
they have the same determination dimensions and those dimensions take very 
different values. What about tropes that have no common determination 
dimensions? It seems to me the best thing to say is that their degree of resemble is 
zero. For instance, a scarlet-trope resembles a mass-trope as much as it resembles a 
height-trope or a pitch-trope – i.e. not at all. As I mentioned earlier, resemblance is 
always with respect to something. Resemblance between objects, for instance, is 
with respect to properties. In the case of tropes, resembles is with respect to their 
determination dimensions, with the degree of resemblance determined by the value 
of these. So for tropes with no common determination dimensions, there is nothing 
internal with respect to which they can resemble each other. And this seems right. It 
is difficult to make sense of the claim that a scarlet-trope could resemble a mass-
trope or a height-trope. 
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6.16 Determination Dimensions and Psychophysical Trope-Reduction
So what does this have to do with the proposal that mental types are classes of 
inexactly resembling tropes? Well, consider again the claim that mental trope M1 is 
identical to physical trope P1, that mental trope M2 is identical to physical trope P2, 
and that M1 and M2 are of the same mental type. Gibb’s argument was that since 
M1 and M2 must exactly resemble, this means that, necessarily, P1 and P2 must 
exactly resemble as well, and this is what the argument from multiple realization 
rules out. But this seems too strong since M1 and M2 might inexactly resemble 
while still being of the same type. What the discussion above shows, however, is 
that if M1 and M2 resemble at all, it is with respect to their determination 
dimensions. And since P1 and P2 are identical to M1 and M2, respectively, this 
means that P1 and P2 must resemble with respect to those same determination 
dimensions. In other words, trope-reduction is possible only if the reduced trope 
and the trope it reduces to have the same determination dimensions. This is the case 
for determinable tropes and their corresponding determinates. For instance, scarlet-
tropes and red-tropes are all individuated with respect to hue, saturation, and 
brightness. This is what allows for the fact that a particular scarlet-trope can be a 
member of several resemblance classes – it is a member of the resemblance class 
represented by a point in the property-space for colour (this is the resemblance class 
for which the members exactly resemble and which is identical to the type scarlet) 
and it is also a member of the resemblance class represented by an extended area of 
the property-space which includes this point (this is a resemblance class for which 
the members inexactly resemble, for instance the type red). But is this also the case 
for mental and physical tropes? 
Unfortunately, there are good reasons for thinking that the answer to this question is 
negative: Mental and physical tropes do arguably not have the same determination 
dimension. For instance, the determination dimensions for pain are plausibly 
sharpness and intensity and Funkhouser proposes that the determination dimensions 
for the intentional property believing that P are the content of P and the degree of 
confidence with which one holds it.186 But whatever the determination dimensions 
are for the physical tropes that could plausibly function as a reduction base for such 
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mental tropes, they will almost certainly not include those determination 
dimensions. This is revealed by the plausibility of even maximally determinate 
mental types being multiply realizable. Say that the determination dimensions for 
pain are indeed sharpness and intensity and that two individuals each have a pain-
trope with the exact same values of these dimensions. This means they exactly 
resemble and now we can run Gibb’s original argument against the trope solution. 
Since the two mental tropes exactly resemble each other, the physical tropes to 
which they reduce must necessarily exactly resemble each other as well. But this 
seems unlikely. Surely it is possible for two individuals to have a pain with the 
exact same sharpness and intensity and nevertheless fail to share any relevant 
physical properties?187
6.17 Concluding Remarks on the Trope Solution
If mental and physical tropes do not have the same determination dimensions, 
psychophysical trope-reduction is blocked and the trope solution to the Exclusion 
problem fails. Note how this once again tips the scale in favour of the Subset view. 
If Distinctness applies not only to mental and physical types but also to mental and 
physical tropes, then the difference between mental and physical tropes must reveal 
itself somehow. Assuming a causal theory of properties, this must be in the form of 
a difference in the causal profiles of mental and physical tropes. And now we can 
get from the statements of the Exclusion problem to the Subset view: All powers 
contained in the profile of any mental trope must be identical to powers contained 
in the profile of some physical property (from Closure). This means that the profile 
of this physical property must contain additional causal powers (from Distinctness). 
And the powers which the mental and the physical property share must be identical 
at both the type and token level (from the amended Exclusion principle).  This is the 
Subset view.
                                               
187 Funkhouser [2006], p. 565. A similar point is made by Ehring in his [1996], pp. 472-473. 
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have defended and motivated a non-reductive view of mental 
properties which allows for their causal efficacy in world that is fundamentally 
physical. Mental causation fits in because it is physical causation. Every time a 
mental property manifests a power to cause an action, the very same power is 
manifested by a physical property. This has two advantages. Not only does it allow 
for the causal closure of the physical domain, it also explains why there is such an 
intimate connection between mental and physical properties – a mental property and 
its physical realizer are so intimately connected because the latter share all the 
causal powers of the former. This is fully compatible with mental properties having 
a multitude of distinct physical realizers. While any realizer of a mental property M
must have all the powers of M, different physical realizers can be distinguished by 
whatever additional powers they have. 
It is worth stressing again, however, that the Subset view does not present an ad hoc
solution to the Exclusion problem. The claim is not that the Subset view should be 
accepted because it happens to solve the Exclusion problem. Such a claim gets the 
order of explanation the wrong way around. Rather, the Subset view follows from 
the statements that make up the Exclusion problem – statements that are 
individually motivated, independently of the Subset view. The amended Exclusion 
principle that allows for weak overdetermination plays a crucial role here. If the 
original Exclusion principle was amended to allow for weak overdetermination on 
the sole basis that this would open the door to the Subset view, then I think we 
should worry that the view presents an ad hoc solution to the Exclusion problem. 
However, as I argued, this is not the case. We have reasons to think that some 
effects are systematically and weakly overdetermined that are entirely independent 
of any motivation for the Subset view. This I consider a strong point in favour of 
accepting the Subset view.  
In a certain sense, the Subset view is a reductive view. It holds that mental causal 
powers are identical to physical causal powers. For philosophers attracted to 
physicalism, this should be embraced. If genuine non-reductive physicalism is 
committed to the existence of irreducible mental causal powers, then I have doubts 
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that the position is a coherent one. Rather, the closest we get to non-reductive 
physicalism is emergentism. So the fact that the Subset identifies instances of 
mental causation with instances of physical causation is no strike against it. If we 
take the truth of physicalism seriously, this is to be expected. What matters is that 
the Subset view does not identify mental causes with physical causes. Mental 
properties are properties in their own right with distinctive causal profiles not found 
at physical level. This, I think, is all a non-reductive physicalist can hope and wish 
for.
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